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Abstract 
In  Pakistan,  educational  institutions  function  in  parallel  under  three  separate  
systems: public, private and madrassas. The incidents of 9/11 brought madrassas into 
the limelight and they emerged as the most controversial educational institutions of 
Pakistan.  International scholarship is polarized on the madrassa issue and presents 
two opposing pictures about these institutes.  For  some,  madrassas  are  the  cause  of  
radical  ideology  and  militancy,  while  for others they are a source of free education 
for the underprivileged. This research compares the attitudes  of  students  attending  
madrassas  with  those  of  students  attending  other  types  of school. A comparison 
of the world view of students coming from different schooling systems was  made  
concerning  socio-political  and  educational  issues  including  an  examination  of 
attitudes towards jihad and Islamic militancy.   
  
It  is  argued  that  students  educated  under  different  systems  have  divergent 
ideologies  about the primary purpose of education, sectarian diversity, the status of 
women and non-Muslims in  Pakistan  and,  most  importantly,  Islamic  militancy. To  
determine  the  worldview  of students  about  the  aforesaid  issues,  both  quantitative  
and  qualitative  approaches  were  used. The  data  were  collected  from  the  
students  of  private  and  public  schools  and  madrassas  in South Punjab (N=500). It 
is argued that madrassas are stratified with some being more liberal than others. The 
questionnaire and interview tool used in the study attempted to find out the students‘ 
responses on armed Jihad, sectarian divide, the status of women, the position of non-
Muslims in Pakistan and about the purpose of education.  The analysis illustrated the  
ways  in  which  Pakistani  society  is  polarized  along  socio-economic  lines  and  
how  different types of schooling are associated with distinct world views.   
  
The  results  indicate  that  the  students  from  madrassas  are  somewhat  more 
aggressive  and intolerant  towards  the  religious  minorities  and  women  than  the  
students  of  English  medium and  Urdu  medium  public  schools.  They  are  also  
less  tolerant  towards  people  of  other  sects and  are  more  susceptible  to  sectarian  
prejudices  than  their  counterparts  in  the  English medium and Urdu medium 
schools. In the same vein, the students from madrassas are more supportive  of  
militancy  and  jihadist  activities  than  their  counterparts. In this regard, the students 
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from Shia and Brailvi madrassas are comparatively less inclined towards the Jihadi 
notion than that of Ahle Hadith, Deaoband and Jamaat-e-Islami madrassas. 
  
While most previous studies of madrassas have presented them as homogeneous 
institutions, this  study  highlights  the  extent  to  which  they  are  internally  
stratified  and  shows  that  the students  studying  in  these  schools  have  
contradictory  viewpoints  with  respect  to  certain socio-political and religious 
issues. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Rationale and Scope: 
The proliferation of madrassas or religious seminaries in the Muslim World in general 
and in Pakistan in particular has been noted with much concern in the wake of the 
terrorist attacks of 11September 2001. The perceived connection between radical 
Islamic education and militant behaviour against Western interests, has led 
development agencies and governments to focus their resources on educational 
reform. 
 
However, there is scant empirical research grounded in rigorous social science that 
determines the attitude of students studying in madrassas/ religious seminaries of 
Pakistan. While the topic has received widespread media coverage and has been 
discussed within the broader context of radical Islamization, 'evidence' of a link has 
tended to be derived from observational accounts and anecdotes that range from 
strongly positive to vehemently negative. There are many writings defending the 
existence of madrassas in the wake of state‘s design to check their growth and 
secularize them. Mostly these writings are in Urdu whether in the forms of books, 
pamphlets or essays in various madrassa‘ magazines etc. At the same time, an absence 
of serious literature suggesting that these institutes are ‗nurseries of sedition‘, 
‗factories of fundamentalism‘ and ‗hot beds of terrorism‘.  Interpretations of the role 
of madrassas are varied, ranging from positive accounts of their educational 
contribution, to those that link them to extremism. Akbar S. Ahmad (2002: p, 39) 
regards madrassas to be a ‗cheaper, more accessible and more Islamic alternative to 
education.‘ Singer (2001) calls them a ‗displacement of the public education system.‘  
The New York Times Magazine (Goldberg, 2000) has described the madrassa system 
as ‗education of the holy warrior‘, even before the incident of 9/11/2001. Andrew 
Coulson (2004: p, 2) refers to madrassas as ‗weapons of mass instruction.‘ Most 
 
 
2 
 
consequentially, the 9/11 Commission report (2004: p, 367) refers to madrassas as 
‗incubators of violent extremism.‘ 
 
Recently there have also been revisionist accounts of madrassa prevalence that 
question the sensationalism of some media reports. In an opinion article for the New 
York Times (14 June 2005), Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey have referred to concern 
over madrassas as a ‗myth‘. This assertion is based on a study on the background of 
seventy-five terrorists behind major attacks on Western targets and concluded that 
only nine attended madrassas. Similarly, ethno-conflict psychologist Marc Sageman 
(2004) suggests that the roots of conflict are not to be found in madrassas since only 
17 per cent of his study sample of terrorists had madrassa linkage. Focusing 
particularly on Pakistan, Zahab and Roy (2004) came up with more or less same 
conclusion but laid the blame on the government for distorting education through 
State-run schools and curricula. The travel-writer and historian William Dalrymple 
(2005) has also taken exception to sensationalism about madrassas and provided a 
more humane and nuanced account of madrassas in South Asia, particularly those in 
India that have been far more moderate. However, none of these scholarly works 
focus on the study of attitudes of students attending madrassas that this study attempts 
to make.  
 
Most of the studies on religious seminaries have taken madrassas as monolithic 
institution; this is not the case. In Pakistan, for example, there are five distinct types of 
madrassas, divided along sectarian and political lines. Some sects are more orthodox 
and may have been radicalised by their exposure to so-called jihad in Afghanistan and 
Kashmir (Ali, 2009). Ali was of the view that most of the foot soldiers for Jihad and 
sectarian violence are provided by the madrassas and unequivocally took the stance 
that usually, their core leadership and masterminds are not graduates from madrassas 
rather, in some instances, they are well educated and have expertise in certain socio-
political and even scientific fields. He further adds, though majority of the madrassas 
do not act as recruiting centres of Islamic militants, the students these seminaries 
produce carry a very narrow outlook for non-Muslims and modern ideals. This study 
is determined to find out how the attitude of madrassa students is different from that 
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of students in mainstream education systems (Public and Private schools). The study 
also intends to look at the viewpoint of students about the primary purpose of 
education. What educational priorities do these students have? Do they see any role of 
education in promoting social equality and economic progress, do they consider 
education as a mean to promote individual freedom, do they feel that schools should 
promote the shared values of Pakistani society, what is their take on the position of 
non-Muslims in Pakistani society, what do they think about equality between men and 
women and so on. Most importantly, the study aims to find out what the students from 
diverse types of schools think about militancy and tolerance towards people of diverse 
sects and minorities. Along with making a comparison of madrassa students and 
mainstream educational institutes‘ students regarding their socio-political outlook, 
this study also aims to take forward a comparative analysis of students of different 
types of madrassas with respect to their worldview about the aforesaid socio-political 
and educational issues. It deliberates upon whether or not, the students from all 
madrassas cheer the concept of armed Jihad and carry intolerant views towards 
minorities of Pakistan. 
 
In contemporary Pakistan, there are three different educational systems working in 
parallel; state run education system, private schools and Madrassas (religious 
seminaries). Elite private English medium schools which are also known as ‗A-type‘ 
private schools have a disproportionately high representation in bureaucracy, 
businesses, and state offices while madrassa students are the most marginalised 
sections of the society and hardly have any representation in public and private job 
sector (Rahman, 2005). These three educational systems are products of totally 
different historical evolutionary processes. They have different textbooks, different 
methods of learning, different discourses they are exposed to inside and outside 
school, and even their familial background (social class) are so different from each 
other that it might be the cause of polarization in Pakistani society (Rahman, 2004). 
According to Rahman, what is really alarming, and relatively less known, is the fact 
that the students of these institutions (the vernacular/Urdu-medium schools, English-
medium schools and madrassas) have such different opinions as to live in different 
worlds (ibid, 2005). This study is to look at certain socio-political and educational 
issues from the viewpoint of students coming from these different types of schooling 
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systems. The study will contend, whether or not, owing to these differences, students 
which pass through these systems have divergent ideologies about education such as 
what do think what education is for, do they think education‘s primary purpose is to 
prepare students for work and employment, education is to promote economic 
equality and social justice, education‘s aim is to encourage understanding between 
men and women, schools are to promote shared values of Pakistani society, should the 
students have their due share in the decision making process about them in the schools 
and so on and so forth. The research will also look at whether the worldview of all 
students, irrespective of their school type, is identical on women rights, status of non-
Muslims, sectarian divide, armed Jihad. Along with it, the study has also included a 
psychometric scale to gauge that to what extent the students believe that they can 
control events that affect them. The psychometric scale named ‗locus of control‘ 
refers to the perception of individuals about daily life happenings associated with 
them; for example those individuals who believe that events in their life are derived 
primarily from their own actions have high internal locus of control and those who 
attribute the outcomes of their actions to luck or chance have high external locus of 
control. In addition, the study will also try to clarify how Pakistani society is polarised 
along socio-economic lines and this polarisation limits the choice of parents in the 
selection of type of schools, they chose to educate their children. In order to 
understand these different institutions and their products, this study is to give a 
historical overview of the development of these diverse educational institutions in 
British India and to describe how these institutions expanded in the post-
independence era. The study is to argue briefly about the differences in curriculum, 
pedagogical style and discipline techniques being practiced in these schools.  
 
Making Choices 
Pakistani economy is now speedily converting into knowledge economy. At all levels 
parents are spending funds to provide quality education to their children. The demand 
for high quality schooling is generally strong across communities in Pakistan, and that 
parents are willing to pay a high price if necessary to send their children to a decent 
school. According to Learning and Educational Achievements in Punjab Schools 
(LEAPS) survey (2007), households have emerged as significant investors in their 
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children‘s education. Out-of-pocket spending by households on children‘s education 
is higher than ever before. More than one-half of children‘s educational expenditures 
are now borne by parents. Even though government schooling is almost a free option, 
yet low-income parents are spending substantially on their children‘s education, both 
by enrolling their children in B-type
1
 private schools and spending on additional 
educational investments beyond school fees (ibid, 2007). Those parents who cannot 
afford their children‘s education send their children to madrassa. Even this decision of 
parents is a compromised one because these children can be bread winners for whole 
family.
2
 Relatively, this shows progressive thinking in the marginalised groups who 
expect that their children would be able to read and write if they sacrificed the meagre 
income earned by these children and encouraged them to attend the Madrassa. 
 
The children who attend madrassas usually come from marginalised social groups 
who spend their life below the poverty line.  The state run education system is in a 
state of disarray and decay (Rahman, 2004) which has hardly any attraction for the 
parents to send their children for quality education. Madrassa is a place where 
students get the boarding and lodging in addition to religious education free of charge. 
The parents who cannot afford the tuition fee of the private schools are constrained to 
look for Madrassa as an option where along with education; their children can get 
food and clothing. As a result, poor parents increasingly, see madrassas or religious 
seminaries as the preferred institutions of learning for their children (ibid, 2004). Ali 
(2009) during his visit to some madrassas in Islamabad learnt that poverty was not the 
only driver for madrassa education, for many parents it was discipline and for others 
simply a matter of religious commitment.  Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, author of several 
articles on the state of education in Pakistan, stated the following when asked if 
Pakistani society at large views madrassa education favourably: 
―The poorest will certainly approve, but the middle class overwhelmingly 
disapproves. They know the kid won't get a job except as a mullah (prayer leader). Of 
                                                          
1
 Private non-elitist so-called English medium schools.  
2
 Child labour is not uncommon in poor sections of Pakistan society. According to Awan et al. (2011) 
the   parents   of   child   labourers   are   often   unemployed   or underemployed, desperate for secure 
employment and income. 
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course, even among the rich you have some parents sending kids to madrassas but 
they lie on the fringe‖ (Dr. Hoodbhoy, personal communication, September 2009)3.   
 
Rahman (2004) provides an overview of the income distribution of students‘ fathers 
in the three types of schools in the appendices part of his book. The data gathered by 
Rahman for his study shows that more than three quarters of the students in madrassas 
come from extremely poor background and their fathers‘ monthly income is less than 
5000 rupees (approximately US$ 80). According to his study, the majority of students 
who attend Urdu medium schools also belong to this income group. While on the 
other hand, there was not a single student from A-type private English medium 
schools in Rahman‘s study that belonged to this income group. In another study of 
madrassas, Hussain (1994), found that 49% of the students from a madrassa stated 
that the reason that they attended the madrassa and not a different type of school was 
their parents‘ income level and only 5% of them attend madrassas on account of 
religious reasons. Ahmar (2007) in his essay: ‗Neoliberalism and Madrassas: An 
Unholy Connection‘ has also tried to establish the argument that children from poor 
families attend madrassas because other options are too expensive for them to afford. 
The results from the aforesaid studies support the stance that the parents of madrassa 
students opt to send their children in madrassas because economically it is a viable 
option for them, the argument that has been negated by Winthrop and Graff (2010) in 
their report: Beyond madrassa: Assessing the link between education and militancy in 
Pakistan. They are of the view that though lower-income households are slightly more 
likely to send their children to a madrassa than to another type of school, but the 
relationship is weak. They further added, although madrassas tend to be free of charge 
but the families tend to use them because they prefer a religious education for their 
children, rather than for their affordability (Winthrop and Graff, 2010). There are 
contradictory findings with regard to the argument what compel parents to send their 
children to madrassas instead of other type of schools. 
 
Like the report of Winthrop and Graff, (2010), there are some other studies as well 
which suggest that the families that do choose to send their children full-time to 
                                                          
3
 Shahid (2010) interviewed Hoodbhoy in 2009 for her thesis. 
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madrassas often do so not out of necessity but preference. According to Nelson (2006) 
the society of Pakistan might have turned into an Islamic radical society and 
contemporary Pakistani parents favour a religious education as opposed to a secular 
one. This trend has acted as an obstacle toward educational reform. Reformers find 
themselves confronted with a broad range of complex issues concerning the nature of 
local demands (ibid, 2006). The demand Nelson (2006) referred to is the increased 
preference for religious education among Pakistani parents. Confusion and challenge 
faced thus far with respect to educational demand resides in the value placed on 
religious education in general and madrassas in particular. The findings derived from 
the interviews of a representative sample of families in Rawalpindi; a twin city of 
Islamabad, demonstrated that nearly half the families interviewed cited religious 
education as their ―top educational priority.‖ Approximately, 60 per cent said they 
would not be satisfied if their children were not offered the possibility of attending a 
madrassa, even if ―madrassa graduates suffer from unemployment.‖ This finding is 
supported by the results of survey conducted by British Council Pakistan (2009) 
showing that overwhelming majority of current generation of Pakistani students 
shares its parents‘ religious beliefs, barring the fact that a sizeable proportion of them 
do not see eye-to-eye with their parents on social and political issues.  
 
The importance of a religious education for instilling good morals and proper ethics is 
often cited by parents. In the words of one mother, ―Islam is a good religion, and we 
want our children to benefit from all it offers. It is only certain interpretations that 
give it a bad name‖ (Winthrop and Graff, 2010). The data from the LEAPS study 
show that the majority of families that send a child to a madrassa also send their other 
children to other types of schools, either government-run or private. This suggests that 
it is not income that solely drives the choice of sending a child to a madrassa indeed, 
madrassas have, comparatively, a higher proportion of wealthy students than do 
public schools—but also a strategic choice to diversify children‘s employment 
potential. After all, the traditional career path for a madrassa graduate becoming a 
Koranic scholar or Islamic political party leader confers status on the family and can 
often not be achieved through either public or private school routes (Winthrop and 
Graff, 2010). The financially weak background of parents directly influences the 
career path of their children who have no say in choice of their career. The children 
 
 
8 
 
who attend the madrassa get opportunity to attend the private arranged religious 
congregation such as Koran Khawani (recitation of Koran) or Meelad (celebration of 
prophet‘s birth) in houses of rich people. During these visits some of the Madrassa 
students get chance to secure some job or private Koranic teaching tuition. In 
addition, these children after completion of their education at madrassa get 
opportunity to act as Imam/mulla (Prayer leader) in local mosques, in local colonies in 
Pakistan. Even though madrassa graduates occupy hardly any reasonable position in 
terms of job (Rahman, 2004), yet for some parents from lower social strata, economic 
motivation for the enrolment in madrassas can be a reason not to ignore. One of the 
key questions therefore is, can the school produce militant/fundamentalist attitudes 
and values if these run counter to those in the family, or do the two have to work in 
harmony. Here I argue that certain types of madrassas are associated with 
fundamentalist values, but only among a certain proportion of its students who tend to 
be drawn from certain types of families. 
  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis has been structured in seven chapters followed by references and 
appendices. Chapter one deals with the rationale and scope of the study, research 
questions, theoretical framework and structure of the dissertation. 
 
Chapter Two deliberates upon the Education system of Pakistan. In this chapter 
different types of educational systems running parallel in Pakistan came under 
discussion. In addition, this chapter gives a historical overview of the development of 
educational institutions in British India and describes how these educational institutes 
are situated in contemporary Pakistan. The chapter then talks about the research 
context and gives few details of the research site.  
 
Chapter Three gives a detailed account of madrassa phenomenon. It talks about the 
genesis of madrassas in the Muslim world and their introduction in the sub-continent 
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and then madrassa legacy in post-independence Pakistan. The organisation and 
curriculum of madrassas also come under discussion in this chapter. 
 
Chapter Four describes the research methodology, research design (instrumentation 
and variables), participants and sampling method, potential ethical issues, data 
collection and data analysis techniques. 
 
Chapter Five presents the findings generated from the data analysis in relation to the 
existing literature of the field followed by chapter Six where a thorough discussion on 
these findings takes place along with an attempt has been made to answer the research 
questions. 
 
The 7th chapter of the thesis concludes the research results is presented followed by a 
note on the limitation of the study and suggestions for the potential research 
possibilities on the topic. In addition, this chapter describes how does this thesis 
contributes to knowledge and what new additions have been made in the existing 
literature. In the end it gives recommendations on policy and pedagogy.   
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Chapter 2 
The Education System in Pakistan 
Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged that education is amongst the single most important factor 
contributing to poverty alleviation. Increasing educational attainment is likely to 
reduce conflict risk, especially in countries like Pakistan that have very low levels of 
primary and secondary school enrolment. And in this regard, education quality, 
relevance and content have a vital role to play in mitigating violence (Winthrop and 
Graff, 2010, p1). Education also plays an overarching role and has a cross cutting 
impact on all aspects of human life. It has always been considered as one of the vital 
factors for socioeconomic and subsequently the national development because of its 
ability to raise the quality and productivity of human capital (De Silva, 1997). 
Education also creates awareness, tolerance, self esteem and confidence, which 
empower people to defend their rights, reduce poverty and inequality and improve in 
health, status and good governance in implementation of socio economic policies
4
. It 
also enables the people to protect their ideological inspiration and help in developing 
national cohesion
5
. In case of Pakistan, there is hardly any convincing evidence to 
suggest that the country‘s education system has contributed to the development of a 
knowledge based economy (Kardar, 1998).  However, so far as the question of 
ideological inspiration and national integration through education is concerned it has 
been the prime objective of policy makers in Pakistan since its very inception 
(Jaffrelot, 2002). In order to meet the end of ‗Pakistani Nationalism‘ language and 
religion were used explicitly to promote national cohesion. That is why the state 
declared the study of Urdu, Islamic studies and Pakistan studies compulsory not only 
in government funded schools but also in all private schools through-out the country. 
Paradoxically, while the state seeks to use education to promote national cohesion, the 
multilayered educational system may in fact be causing polarization in Pakistani 
society (Rahman, 2004). In the same vein, in a recent report of standing committee on 
Education, Health and Environment (2010) serious concerns were expressed by the 
                                                          
4
 Pakistan Economic Survey 2007-2008 (p169) 
5
 National Report of Pakistan (2004) 
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members about the ongoing diverse and unequal schooling system in the country. The 
report says: 
 
It is unfortunate that we see a multilayered educational system in Pakistan, which is 
harmful to national integrity and national cohesion and is catering to division and 
divide. There are many systems working here in Pakistan resulting not in synergy but 
in social division and conflict. Students coming out of English medium schools 
especially from good private sector school, get the best paid jobs in the country where 
as those passing out from Urdu medium schools  are usually destined to work in 
clerical or other lower levels positions. Religious madrassa students turnout yet 
another class who are usually unaware of the world outside  their own, with their 
strong sectarian bias and little or no training in modern disciplines. They are usually 
ill-equipped to interact meaningfully with the larger society and are also monumental 
at times in spreading sectarianism
6
. 
 
Kinds of Schools in Pakistan 
The coming paragraphs of the chapter will deal with the major types of schools in 
Pakistan. These can broadly be categorised as Urdu language-medium schools, 
English language-medium schools and madrassas (Islamic seminaries). In most of the 
cases but not all, Urdu medium schools and vernacular language-medium schools (I 
have briefly discussed vernacular language-medium schools under the heading of 
Urdu medium schools) are government funded as opposed to English medium schools 
and madrassas. No doubt there are some madrassas which are totally government 
funded and many English medium schools that get their funding from the government 
but by and large the reality is other way round. According to Rahman (2004) these 
schools are divided not only according to the medium of instruction and curriculum 
but also on the socio-economic basis
7
. English language-medium schools cater for the 
middle, upper-middle and upper classes, and the Urdu language-medium schools are 
aimed at the lower-middle and working classes while the madrassas provide education 
                                                          
6
 The report was presented in the parliament on25th of May 2010 by the chairperson of the Standing 
Committee Ms. Ayesha Bilal. 
7
 The data on the family income of students come from a small survey of 230 students undertaken in 
December 2002 and January 2003. 
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for poor, marginalized or very religious people. Indeed patterns of expenditure by the 
state can effectively perpetuate class divisions in Pakistan. On the basis of the results 
of his survey of 618 students and 243 teachers carried out from December 2002 to 
June 2003 in Urdu-medium schools, English-medium schools (including private 
institutions and cadet colleges), and Sunni madrassas Tariq Rahman (2004) came up 
with a conclusion that the world view of the students of these institutions, especially 
the madrassas and private English language-medium schools, is so polarized on issues 
of militancy (regarding Kashmir) and tolerance (of religious minorities and women) 
that they seem to inhabit different, and violently opposed, worlds. In the future, this 
may be a source of social instability, internal conﬂict and violence in Pakistan that is 
detrimental to national integration the so called objective of education (Rahman, 
2004). 
 
Urdu Medium Schools 
As Urdu was a symbol of Muslim identity during the Urdu-Hindi controversy period 
in pre-partition India, so it had an established political significance in the eyes of the 
Muslim League which fought for the creation of Pakistan and started ruling the 
country since its birth in 1947. At the time of its birth, United Pakistan
8
; a 
multilingual country was comprised of 55.6 per cent Bengali speaking population. 
The ruling elite; Muslim League politicians, bureaucracy and the military that was 
dominated by Punjabi and Urdu speaking coalition felt threatened by the mere fact of 
Bengali majority. To neutralize this possible domination by East Bengal, it might 
have made sense to the ruling elite to fall back on Urdu as a unifying symbol of the 
state (Rahman, 2002). However, whatever the underlying political motives of the 
West Pakistani elite might be, there is no doubt that most of the people in West 
Pakistan particularly the dominant intelligentsia, sincerely felt that it would be in the 
national interest to integrate the new nation and that Urdu could do that job better than 
any other language. With this in mind the teaching of Urdu was promoted as part of 
the overall political imperative of the national integration. 
 
                                                          
8
 I used the term United Pakistan for the country which was comprised of West Pakistan (present 
Pakistan) and East Pakistan (present Bangladesh) before 1971. 
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The first educational conference was held from 27
th
 of November till 1
st
 of December 
1947 at Karachi. The cardinal points regarding language policy of this conference 
were to make Urdu ‗the lingua franca of Pakistan‘ and to teach it as ‗a compulsory 
language‘ (PEC 1948: 39). While the conference did not declare it as the medium of 
instruction in schools, the situation was that it was being used as such in Punjab, 
NWFP (North Western Frontier Province), Balochistan and in many parts of Kashmir. 
In Sind alone, out of the provinces of present-day Pakistan, Sindhi was the medium of 
instruction for most schools. However in the later years, the National Commission on 
Education made Urdu language as a medium of instruction in the schools of West 
Pakistan (present Pakistan). The report said: 
We are firmly convinced that for the sake of our national unity we must do everything 
to promote the linguistic cohesion of West Pakistan by developing the national 
language, Urdu, to the fullest extent. In the areas of the Punjab, Bahawalpur and 
Balochistan, Urdu is already medium of instruction at primary stage, and this 
arrangement should continue.‖ (Edn. Com. 1959: Chapter 21, paragraph 14, p.292). 
 
Most of the non-elitist government schools use Urdu as medium of instruction in the 
Punjab, Khyber Pakhtoon Khwa (KPK formerly NWFP), Balochistan, Azad Kashmir 
(AK), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Federally Administered 
Northern Areas (FANA) and urban parts of Sind. The Urdu medium schools are the 
largest in number and most representative schools for the ordinary people of Pakistan 
(Rahman, 2004. p25). As for the vernacular-medium schools, the Pashtu-medium 
ones run only up to class-5, after which students go to Urdu medium schools. The 
Sindhi-medium schools operate only in parts of the Sind. All of the non-elitist 
government schools of Southern Punjab that I selected for my research project are 
Urdu medium schools. These schools have just one section of able students who are 
taught Science subjects in English. By and large, these schools are Urdu language 
medium schools. 
 
According to Rahman (2004), majority of the students and teachers of Urdu and 
vernacular medium schools come from lower-middle class. I undertook a small survey 
of 80 students from Urdu-medium schools in South Punjab in the year 2010. It was 
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discovered that they belong to poor sections of society. Unlike Rahman‘s survey, 
students were not directly asked about their family income; rather various indicators 
were used to have knowledge about their social status. Its detail will come in the 
subsequent chapters. 
 
After ten years of schooling, students appear in the exam of matriculation held by 
different Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education in the country. In most of 
the cases teaching and examinations are in Urdu and in some cases in English. 
However, in interior Sind (also called rural Sind) exams are held in Sindhi.  
 
Schools are not accessible to all children; they are often too far from where the 
children live. Therefore, children have to spend a considerable amount of time, energy 
and money to get to the school daily (Rahman, 2004). According to Pakistan 
Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) of 2001-2002, most of the students travel less 
than 2kms and a few even travel more than 5kms to their schools. However, girls have 
to travel long distances in Baluchistan, Sindh and some parts of South Punjab. 
 
Government funded Urdu-medium schools are generally dull, stringent places, often 
painted a dirty yellow with blue doors and windows and doors with broken glass 
panes (Rahman, 2004). In some instances there are no school buildings at all. Students 
get their daily lessons under the shade of trees. Often, such kind of schools are highly 
regimented with semi-educated teachers, forcing their pupils to memorise passages 
out of poorly written, poorly printed and extremely dull books (ibid). According to 
PIHS (2001-2002) on average classrooms are overcrowded with forty one girls and 
thirty eight boys per teacher at primary level. 
 
Text books are one of the many influences on a pupil‘s worldview. How significant 
the influence may be depends on many variables like teachers, peer pressure, family 
and friends, childhood experiences, social class and exposure to discourses other than 
textbooks etc. No doubt it is very difficult to determine the degree of influence of 
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textbooks but the thing which can be determined easily is the intention of writers of 
textbooks; the policy guidelines of those who get the textbooks written; and the values 
which the educational authorities responsible for writing and disseminating through 
textbooks. This issue has been discussed in the later paragraphs under the heading 
―Islamization of Education in the Name of Ideology and Nationalism‖. 
 
These schools employ matriculates to teach primary classes and those with FA and 
BA degrees to teach middle and high school classes (Rahman, 2002). Teachers of 
these schools get paltry amount of money which adversely affects the quality of 
teaching. According to Rahman (2004) the low salaries, which Urdu medium schools 
offer attracts only those who fail to get other jobs. Thus the quality of instruction in 
most schools is very low. So far as the funding of these schools is concerned, 
government allocates budget for these schools and charges no fee at all. However, in 
high schools students are supposed to pay small amount of money for Faroogh-i-
Taleem Fund (FTF)
9
. For 9
th
 and 10
th
 level students this amount is twenty rupees per 
month
10
. 
 
English Medium Schools 
English being the official language of Pakistan is used in government, bureaucracy, 
military, judiciary, commerce, media, education and research at the highest level. In 
short, it is used in all domains of power. As it is empowering to learn English, people 
all over the country are ready to invest in it for the better future of their children. 
Because of this demand, all over the cities of Pakistan one can see boards advertising 
institutions which claim to be English-medium schools or tuition centres claiming to 
teach spoken English and English for passing all kinds of examinations and 
interviews. They are present in areas ranging from the most affluent to the slums and 
even in the rural areas. Indeed, going by numbers alone, more of them are located in 
middle-class, lower-middle-class and even in working-class areas than in the more 
expensive localities of the cities. Besides the claim made by the boards, these schools 
                                                          
9
 Fund for the development of Education (its literal meaning). By virtue of this fund pupils of 9
th
 and 
10
th
 class are charged twenty rupees (15 pence) per month but no fee is charged.  
10
 Source: Office of District Executive Officer (Education) Dera Ghazi Khan. 
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share little else in common. It is a far cry from the rolling green grounds of Aitchison 
College
11
 in Lahore to a two-room house in a slum which advertises itself as the 
‗Oxford and Cambridge Islamic English-medium school‘. Indeed, if there is anything 
which links such diverse establishments together it is that they cater to the persistent 
public demands for English education. In Pakistan, according to Rahman (2004), 
English is still the key for a good future - a future with human dignity if not public 
deference; a future with material comfort if not prosperity; a future with that modicum 
of security, human rights and recognition, which all human beings desire. So, 
irrespective of what the state provides, parents are willing to part with scarce cash to 
buy their children such a future. 
English medium schools can be classified into three major types: 
(a) State influenced elitist public schools or cadet colleges 
(b) Private elitist schools (commonly known as A-type Private schools) 
(c) Private non-elitist schools (commonly known as B-type Private schools) 
Within each category are sub-categories. Indeed, the non-elitist so-called English-
medium schools are so varied that they defy classification. Let us focus only on the 
major categories after a brief history of English medium schools in the sub-continent 
in general and in Pakistan in particular. 
 
Historical Background 
To appreciate the significance of English medium schools in contemporary Pakistan, 
it is necessary to understand some of the history. Under the British rule, there were 
two kinds of elitist schools in India: those for the hereditary aristocracy, called the 
Chief‘s colleges and those for the newly emerging classes commonly known as 
European or English schools. These schools taught all subjects in English. Both kinds 
of institutions served political and social purposes. According to Rahman (2004), the 
Chief‘s Colleges were meant to Anglicize young rulers to encourage loyalty to the 
English Crown and resulted into incidents like mutiny of 1857. This was the principle 
of ‗indirect rule‘ discussed by James Anthony Mangan (1986) in some detail in the 
context of schooling. Six major chief‘s colleges were established: Rajkumar College 
(1870) at Rajkot, Mayo College (1872) at Ajmer, Rajkumar College (1871) for 
Bundelkhand, Daly College at Indore and Aitchison College at Lahore. There were 
                                                          
11
 Aitchison College is one of the most prestigious institutions of Pakistan. 
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lesser schools for the landed gentry as well. In all these institutions the emphasis was 
on English as the central symbol and tool in the process of Anglicization. According 
to Raleigh (1906) Indian Viceroy Lord Curzon believed that the young chiefs who 
were supposed to learn English language, literature, science and mode of English 
thought would be allies of British. The political motive of making chiefs loyal to the 
Crown and so consolidating the empire was justified on the assumption that it was 
morally necessary to civilize Indians (Rahman, 2004). The families of newly 
emerging professional upper middle class used to send their children to European or 
English schools. Both kinds of schools charged very high tuition fees from their 
pupils. Such pricing policies excluded all but the wealthiest from these institutions. 
These English schools run on the lines of British public schools where in most of the 
instances the administrators were missionaries (ibid, 2004). 
 
In the area now comprising Pakistan, such schools existed only in big cities. In the 
NWFP, for instance, Convent Day School was the major English school where 
Europeans also used to send their children. In Sind, the English schools were mostly 
in Karachi. By 1940, there were three such schools in the province. In Punjab the 
number was thirteen and in Balochistan there was not a single school of this type. The 
popularity of these schools was very high among Indian parents on account of higher 
standards of instruction and more efficient discipline as compared to Indian Schools 
(Rahman, 2002). 
 
When Pakistan was established, the parallel system of elitist schooling did not change, 
as the military and higher bureaucracy both came from such schools. These schools 
multiplied in sixties as the professional-middle class started expanding. Ayub Khan 
was a Sandhurst-educated officer who believed in the superiority of the army over 
politicians and was in the favour of rule of elite in the country. He believed that such 
elite could be created in the English medium schools only (Zaidi, 1999 cited by 
Rahman, 2002). As Commander-in-Chief, he established a number of cadet colleges 
and academies to train those, according to Zaidi, who would one day administer the 
country. The armed forces encouraged the use of English at training institutions, at 
least, of officer corps. The other powerful partner of the army at that time was the 
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Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP). It was not traditionally anglicized like the army, but 
also had a larger number of people from the westernised elite in it. Thus it is no 
surprise that the government dominated by the members of these two elite pressure 
groups came up with government policies that supported English medium schools. 
One can see its depiction in the reports of Sharif Commission of 1958 and Hamoodur 
Rahman Commission of 1966 clearly. The Sharif Commission in its report says: 
While we feel that English must yield to the national languages the paramount 
position that it has occupied in our educational system so far, we are at the same time 
convinced that English should have a permanent place in the system (GoP, 1959 
p228). 
 
More or less similar views were expressed by the Hamoodur Rahman Commission on 
Education of 1966 regarding English medium schools. The report said: 
Such establishments are intended to produce some better type of students who would 
be more suitably disciplined and equipped for eventually entering the defence service 
of the country or filling higher administrative posts and other responsible executive 
positions in the government and semi-government bodies and private firms and 
corporations (GoP, 1966 p18). 
 
The leaders of the Urdu proto-elite criticized this attitude (Abdullah, 1976), although 
most of the criticism against it came from the supporters of the older indigenous 
languages (Adil, 1962; Ahmad. S, 1968 cited by Rahman, 1996). In the face of public 
pressure after 1958 commission, the Hamoodur Rahman Commission agreed that the 
existence of such schools is the violation of constitution which assures the equality of 
all citizens before law and recommended the award of scholarships to poor students, 
so that they can also study in these government-funded elitist English medium 
schools. This was just a cosmetic recommendation on the part of commission. To 
allay the public reaction the commission also urged government not to build such 
schools any more. As a matter of fact these schools continued to thrive during Ayub 
era (1958-1969). The most significant anti- English policy came in early years of Zia 
regime (1977-1988). During that time, it was ordered that Urdu would be the medium 
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of instruction in all schools from class one from 1979. Thus all the students appearing 
in the matriculation examination in 1989 would use only Urdu. Moreover, the 
Ministry of Education also said that the nomenclature ‗English medium‘ schools will 
be abolished. Visible resistance came from the parents whose children studied in 
English medium schools. As the military-bureaucratic oligarchy was not happy with 
this decision of the regime, the government expressed hardly any will to implement its 
policy. According to Lady Viaqarunisa Noon, the General (Zia) had assured her that 
she could continue to use English as medium of instruction in her school. This 
suggests that General was under pressure from the westernised elite and that he did 
not want to alienate them (Noon Interview, 29 Dec 1994 quoted from Rahman, 2004). 
According to Rahman (2004), during Zia era the elitist schools not only continued to 
exist, but indeed they proliferated. The real change in policy occurred in 1983 when 
Zia gave legal protection to the elitist English medium schools by allowing them to 
prepare students for the ‗O‘ and ‗A‘ levels examinations of the University of 
Cambridge. On 28
th
 of October 1987, the Pakistan Times reported: 
The Federal Ministry of Education has decided to continue the existing practice of 
allowing English as medium of instruction in the science subjects besides Urdu or 
provincial language in all secondary schools of the country. 
 
The Present Situation and Government-funded English Medium Schools 
At the moment the federal government has its own English medium schools. The 
nineteen model colleges of the Federal Government are English medium schools and 
colleges. In these schools the cost of per student per year is much higher than the cost 
of Urdu medium schools in the provinces. The military controls eighty eight Federal 
English medium schools in cantonments and garrisons. In addition to it, there are elite 
public schools under boards of governors such as the Boys Public School and College 
in Abbotabad, Sadiq Public School in Bahawalpur. Other state controlled bodies such 
as WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority), the Customs Department, 
Pakistan Railways, Telephone Foundation and Police also run English medium 
schools. They provide schooling in English though in varying quality, for affordable 
fees from their own employees while charging much higher fees from the ordinary 
public. The armed forces, besides controlling many English medium schools through 
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the Fauji Foundation (Army), Shaheen Foundation (Air Force) and Bahria Foundation 
(Navy), they still get subsidized education for their dependents from some private 
elitist English medium schools located in garrisons and cantonments. This means that 
English medium schooling can be bought either by the elite of wealth or that of 
power. And this has not happened through market forces but has been brought about 
by the functionaries or institutions of the state itself. Indeed, the state has invested 
heavily in creating a parallel system of education for the elite, particularly the elite 
that would presumably run elitist state institutions in future. This leads to the 
conclusion that the state does not trust its own system of education and spends public 
funds to create and maintain the parallel elitist system of schooling. 
 
Private Elitist English-Medium Schools 
Apart from the schools run by agencies of the state itself like by the federal 
government, the armed forces, the bureaucracy, in contravention of the state policy of 
providing Urdu and vernacular medium education at state expense, there are private 
schools that sell English and which charge relatively high fees. Private schools 
catering to the elite have existed since British times. In Pakistan the convents were 
such types of schools i.e. Saint Anthony‘s in Lahore, Burn Hall in Abbottabad, St. 
Joseph‘s Convent in Karachi, Presentation Convent in Rawalpindi and convents in 
Murree and other places. These schools were not as much expensive as those that 
replaced them from mid 1980,s onwards. The new schools which took their place 
were Beacon house, City School, Roots, Froebels, Lahore Grammar and Khaldunia. 
Most of them have campuses spread all over the country though all are not of equal 
quality. Their tuition fees vary in amount. Their tuition fee ranges between Rs1500 to 
7500 per month. They also charge high admission fee ranging between 15000 to 3000 
rupees. In addition, there are incidental expenses, examination fees, and security fee 
for library, examination fees, and high expenses for textbooks, stationery and 
uniform. These expenses exclude not only the poor but even the middle class from 
these schools. Besides what the students have written, indicators of their socio-
economic background are, the exorbitant tuition fee their parents pay. 
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Unlike non-elitist private schools these schools prepare students for the English 
Ordinary and Advanced level examinations. Their faculty, especially at senior levels 
is paid better than government school teachers.
12
 However, there are vast differences 
in salaries even in the same school and data bearing figures about salaries was not 
shared with the researcher by schools‘ managements. 
 
Teaching methods in these institutions are more humane, modern, innovative and 
interesting than in Urdu medium schools and madrassas (Rahman, 2004). Books are 
printed abroad and have pictures and more general knowledge than found in the 
textbooks of Urdu medium schools. The classics of English, generally in abridged 
forms, are used to teach English. World history is taught, instead of the propagandist 
form of Pakistan studies. However, the ‗O‘ level examination makes the study of 
Pakistan studies, Islamic studies and Urdu compulsory even for these students. 
 
Private Non-elitist Schools 
By far the largest number of the so-called English-medium schools is English-
medium only in name. According to a 1987 survey of Rawalpind-Islamabad, there 
were sixty English-medium schools in Islamabad and 250 in Rawalpindi. Out of these 
250 only thirty nine were recognised schools (Awan, 1987). A 2001 survey conducted 
by the government showed that there were a total of 33893 institutions of general 
education in the private sector. Though the medium of instruction was not given most 
of them claimed to be English-medium schools (Census Private 2001: 12 as quoted by 
Rahman, 2004). At present one can see such schools in much proportion, particularly 
concentrated in the cities though they are fast appearing even in small towns now all 
over the country. Their fees ranges between Rs 50 to 1500 per month, which is far 
higher than the state vernacular schools but lower than that of elitist private English 
schools. In these schools pretence is made of teaching most subjects in English. In 
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 The researcher got information regarding the tuition fee and salaries of teachers teaching to 10
th
 level 
students at government schools, Elitist private, Non-elitist private schools and madrassas. The per 
month salary within madrassa teachers varied considerably depending who is getting residence from 
madrassa and who is not. 
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general teachers write answers of all subjects on the board, which students faithfully 
copy, memorise and reproduce in the examination. 
 
Recently, chains of non-elitist English-medium schools run by organised bodies have 
sprung in Pakistan. One such chain goes by the name of Hira English-medium 
schools. The Hira Educational Project created this chain in 1990 in Lahore. In 1997 
the name was changed to Hira National Educational Foundation. The aim of this 
project is to educate students along both Islamic and modern lines. According to a 
Principal of one of such schools, Islamic moral lessons are taught from class I but the 
books of science and mathematics are in English. Social studies is taught in Urdu and 
Urdu is compulsory.
13
 
 
Madrassas 
The third tier of schooling in Pakistan is that of madrassas. Madrassa is Arabic for 
school. It has now come to be used in South Asia exclusively for institutions of 
classical Muslim religious learning. A higher level madrassa is usually called darul 
ulum (house of knowledge) or jami'a (equivalent of a university). In this study, the 
term madrassa will be mostly used to designate institutions of religious education at 
advanced levels. 
In a society that has persistently neglected the education of its children, and where 
investment of time and labour in schools does not go very far in fulfilling the needs of 
livelihood, madrassas have rapidly emerged as a parallel, but non-equivalent, system 
of education. Present-day madrassa education indicates the existence of an ice age of 
the intellect when, for reasons that are still debated, time came to a halt a few 
centuries ago. There is no room in contemporary madrassas for modern subjects. 
Instead, even 'advanced level' education engages a student in the ancient debates of 
philosophy, logic, history, astronomy, geometry, and arithmetic that had existed in the 
tenth to twelfth centuries. The emphasis is on ritualistic aspects of faith, oratory, and 
means to protect the faith against heretics and blasphemers. Once an impressive 
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 The researcher visited Hira School in Multan and had an informal sitting with the Principal of the 
institute. 
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system of education which had produced towering intellectuals in Islamic civilization, 
now the scope of madrassa education has been progressively reduced to mere 
preservation of specific doctrines. Madrassa schooling will be discussed in detail in 
the succeeding chapter. 
Here is a table of statistics to illustrate the respective sizes of each of the major types 
of school in Pakistan during the years 2005-06. 
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Table 2.1: Total Number of Educational Institutions including Madrassas and Maktabs (Mosque Schools)  
with student enrolment in them 2005-06 
Table 2.1 
Institutions Type 
 
Institutions 
 
Enrolment by Stage 
 
Teachers 
 
Boys Girls Total Male Female Total 
Pre- Primary 
 
Public - 2,392,219 1,904,159 4,296,378 - - - 
Other Public - 48,619 4 6,147 94,766 - - - 
Private 794 1,508,643 1,235,660 2,744,303 455 2,950 3,405 
Total 794 3,949,481 3,185,966 7,135,447 455 2,950 3,405 
Primary 
 
Public 137,751 6,639,788 4,932,846 11,572,634 221,621 126,669 348,290 
Other Public 2,070 136,748 1 31,337 268,085 2 ,012 3,815 5,827 
Private 16,911 2,770,093 2,223,605 4,993,698 18,846 67,605 86,451 
Total 156,732 9,546,629 7,287,788 16,834,417 242,479 198,089 440,568 
Middle c 14,982 2,169,600 1,376,236 3,545,836 5 9,851 54,225 114,076 
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 Other Public 273 48,251 4 8,606 96,857 724 1,709 2,433 
Private 24,115 875,462 7 44,168 1,619,630 4 8,583 145,661 194,244 
Total 39,370 3,093,313 2,169,010 5,262,323 109,158 201,595 310,753 
High 
 
Public 9,110 888,505 2 4,202 1,452,035 107,959 53,266 161,225 
Other Public 315 24,512 2 4,202 48,714 2 ,410 4,281 6,691 
Private 13,484 338,041 5 63,530 632,259 5 4,420 139,852 194,272 
Total 22,909 1,251,058 8 81,950 2,133,008 1 64,789 197,399 362,188 
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Institutions Type 
 
Institutions 
 
Enrolment by Stage 
 
Teachers 
 
Boys Girls Total Male Female Total 
Higher. Sec/ Inter 
Colleges 
(XI-XII) 
 
Public 1,075 335,408 3 43,909 679,317 1 6,963 10,396 27,359 
Other Public 96 12,183 7 ,963 20,146 1 ,087 1,690 2,777 
Private 1,825 78,141 7 5,931 154,072 1 7,416 21,873 39,289 
Total 2,996 425,732 4 27,803 853,535 3 5,466 33,959 69,425 
Degree 
Colleges 
(XI-XIV) 
 
Public 753 105,450 1 76,749 282,199 7 ,707 6,892 14,599 
Other Public 24 11,768 2 ,865 14,633 304 553 857 
Private 358 10,567 1 8,594 29,161 2 ,072 3,040 5,112 
Total 1,135 127,785 1 98,208 325,993 1 0,083 10,485 20,568 
Non-Formal 
Basic Education 
Public 10,185 123,850 2 37,897 361,747 6 02 9,583 10,185 
Total 10,185 123,850 2 37,897 361,747 6 02 9,583 10,185 
Technical & 
Vocational 
Institutions 
Public 692 53,945 2 8,189 82,134 4 ,060 1,847 5,907 
Other Public 224 12,564 9 ,054 21,618 924 494 1,418 
Private 2 ,143 82,532 5 2,403 134,935 4 ,923 2,317 7,240 
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 Total 3,059 149,041 8 9,646 238,687 9 ,907 4,658 14,565 
Teachers 
Training 
Institutions 
 
Public 146 394,186 1 98,185 592,371 - - 3,219 
Other Public - - - - - - - 
Private 23 2,323 1 ,898 4,221 - - 266 
Total 169 396,509 2 00,083 596,592 - - 3,485 
Universities 
 
Public 59 200,109 1 62,797 362,906 - - 31,312 
Private 57 44,960 1 6,146 61,106 - - 6,197 
Total 116 245,069 1 78,943 424,012 - - 37,509 
Professional 
Institutions* 
 
Public 488 127,372 7 5,079 202,451 4 ,240 2,198 6 ,438 
Other Public 71 27,314 9 ,480 36,794 597 332 929 
Private 957 134,595 4 5,391 179,986 7 ,986 2,784 1 0,770 
Total 1,516 289,281 1 29,950 419,231 12,823 5,314 1 8,137 
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Institutions Type 
 
Institutions 
 
Enrolment by Stage 
 
Teachers 
 
Boys Girls Total Male Female Total 
Deeni Madrassas Public 313 26,378 1 1,518 37,896 1 ,227 291 1 ,518 
Other Public 41 2,632 2 ,277 4,909 130 20 150 
Private 11,799 913,597 5 56,043 1,469,640 41,042 12,199 5 3,241 
Total 12,153 942,607 5 69,838 1,512,445 42,399 12,510 54,909 
Total Public 175,554 13,456,810 10,011,094 23,467,904 424,230 265,367 724,128 
Other Public 3,114 324,591 2 81,931 606,522 8 ,188 12,894 21,082 
Private 72,466 6,758,954 5 ,264,057 12,023,011 195,743 398,281 600,487 
Total 251,134 20,540,355 15,557,082 36,097,437 628,161 676,542 1,345,697 
SOURCE: Pakistan Education Statistics 2005-06 
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Islamization of Education in the Name of Ideology and Nationalism 
The term ―ideology‖ is basically a set of beliefs or principles that underlie one‘s actions in a 
political, economic or social system (Ray, 1992). It refers to political, economic and social 
ideas presented or disseminated by groups contending for obtaining power over people‘s 
consciousness. The state for instance, disseminates its dominant ideology everywhere. 
Religious groups in the Muslim world counter this with their ideology. Both may do it 
through electronic and print media, national anthems and formal and informal education etc, 
of which textbooks may be a part, which make it necessary for me to look at such textbooks 
very briefly in the coming paragraphs. In short, when I use the term ‗ideology‘ in this chapter 
I will use it for ideas given by the state or ruling elite, in the pursuance of some objectives 
like national integration and maintenance of a group‘s hegemony on the others. 
Among many others, it is history which is used to propagate one‘s ideology and create a 
world view which supports the powers that be. In the recent history of Europe, the examples 
of notorious state interventions in historiography can be found in the regime of Nazi in 
Germany and Fascist regime in Italy before World War II. Less notorious are the colonial 
experiments in education and the distortion of American history by erasing parts dealing with 
slavery and the annihilation of the native Americans (Fitzgerald, 1979). In India the 
Congress
14
, with a view to creating a composite Indian nationalism by eliminating the tension 
between Muslim and Hindu identities, promoted history which de-emphasised the role of 
religion and emphasised that of economic and political factors in India‘s past. The National 
Council for Educational Research and Training textbooks do not vilify Muslims but they do 
not accept Islam as a basis for the creation of Pakistan (Behera, 1996 p198). The Hindu 
nationalist, such as the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) wants to control history as a justification 
for a Hindu identity for India. In 1977 Moraji Desai (Indian P.M) conceded the Hindu 
nationalists‘ demands by banning well-known histories. Among others Medieval India by 
Romila Thapar; Modern India by B. Chandra and R.S. Sharma‘ Ancient India were 
withdrawn from the schools. According to Behera (1996) in 1979 the Indian History 
Congress endorsed the textbooks reaffirming its commitment to the ‗scientific and secular 
approach to the study of history‘. However, after winning October 1999 elections, Hindu 
Nationalist party BJP came to power and started Hinduizing historical and other texts (Dawn, 
20 Feb 2000). 
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 The largest political party of India. 
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In Pakistan, too, the main ideology-burdened texts or propagandist texts are historical, 
political and sociological in nature. The subject of Pakistan Studies contains elements of all 
three and is meant for disseminating state-supported ideology. As we have seen, such a use of 
history is not new. All official historians are made to conceal those aspects of the truth which 
would annoy the powers (state establishment) that be. In this regard the role of the 
Curriculum Wing of the Ministry of Education cannot be underrated. 
 
In Pakistan, the responsibility for designing the national curricula and textbooks in Social 
Studies, English, Urdu and Civics from Class I to Class XII, lies with the Curriculum Wing 
of the Federal Ministry of Education and the provincial Text Book Boards. The Curriculum 
Wing is mandated to design all pre-university curricula and issue guidelines to textbook 
writers and school teachers. Provincial Textbook Boards are assigned for the writing of 
textbooks and get them printed after their contents are approved by the Curriculum Wing. A 
close analysis by a group of independent scholars shows that for over several decades 
particularly after the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, the curricula and the officially 
mandated textbooks in these subjects have contained material that is directly contrary to the 
goals and values of a progressive, moderate and democratic Pakistan (Nayyar and Saleem, 
2003). In their latest analysis of Pakistani school textbooks, which can be found in a report 
The Subtle Subversion, Nayyar and Saleem (2003) came up with a conclusion that the most 
significant problems in the current curricula and textbooks are: 
 Inaccuracies of fact and omissions that serve to substantially distort the nature and 
significance of actual events in our history. 
 Insensitivity to the existing religious diversity of the nation 
 Incitement to militancy and violence, including encouragement of  Jehad (holy war) and 
Shahadat (martyrdom) 
 Perspectives that encourage prejudice, bigotry and discrimination towards fellow citizens, 
especially women and religious minorities, and other towards nations. 
 A glorification of war and the use of force 
 Omission of concepts, events and material that could encourage critical self-awareness among 
students 
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 Outdated and incoherent pedagogical practices that hinder the development of interest and 
insight among students 
 
Urdu medium schools or non-elitist government funded schools are much more vulnerable to 
such curriculum, as have rightly been pointed by Ahmed, (2003) in her essay, Teaching of 
Social Studies: Class 6 to 10. 
Unfortunate are the Pakistani students who are forced to follow the social studies curriculum 
and textbooks designed by the Ministry of Education and the Textbook Boards. In contrast, 
students from the affluent sections of the society who can afford to go to elite English 
Medium schools aiming for O and A level examinations of the British universities are 
extremely fortunate to be exposed to an exceedingly interesting and enlightening material in 
the discipline of social studies. 
 
However, the project of using Islam to create Pakistani nationalism of the kind which 
supports increased militarisation is not confined to non-elitist government funded schools 
alone. Islamic Studies, Pakistan Studies and Urdu are compulsory in all public and private 
schools of Pakistan and they all contain such lessons. But according to Rahman (2002), ―dose 
is less intensive in the elitist English medium institutions because foreign textbooks, English 
literature and outside influences
15
 counteract it.‖ More or less similar views were expressed 
by Rahman (2004, p32) in his other book Denizens of Alien Worlds: 
As English-medium school students are exposed to other discourses that probably dilute the 
influence of the state-sponsored ideological texts, it is only the Urdu-medium ones (i.e. the 
common people of Pakistan) who face the full brunt of this ideological exposure.   
 
As mentioned above, the states quite often use formal education as a tool to disseminate and 
perpetuate their political messages. In the Pakistani context, except religion, there was hardly 
anything common in a socially, culturally and ethnically heterogeneous society.  Such diverse 
disposition of the country made the use of education as a political tool very essential since its 
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 In the previous paragraphs, he explained about the outside influences, by which he mean the exposure of 
elitist-English medium schools students to cable, TV, international electronic and print media etc. 
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birth in 1947. Political leadership of that time found Islam and Urdu
16
 useful as integrative 
symbols against the threat of ethnic breakup. In the face of anti-Urdu and pro-Bengali riots in 
East Pakistan, the government acknowledged Bengali as a second national language of 
Pakistan but its policy regarding the place of Islam in education remained intact. The 
country‘s education system started to enforce one particular view of Pakistani nationalism 
and identity, namely that Pakistan is an Islamic state rather than a country with a majority 
Muslim population. This came about partly due to the insecurity that the newborn nation was 
facing, and partly because of the emphasis on the ―two-nation theory‖ as the basis for 
Pakistani identity. These combined to produce the need for a singular homogeneous 
majoritarian Muslim identity that could be sharply differentiated from that of India, even 
though it meant suppressing the many different shades within Pakistan. 
 
Brief history of educational policies 
The First Educational Conference was called by the Government of Pakistan in 1947. The 
Federal Minister for Education underscored the direction that was to be taken by the 
education in the new state. Among the three issues of priority, the foremost was to have an 
educational system that was inspired by Islamic ideology (Jalil, 1996). 
 
During the military rule of Ayub Khan, a National Commission for Education was 
established in 1959, whose report was adopted as the National Education Policy. The 
responsibility for primary education was transferred to provincial governments. During the 
second 5-year plan (1960-65), primary and secondary curricula were revised, and ―much 
emphasis was laid on Islamic studies and religious education‖ (Jalil, 1996 p167). The 
promised financial allocations were severely cut down due to the 1965 war with India. The 
New Education Policy of 1969 aimed at minimizing the wide gap between the traditional 
madrassa system and the general system of education. 
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 Urdu emerged as a symbol of Muslim identity in the wake of Urdu-Hindi controversy period in pre-partition 
India.  According to Rahman (2002), Urdu was related to Muslim identity and had also been linked with the 
struggle for power between Hindus and Muslims in India. 
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Following the separation of East Pakistan in 1971, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto‘s government 
embarked on reforming education but remained committed to designing curricula relevant to 
the nation‘s changing social and economic needs compatible with so-called basic ideology. 
The basic objectives of the education policy of 1972-1980 were: 
(i) Ensuring the preservation, promotion and practise of the basic ideology of Pakistan 
and making it a code of individual and national life. 
(ii) Building up national cohesion through education and by promoting social and cultural 
harmony compatible with our basic ideology (New Education Policy, 1972-80, p 2-
3). 
 
Soon after his coup in 1977, the military government of General Zia ul Haq had its own 
problem of legitimacy, which it tried to guise in an overarching quest for Islamization of the 
society. Education was among the first of its victims. Religious political parties became 
enthusiastic partners in this quest. In the educational sphere, this amounted to a distorted 
narration of history, factual inaccuracies, inclusion of hate material, a disproportionate 
inclusion of Islamic studies in other disciplines, glorification of war and the military, gender 
bias, etc.  Subsequent governments either failed to check these harmful deviations, or 
willingly perpetuated them. 
  
In early months of Martial Law, General Zia-ul-Haq called a national education conference, 
the goals and objectives of which were ―to redefine the aims of education, choose basic 
strategies, ascertain the main problems in education confronting the nation, and to bring 
education in line with Pakistani faith and ideology‖ (Jalil, p 272). The direction, again, was 
clear. General Zia said in his inaugural speech: ―Our curriculum must ensure that our children 
are brought up educated as good Pakistanis and good Muslims. They must imbibe the lofty 
ideals and principles of Islam‖. (Zia‘s inaugural speech, 1977, quoted by Jalil, 1996). 
 
Under the new policy, the subject of Islamic Studies was made compulsory at all levels of 
education up  to BA, teaching of Arabic
17
 was made compulsory in all schools to students of 
                                                          
17
 Arabic is language of Koran.  
 
 
34 
 
all religions, great emphasis was placed on the Ideology of Pakistan, the madrassa education 
was encouraged by declaring madrassa certificates equivalent to normal university degrees. 
 
This effort formed part of the larger process of Islamization, in which the government 
imposed several laws including the blasphemy law and the Hudood ordinance, the system of 
Zakat and Ushr, established Sharia courts. It also started a major process of Islamising the 
education system by bringing in radical religious ideologues from political parties 
sympathetic to the dictatorship to devise new curricula and to ensure that textbooks were 
consistent with these guidelines. As a matter of fact, there was continuity between Zia‘s 
policies of Islamising education and the policies of earlier regime. The difference, indeed, 
was that of degree not of kind. Rahman (2002) commenting on Zia‘s policy says, ―this was 
not case of a radically new policy but of more of the same‖ (p 277). 
 
Following the restoration of democracy in 1988, the two major political parties, the Pakistan 
Muslim League and the Pakistan Peoples‘ Party ruled alternately – twice each – until the 
1999 military coup of General Musharraf. The two parties had different levels of commitment 
to the Islamization process initiated by General Zia-ul-Haq, and hence different perceptions 
on the role and utility of the doctrinal contents of curricula and textbooks. 
 
The Muslim League was firmly in favour of the Islamist agenda. It was about to bring in a 
constitutional amendment for the imposition of Islamic Sharia when the government of 
Nawaz Sharif was dismissed by the military coup of October 1999. With such a strong 
commitment, the Sharif government was not likely to change the process of Islamization of 
education. In fact, the National Education Policy 1998-2010 prepared by his government was 
intended to: 
―.. provide guidelines on strengthening the ideological frontiers of Pakistan, based on 
Islamic teachings and to equip the nation with required knowledge and skills.‖ (The 
National Educational Policy, 1998 – 2010)18 
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 The National  Education Policy, 1998-2010, quoted in Nayyar and Ahmed (2003). 
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The policy made nazra Koran
19
 compulsory from Class-I and learning the Qur‘an with 
translation from Class -IV. Islamic Studies was made compulsory from Class-I to BA/BSc 
level. Not surprisingly, there was little effort to change the Zia era curriculum. 
 
Although Benazir Bhutto‘s government was less committed to Islamization, attempts to undo 
the ideological content of education during her two tenures were neither well-organised, 
given high priority, nor subject to scrutiny. It seems the Islamist groups within the 
educational bureaucracy were able to successfully resist such attempts. The bureaucracy 
showed how by using its command of details and procedures, which politicians lack when 
they take office and often never acquire, they could resist long enough for the Minister to 
either lose interest or be replaced. 
 
The military government of General Musharraf embarked on an ambitious plan to reform the 
education sector following his unambiguous proclamation against religious extremism. A 
comprehensive Education Sector Reform (ESR) Action Plan was prepared.  It sought to 
reform all the sectors of education, and supported the reform process by raising the 
expenditure on education to an unprecedented 3% of GDP. However, the ESR Action Plan 
came up with hardly any substantial success. Apparent reason was the resistance made by 
MMA against Musharraf‘s educational reforms.20 
 
Present government led by Pakistan People‘s Party (PPP) expressed little interest to review 
the national curriculum. One can gauge the solemnity of present government towards 
education by the fact that it reduced education budget to 1.85% of GDP this year. It seems 
clear that unless there is a much greater priority given to education in general and a 
fundamental change in curricula and textbooks in particular, Pakistani children will continue 
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 Nazra Koran means the capability to read Koran. 
20
 MMA was an alliance of country‘s right-wing Islamist parties. During Musharraf regime, MMA was the 
largest opposition party in centre and was coalitional partner in two provinces (out of four) with Musharraf‘s 
political Party PML (Q). 
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to be educated in bigotry, violence and hate, as they have been during the last several decades 
especially during and after Zia regime. 
 
Theories on the causes of religious extremism in Pakistan 
Scholars of neo-Marxist, feminist and social historians have defied the older Marxist and 
functionalists views about religion as a ‗false consciousness‘ used as a tool to repress class 
struggle. These new sociologists of religion have portrayed religious institutions and 
theological worldviews as expressive of class and power struggles, rather than of monolithic 
ideological hegemony; the interests of the less powerful have been found to be expressed 
through and in religion. For many, religion, spirituality and belief contribute to enhancing the 
inherent dignity and worth of every human being. Religion, however, is sometimes used and 
abused to fuel hatred, superiority and dominance. The politicization of culture and religion 
creates an intolerable environment and the rise of religious intolerance is a cause for serious 
concern. Much of the literature on the role of religion in politics and religious extremism 
falls into three major groups. One school of thought believes that religion is always violent, 
such as Hent de Vries (2002) and Mark  Juergenmeyers (2001).  De Vries argues that there is 
no religion without violence of some sort, and no violence without religion of some sort. But 
De Vries‘ theory cannot explain why religious conflict is sometimes violent and sometimes 
does not lead to violence. ―Does violence inevitably shadow our ethical-political 
engagements and decisions, including our understandings of identity, whether collective 
or individual?‖ he asks. Juergenmeyer, on the other hand, argues that religious violence is a 
result of people‘s tendency to see their lives as a struggle between good and evil. He asks, 
‗why do religious people commit violent acts in the name of their god, taking the lives of 
innocent victims and terrorising entire populations?‘ He argues that this is because people 
believe they are part of a cosmic struggle between the powers of good and evil - a battle to 
bring order and peace out of chaos and darkness. The clash between the forces of darkness 
and light can be understood not as a sacred struggle, but as a real fight which often involves 
political manoeuvring. He claims that when there is an identity crisis or problem of 
legitimacy, threat of defeat; a real world struggle can be conceived as a sacred war where 
enemies are demonised. 
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Another school of thought, that includes Daniel Pipes, Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis 
and Jessica Stern, views only Islam and not other religions as inevitably violent. Daniel 
Pipes, for instance, claims that radical Islam is an ideology incompatible with secular 
society. Muslims want to force the secular world to submit to their principles. They are thus, 
kind of extremists who cannot stand the thought of peace (Daniel Pipes, 2002). However, 
there surely are better explanations of why religion has become an essential ‗tool‘ in politics 
and its extremist manifestation. For instance, Ted Gurr‘s model of relative deprivation, 
mobilization and grievances is extremely relevant to understand the intrusion of religion in 
politics and the phenomenon of extremism. It is often said that religious extremists are not the 
poorest of the poor. However, those who are most deprived, oppressed, most in need, are not 
those who usually violently rebel. In fact, all the big names in the list of the culprits in recent 
history have turned out to be those who were educated and well off
21
. While there have been 
food riots and peasant uprisings, most often, revolutions and violence have occurred when 
conditions are better or have been improving, and by those who are not the most deprived. 
Explanations vary, but generally focus on two propositions. First, deprivation is subjective 
and a function of a person's perception, needs, and knowledge. To nail deprivation to an 
objective or absolute lack of something such as freedom, equality, or sustenance, is to ignore 
the fact that the definition of these shifts according to historical periods, culture, society, 
position, and person. The second proposition, deals with these norms. It asserts that we take 
our presently perceived or expected position, achievements, gratifications, or capabilities as a 
base of comparison against our wants or needs, or what we feel we ought to have. The gap 
between wants or ought and gratifications or capabilities is then our deprivation, or relative 
deprivation, in the sense that it depends on our basis of comparison (Arshi Saleem Hashmi, 
2009). According to Ted Gurr, relative deprivation is cause of aggression which he explains 
in his book ‗Why Men Rebel‘22. Ted Gurr articulates models, suggesting that the gap between 
expectations and achievement would contribute to the willingness of the people to rebel. In 
particular, he observed, rebellion was most likely to be fuelled by movements on the basis of 
perceived deprivation. In this discussion here on religious extremism, the aggressive, violent 
phenomenon of extremism attests to Ted Gurr‘s theory that it is actually the gap between the 
expectations of a regime based on ‗true‘ faith (Sharia in case of radical Muslims) and the 
reality of an ‗adulterated‘ regime that lead these self-proclaimed custodians to use violence in 
the name of religion. In case of Islam, it has glorious past and the expectations of orthodoxy 
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 Osma Bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Khalid Mohammad Sheikh etc. 
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 Gurr, Ted. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
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is ‗Islamic Revivalism‘ which generally means that the supporters of the movement want to 
revisit history and to re-establish the so-called glorious state and societal structures, which 
once distinguished Muslim civilisations from others. 
 
Here two theories can be made the base; one that grievance born of deprivation (either 
economic or political) is an individual concern that manifests itself collectively. Quite often 
material and political deprivation is aggregated within specific groups with a homogenous 
cultural identity. For example, a religious or linguistic minority might suffer 
disproportionately in a given society, and this form of grievance can lead to unrest across the 
social lines that distinguish the minority group. In most regions of the world with ethnic and 
religious movements, which sometimes are of a violent nature, are minorities rebelling 
against the system. South Asia, however, is unique in the sense that the religious revivalism 
in extreme forms in all of its troubled areas was initiated by religious majorities (ibid, 2009). 
This makes part of the discussion, which argues that to understand the intrusion of religion in 
politics i.e. ‗Political Islam‘ and the phenomenon of religious extremism in Pakistan, one 
needs to understand the element of ‗Fear‘. One wonders if Winston Churchill realized the 
sweeping political accuracy of his assertion that ‗we have nothing to fear but fear itself‘. The 
common thread that weaves violent political movements together is fear. This is true in the 
case of violent religious movements. The fear of being deprived of something drives one to 
act aggressively, while the fear of being left out drive movements against prevalent forces. 
Although it is neither the only motivating factor for the political manifestation of religious 
violence, nor necessarily the most obvious, it is conspicuously present at all times (Hashmi, 
2009). Whenever the question comes to one‘s mind that why people harbour hatred or why 
they are willing to kill or die for a cause, the answer inevitably is ‗fear‘. Religious radicals 
are united by fear. In this case there is no discrimination of religions, whether they are 
Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus or Buddhist, the fear of being deprived the role and status 
that they expect and desire to achieve is common denominator. Some groups fear change, 
modernisation and loss of influence and others fear that young will abandon the churches, 
temples, mosques and synagogues for physical and material gratification. They are especially 
fearful of education, especially if it undermines the teachings of their religion. They fear a 
future they will have little control over and one they cannot even comprehend. Therefore, if 
relative deprivation can explain the phenomenon of religious extremism among religious 
minorities, the fear of being deprived the expected status and the inability to achieve a 
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‗desirable‘ society can explain the rising religious extremism and militancy among the 
religious majority. South Asian religious majorities suffer from such fear that have often led 
to extreme and unfortunate occurrences like the pogrom in Gujarat and Burma unleashed by 
the Hindu and Buddhist respectively against Muslims. Similarly, Jihad waged by Islamic 
militants against the ‗infidels‘ in Pakistan, or the Sinhalese Buddhist engaging in violence 
against Tamil Hindus and Christians in Sri Lanka. If we see the history of Pakistan, it is clear 
that relative deprivation (Islamic Revivalism) as Ted Gurr suggested and the element of fear 
both have pushed the Muslim majority in Pakistan into a cycle of religious violence. The 
political, military and religious forces ‗feared‘ losing the identity on the basis of which the 
state was carved out, in addition to the vast majority of people who live on the margins of 
society and feel deprived of political and economic power, leading to the politicization 
of religion and its extreme manifestation in the form of violence (ibid, 2009). 
 
According to Umbreen Javaid (2011) one of the leading factor behind religious extremism is 
the failure of orthodoxy to come to grip to the challenges of the modern world. She states that 
the arrival of Europeans in India not only introduced modern and improving knowledge in 
India but also made the old stock of the knowledge possessed by the orthodox Muslims 
irrelevant for the functions of the modern state and the production and distribution process of 
the modern economy. This redundancy bred frustrations among the old guards. They ‗feared‘ 
the loss of influence and eventually chose to take up the path of armed struggle. 
 
Founder of Pakistan Mohammad Ali Jinnah‘s vision of Pakistan as a tolerant, modern, 
Islamic democratic state was later hijacked by religious elements who found in the new state 
an opportunity to advance their causes along conservative religious lines (the genesis of 
Political Islam in the newly born state of Pakistan). These religious elements started making 
inroads into the state structure during the General Ayub‘s era (1958-69). The orthodoxy was 
promoted as an undeclared state policy under the dictation of international force as an 
effective tool to fight against the onslaught of Communism (Javaid, 2011). In addition to 
external factor, there were some internal features of the Pakistani society which were very 
conducive for orthodoxy. For instance, Islam was the only bonding factor in a multi-ethnic 
state of Pakistan. This policy got its justification and re-enforcement from the attitude of 
pseudo liberal intellectual of the new state whose half baked nationalism failed to appreciate 
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the raison deter for the creation of the new state of Pakistan and who, with a comparable 
dogmatic approach, wanted to enforce a socialist set up in Pakistan as compared to 
enforcement of ill-defined conservative version of Sharia propagated by the orthodoxy. 
Interestingly this opposing ideology wanted to use state as a tool for the enforcement of their 
doctrine. The support of state for the orthodoxy waned and waxed exactly with proportion to 
the intensity of the ongoing cold war throughout the world between the capitalist and the 
communist blocs. The support had truly started in Pakistan after the start of Korean War and 
attained its first peak during the days of the Vietnam War. Internally, the reflection came with 
an open state patronage for the politics of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the clear collusion 
between the military generals of the day and the JI (ibid, 2011). The nexus reached at its 
culmination in the wake of soviet invasion in Afghanistan. 
 
According to Umbreen Javaid (2011) the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 heralded a 
win-win era for religious extremism in Pakistan. The extremist elements were eulogized and 
fortified through mass media campaign and excessive funding by national and international 
agencies. A clandestine international net work was established to promote religious frenzy. 
The production frontiers were extended upward by broadening the cadre and inducting the 
Deobandis. Hitherto, the executing agency of extremist agenda was mainly the JI, who in 
their own right were comparatively literate and futuristic. The opening up of cadres to the 
Deobandi madrassas opened a flood gate for utter backwardness and rigidity (ibid, 2011). 
Ahle Hadith school followers had a very thin representation in Pakistan and were not very 
popular because of their aversion even to innocent pleasures of modern life. Their code of life 
did not suit or match the aspirations and moorings of an average Muslim of this country. 
They saw a golden opportunity to expand and swell their ranks with the help of the 
astronomical money provided by the foreign monarchy (ibid, 2011). 
 
As mentioned above orthodoxy fears change, modernisation and loss of influence. In order to 
perpetuate its influence on the masses, the orthodoxy, since the very beginning, not only 
made inroads in Pakistani politics but also established a network of madrassas in the country 
(Mir, 2006). These madrassas have come to symbolise the stagnation and ossification of 
knowledge. Madrassa system is an outright opposition to rational thinking in the field of 
education (A. H. Nayyar, 1998). According to Rana Muhammad Amir (2009) most of the 
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‗Pakistani madrassas are seen as a catalyst promoting extreme views.  Their role in shaping 
the views of their students and the masses and their affiliation with political, sectarian and 
militant organizations is viewed as a serious concern (ibid, 2009). Umbreen Javaid (2009) 
traces the emergence of extremism in Pakistan to these seminaries and adds that religious 
extremism not only stands for militancy and sectarianism but also to subjugation of women 
and their confinement to the four walls of their homes, intolerance of difference of opinion, 
disdain and scorn for modern technology and gross violation of human rights of the dissidents 
and opposing camps (p.282). In this study the researcher has tried to determine the attitudes 
of students studying in different types of madrassas and mainstream schools regarding the 
status of women, position of minorities, sectarian differences, armed jihad and primary aim of 
education.   
 
Conclusion 
Religion has often proved to be a powerful binding factor which has merged heterogeneous 
groups into a distinct nationality. Through appeal to supernatural authority, religion promotes 
national unity as a divine command. Examples abound in contemporary history: the Greek 
Church as a source for Greek nationalism, the Catholic Church as a factor in Irish separatism, 
Judaism and the state of Israel, Islam and Pakistan (Usmani, 2011). Barring the fact, the 
newly born country was multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and a multi-religion, soon after the 
creation of Pakistan, the founding fathers sought to create a nation based on common 
language and common religion. They ignored the notion of ‗unity in diversity‘ and discarded 
the secular principles that were in vogue in British India. Barring the fact that more than 56 
per cent population of the country speaks Bengali, Urdu was declared as the only national 
language of Pakistan soon after the independence. Language controversy resulted in the 
eruption of riots in erstwhile East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). The net effect of this process 
has been to create a deep rooted alienation among certain ethnic entities especially among 
Bengalis and resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. The policy of Islamization 
of education is still in practice with same degree of obstinacy. The curriculum of government 
schools conveys a very harmful message: being a Pakistani is equated with being a Muslim 
and that only Muslims are true Pakistani citizens. Patriotism has been equated with Islamic 
zeal. The only thing they have been able to achieve is to alienate non-Muslim population, at a 
grave cost to the national integration (Nayyar, 2003). In this respect, Kazi (1994) and Ahmed 
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(1998) has also presented a good critique on Pakistan‘s educational history in relation to 
ethnic diversity. They rightly pointed out that the ruling elite has overemphasised Islamic 
ideology and used Urdu to neutralize ethnic tendencies. The chapter describes how language 
and religion were used to create a so-called unified Pakistani nation. The policy of 
‗Islamization of education‘ on the part of ruling elite to combat ethnicity has also been 
examined and top of all this, the chapter deliberated upon the three major streams of 
education systems: English-medium, Urdu-medium and madrassa with a view to determining 
how did they evolve in post independence period and how do they function in contemporary 
Pakistan. 
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Chapter 3 
Madrassa Education in Pakistan 
Introduction 
It is beyond any doubt that all of the three education systems need extensive debate, but as 
the current study is in particular about madrassa education so more deliberation is required to 
have deep understanding of the whole phenomenon. In this chapter, the historical evolution 
of madrassa would be discussed; the development of madrassas system in pre and post 
colonial era will come under discussion. In the wake of colonization, how these religious 
schools got reformed, will also make the part of discussion. In addition, the organisation, 
curriculum and funding of madrassas will be deliberated upon. Moreover, the pedagogical 
techniques being used in these schools will also make the part of debate. 
 
Before 9/11 academic works on Pakistani madrassas were limited. However, after the tragic 
events of 9/11, there has been a plethora of academic works, journalistic articles, and policy 
reports, on madrassas. Numerous concerns arise from the debate on madrassa education, 
ranging from rise in Islamic militancy due to madrassa education to the incompatibility of 
non-secular education in a modern globalised socio-economic and educational set up. The 
ongoing increase in the number of madrassas has raised the eyebrows of educationalists and 
policy makers in Pakistan as well as in the West. Their writings have highlighted the 
importance of developing a greater understanding of madrassas. Increasingly, scholars, 
researchers and educators argued that improving the educational status of Pakistan, which 
unfortunately is one of twelve states that have lowest literacy rate in the world, will help to 
bring a positive change. It will not only check the growth of Islamic extremism but will also 
help to increase the number of citizens prepared to participate in the economic development 
of the state. In order to pursue these objectives many proposals were forwarded to revamp the 
whole system. 
 
Madrassa education is an important issue in the contemporary era. The tragic incident of 9/11 
further enhanced its significance and took its implications beyond the national and regional 
domains. After this incident, madrassas of the Muslim world in general and Pakistani 
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madrassas in particular gained special world attention: mainly because madrassas in Pakistan 
are seen as more militant in their outlook as compared to their counterparts in other parts of 
the Islamic world (Jessica Stern,
23
 2000-01; Tariq Rahman, 2004).  
 
Madrassas play a very complex role in the modern Pakistani society. At one hand, they serve 
as the sanctuaries of ‗have-nots‘ and impart free education to the poor sections of society, 
while on the other hand some writers have portrayed madrassas as ‗factories of terrorism‘ and 
‗hotbeds of fundamentalism‘. This crucial role played by the madrassas demands a very 
careful analysis. For this purpose, the chapter has been divided into several sections and 
different aspects of the madrassa phenomenon have been elaborated separately. 
 
The word ‗madrassa‘ is derived from an Arabic word darsum meaning lesson. In the 
contemporary Arabic language, the ‗madrassa‘ means ‗centre of learning‘ (the Arabic plural 
form of madrassa is ‘madaaris’, but for the sake of clarity I will use the English equivalent 
plural form ‗madrassas‘ in this study). Madrassas are in some ways analogous to a seminary 
in Christian tradition. 
 
Usually, the terms madrassas and maktabs (Koranic schools) are wrongly used for each other. 
So, before we move on, it is necessary to understand the difference between the two. The 
Koranic school or Maktab is a place where the children go to read and recite the Koran only. 
Koranic schools can function in the mosque, under a tree, in the house of the Koran teacher 
or under an open sky.
24
 The term Madrassa is usually used for a bit more organized 
institutions with classrooms and teachers for different levels. Many Madrassas have boarding 
and lodging facilities for students that are offered free of charge. In addition, whereas a 
Koranic school is usually a place for lower level of religious education (the recitation and 
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Jessica Stern in her writings ―Pakistan‘s Jihad Culture,‖ Foreign Affairs79, no. 6 (2000): 115-126, and 
―Meeting with the Muj,‖ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57, no.1 (January-February 2001)42-50 has advanced 
the belief that Pakistan‘s madrassas are factories of ideological indoctrination and even military training for 
terrorist organisations throughout Pakistan and South Asia. 
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 In Pakistan, most of the mosques act as maktabs as well. Some parents send their children to maktabs daily 
(hardly for one hour) to make their children learn how to read and recite the Koran and the affluent families 
usually hire tutors who come at home to teach their children Koran.  
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pronunciation of the Koran), Madrassa is the institute where more in-depth religious 
education is provided. Most of the Madrassas issue certificates of various levels and maktabs 
don‘t. According to Saleem H. Ali (2009) ―madrassa is organised and integrated religious 
institution with various levels which maktab simply don‘t‖. For the term ‗madrassa‘ there are 
regional variations in other part of the Muslim world as well. It is interesting to note that in 
many countries, including Egypt and Lebanon, ‗madrassa‘ refers to any educational institute, 
while in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh it commonly refers to an Islamic religious school. 
 
Historical Evolution of Madrassas 
According to early historical accounts, the first formal education sessions in Islam started at 
the house of Zaid-bin-Arqam in the valley of the Safa Hills, where the prophet of Islam 
Muhammad himself worked as a teacher and some of his early followers became his students. 
After the prophet‘s migration to Medina (hijrah), a madrassa, namely the madrassa Ahle-
Suffa was established in a mosque at Medina. Ubada-ibn-Samit was the primary instructor 
there. Mu‘az-ibn Jabal and Abu Zar Ghifari; two well-known companions of the prophet, 
were among the students. As Islam expanded to other regions of the world (non-Arabic), it 
became necessary to create uniformity in the teachings of Islam to preserve religious 
conformity. Henceforth began the tradition of madrassas worldwide, in order to develop 
writings and textbooks on Fiqah (Islamic Jurisprudence), Sunna (prophet‘s traditions), 
Hadith (prophet‘s sayings) and Tafseer (the interpretation of Koran). Anzar (2003) has 
rightly said that initially it was mosque that acted as a centre of learning. This mosque based 
understanding and acquisition of knowledge worked very well for the Muslims of the 
Arabian Peninsula because the tribal traditions combined with the teachings of the Koran 
were sufficient to govern the lives of people who spoke the same language and had the same 
cultural background. However, as Islam expanded to other regions and came into contact 
with other indigenous traditions and languages, it became necessary to create a cadre of 
Muslim experts who would develop sophisticated writings and textbooks on Fiqa – Islamic 
jurisprudence, Sunna – Prophet‘s traditions, Hadith – Prophet‘s sayings, and Tafseer – the 
interpretation of the Koran, to cater to the needs of non-Arab Muslim populations. Thus 
began the tradition of Madrassa, the centre for higher learning the initial purpose of which 
was to preserve religious conformity through uniform teachings of Islam for all. 
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One of the first known madrassa is believed to have been established in AD 1005 by the 
Fatmid caliphs in Egypt, teaching the minority shi‘ite version of Islam. It was fairly well-
resourced educational institute complete with library, teachers for different subjects, 
including astronomy, architecture and philosophy, and students were provided with free ink, 
pens and papers. After the Sunni conquest of Egypt, the Sh‘ite version of Islam promptly 
replaced with the Sunni version. Several Shia manuscripts were destroyed but secular 
writings on astronomy and other fields of general knowledge were preserved. A number of 
books were subsequently preserved and taken to Baghdad, where Seljuk Vizier called Nizam-
ul-Mulk bin al-Tusi established the first organized madrassa called the Nizamiyah in AD 
1067. 
 
According to Anzar (2003), two types of education were imparted in madrassas of that time: 
‗scholastic theology to produce spiritual leaders, and earthly knowledge to produce 
government servants who would be appointed in various regions of the Islamic empire. The 
former produced khatibs (sermonizers), imams (prayer leaders), qazis (judges), mudarris 
(teachers), muftis (those who can issue religious edicts), and shayookhul Islam (the grand 
religious leaders), while the later produced clerks, accountants, geographers, astronomers, 
bureaucrats, statesmen, etc. (Nayyar, 1998, p.216). Later Nizam-ul-Mulk established 
numerous madrassas all over the empire that provided knowledge in the fields of science, 
philosophy, public administration and governance.‘ Nizam-ul-Mulk is thus considered to be 
the progenitor of the Islamic public education system. His act was quickly followed in other 
regions of the Islamic world. According to Kraan (1984) in the 12th century AD there were 
thirty madrassas in the eastern part of Baghdad alone, and between AD 1155 and 1260, the 
number of colleges in Aleppo increased from six to forty four. Even the Mongols built 
madrassas. The zenith, however, was reached in the Ottoman Empire: madrassas were found 
in every town and, by the eighteenth century, there were at least 275 madrassas in Istanbul 
alone.
 25
 
 
Offering food, lodging and a free education, madrassas spread rapidly throughout the Muslim 
empire, and although their curricula varied from place to place, it was strongly religious in 
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 Miller,Barnette (1941). The Palace Schools of Mullammad the Conqueror, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
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nature because these schools ultimately intended to prepare future Islamic religious scholars 
(Ulema) for their work. 
 
The First Curriculum 
The original curriculum, as also the curriculum later devised by Ibn-e-Khaldun, consisted of 
two main branches of learning: revealed knowledge (manqoolat, or Uloom-e-Naqliah); and 
the knowledge acquired through intellectual endeavour (Ma'aqoolat, or Uloom-e-Aqliah). It 
consisted of the following topics:  
1. Koran: Tajveed, Qir'at, Hifz, and Tafseer  
2. Hadith, and the ancillary knowledge of ascertaining the authenticity of ahadith 
3. Fiqh and UsuI-e-Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence and its principles ) 
4. Philosophy of Religion (IlmuI Kalam or dialectics) 
5. Tasawwuf (Mysticism) 
6. Linguistic sciences: Nahw (grammar), Lughat (etymology), Bayan (Rhetoric), Adab 
(Literature) 
7. Mantiq (Logic) 
8. Hisaab (Arithmetic) 
9. Ilm-e-Hindsa (Geometry) 
10. Ilm-ul-Hae'at (Astronomy) 
11. Ilm-ul- Tabiaat (Physics, chemistry, and medicine) 
12. Moosiqi (Music) 
 
Topics 1-5 belonged to the realm of revealed knowledge (Uloom-e-Naqliah). These must 
have formed the core of the curriculum of the seminary part of the school. The remaining 
topics 6-12 belonged to the realm of intellectual knowledge (Uloom-e-Aqliah), and were 
deemed necessary for anyone intending to enter into government service. 
 
The separation of 'Islamic knowledge' as against the 'pagan' or qadimi (ancient) knowledge of 
the Greeks took place quite early in history. Although Uloom-e-Aqliah formed a part of the 
madrassa curriculum, this was probably never a source of achievements of the Muslim 
scientists for which early Muslim civilization is known. The Aqliah curriculum was very 
restrictive, and perhaps meant only to provide enough knowledge for state employment of the 
 
 
48 
 
madrassa graduate. The institutions producing famous scholars in Uloom-e-Aqliah were 
different. It may be noted that the early Islamic kingdoms permitted establishment of 
educational institutions without enforcing any rigid system of granting accreditation. The 
schools were mainly recognized for the famous teachers around whom they were established. 
Within this freedom to establish schools, there was the system of state patronage under the 
institution of waqf (or trust) through which the schools were financially supported. This also 
turned out to be the instrument by which an independent teacher was made a salaried 
employee, securing his financial well-being on the one hand, but making him susceptible to 
state pressures on the ideological front on the other. There was a bias towards religious 
education in these madrassas. Even during the times when 'the philosophical, natural or 
"foreign sciences" flourished in Islam, they were rarely taught at the madrassas'26 because 
‗the Islamic waqf‘, upon which rested the whole edifice of institutions of learning, excluded 
any and all things that were considered to be inimical to the tenets of Islam. Hence the 
exclusion of the godless ―science of the Ancients‖ (knowledge of the Greeks) from the 
curriculum took place. The exclusion meant that the study of ―foreign sciences‖ had to be 
pursued privately; without being subsidized in the same manner as the Islamic sciences and 
its ancillaries. But there was nothing to stop the subsidized student from studying the ―foreign 
sciences‖ unaided, or learning in secret from masters in the privacy of their homes, or in the 
waqf institutions, outside of the regular curriculum.27 Thus waqf was both a system of 
support as well as control in the times when not only was Islam grappling with the alien 
methodology of the imported Greek knowledge, subjecting it to serious tests on the plain of 
logic, but also with the various schools of thought that had emerged within Islam. 
 
Madrassas in sub-continent 
When the early Muslim 'saints' came from the Arab lands, Iran, and Central Asia, and settled 
in India, elementary religious schools cropped up here and there, mainly around mosques and 
shrines. Rather than being madrassas, they were simply centres of preaching to the pagan 
local population and for imparting elementary religious knowledge to the Muslim population. 
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 Kraan,op. cit., p.11. 
27 Makdisi, G. (1981). The Rise of Colleges, Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West. Edinburgh 
University Press, Edinburgh.  
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State patronage on the pattern of Arab, Iranian, and Central Asian kingdoms started once the 
Central Asian conquerors settled down in India and established sultanates. The founding of 
the first madrassa is credited to Sultan Muhammad Ghauri at Ajmer around AD 1210 which 
was followed by the Mu'izzi madrassas of Delhi and Badayun, and the Nasiriyyah. The 
purpose as well as the pattern was the same as in the parent country. The purpose was 
primarily to educate people for state employment, and the pattern closely followed that of the 
well-established schools in the Muslim world. As pieced together by Maulvi Abdul Hayy of 
Darul Uloom Nadwah, the important subjects of study, broadly speaking, were:  
1. Grammar (etymology, syntax, and rhetoric)  
2. Literature 
3. Logic 
4: Islamic Law and its principles 
5. Koranic commentary 
6. Hadith (sayings of the prophet of Islam) 
7. Mysticism 
8. Scholasticism (religious philosophy) 
 
The books listed contained many of the original texts from the Baghdad schools, but also 
contained texts from the later scholars of Bukhara and Khwarizm in Central Asia. 'The same 
curriculum more or less continued for over two hundred years to the close of the 15th century 
in India'.28 An important change was the introduction of Persian language as this was the 
court language and of the Muslims who had migrated from Iran and Central Asia. Persian 
literary classics were introduced into the curriculum. Medicine and music were also 
important parts of the curriculum. Organized technical education is known to have been given 
in the time of Firoz Shah Tughlaq, but that was in special guilds outside of the conventional 
madrassas. 
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Beginnings of Bifurcation 
 
There was a qualitative change in the curriculum during Akbar's reign (1556-1605). Every 
student was then expected to study arithmetic, geometry, ethics, agriculture, astronomy, 
physiognomy, economics, civics, logic, and medicine. The higher sciences were divided into 
Ilahi (theology), Riyadi, (comprising mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, and music), and 
Tabi'i (physical sciences). History was also an important subject. In studying Sanskrit, 
students were to learn Vyakarana (grammar), Vedanta (philosophy), and Patanjali (Yogism). 
Hindus and Muslims were studying in the same schools and colleges'.
29
 This was about the 
time when a clear division appeared between religious and secular education. The Arabic 
madrassas continued to operate, but were becoming increasingly irrelevant to the needs of 
statecraft. The court language forced people, both Muslims and Hindus, to acquire skills in 
the use of the Persian language. The job market thus made Persian schools more attractive 
because they offered more secular courses, although in various instances the religious courses 
were almost the same as in Arabic madrassas. The curriculum of Persian schools included a 
long list of Persian classics, as well as a translation of Sanskrit classics. 
 
Parallel to the madrassas, the secular Persian school system flourished rapidly. These schools 
were comparatively secular in their outlook and their curriculum consisted of literature, 
history and ethics30
.
 Translations of the Hindu classics, Vedanta, Lilalvati, Patanjali, and 
Mahabharata were also part of curriculum during Akbar's reign.31
 
In general there were many 
more Persian schools than Arabic madrassas. According to a survey conducted for the British 
East India Company in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, out of a total of 375 schools 
in the district of Bareli, there were 228 Persian, 17 Arabic, and 130 Mahajani.32
 
The southern 
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   Ibid., p. 53. 
30 Maulana Abul Hasanat Nadawi discovered a Persian curriculum that was in use in the year AD 1688. This is 
given in Sufi, G.M.D. (1941). Al Minhaj The Evolution of Curriculum in tile Muslim Educational Institutions of 
India, p. 77-78. 
 
31 Shahabi, Mufti lntizamullah. Islami Nizam.e-Ta'aleem ka Chauda Sau saalah Muraqqa , p. 126. Matb'a 
S'aeed, Koran Mahal, Karachi. 
  
32 Ahmed, Shabir (1974). Taleem ki Kahani, p. 311. Kifayat Academy, Karachi. 
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region of Bihar had 291 schools, of which 279 Persian and 12 were Arabic.33 On the other 
hand, Sindh in 1856 had 374 educational institutions; of which 52 were Persian and 276 were 
Arabic.34 
 
Resurgence of Madrassas in Modern India 
The decline of the Muslim empire, the occupation of the land by foreign forces- particularly 
the defeat at the hands of these forces in the 1857 war of independence (commonly known as 
mutiny of 1857 in the English history) -the onslaught of the Christian missionaries, 
introduction of a different educational system by the colonial power, and the failure of the 
Muslim population in general to accept the available alternative (and hence to be accepted in 
the employment of the colonial powers) forced a large section of Indian Muslims to fortify 
their religious identity. This led to a new wave of madrassas in the second half of the last 
century, many of which piloted a new movement for Islamic education, and which proved 
standard-bearers of the present-day madrassa. The big names in this category were Darul 
Uloom Deoband (established in 1867), Nadwatul Ulema (established in 1894)," Darul 
Uloom-Mazahirul Uloom, Saharanpur (established in 1898), etc. Although they mainly 
followed Dars-i-Nizami, they were distinguished from the earlier madrassas by the mode of 
teaching, organization, regularization of the curriculum, introduction of a system of 
examinations on the pattern of the British system, and a system of awarding formal 
certificates and degrees (asnad). 
 
Prior to this formalization, graduation from a madrassa had been rather informal. Education 
was imparted in institutions as well as by individual teachers. The courses were based on 
textbooks. A student chose a set of courses and completed as many of the prescribed books as 
he was capable of. Some restricted their studies to linguistics only, some to arithmetic, 
geometry, and astronomy, and others, possessing special inclinations, chose to go into the 
deeper realms of Hadith, Fiqh, Usool-e-Fiqh, and Kalam. Whenever a student thought he had 
had enough, he was given a certificate by the teacher that he had completed the study of such 
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and such books to the satisfaction of that teacher. The mode of examination was also informal 
and mostly oral. It was not uncommon to find a student attending several madrassas in search 
of illustrious teachers. 
 
This mode of teaching changed in the new madrassas. The curriculum was structured over 
periods of time, i.e., years of schooling. Prerequisites were prescribed, and a mixed mode of 
written and oral examinations was introduced. Certificates and degrees to be awarded were 
defined. The administration was less personal. Run by a majlis-e-shoora, Darul Uloom 
Deoband had a sarparast (rector), a muhtamim (chancellor), a sadr mudarris (principal), and 
other staff. 
 
The most distinguished feature of madrassas that developed over a period of time and finally 
established in the later half of the nineteenth century was that they were conceived to be free 
of obligation to the state. The earlier schools had almost always had state endowments in the 
form of land grants to sustain the teachers and students, as well as for books and other 
essentials. The founders of Darul Uloom Deoband introduced the practice of running their 
institution on community funds, collected in person by teachers and students, either in cash or 
kind. For them this practice meant several things. Besides freeing them from the whims of 
rajas, nawabs (dukes) or governments, it brought into the community a sense of participation 
in the process, and instilled in both the teachers and the taught a sense of obligation towards 
the people, rather than towards any rich benefactor. The founders of madrassas were strongly 
anti-imperialist, and communicated this spirit to their students. Many of the founders were in 
the forefront of the independence movement and had a nationalistic political outlook. They 
viewed the imperialism of the West more as that of Christendom, and the modern technology 
brought in by the imperialists as a tool in the hands of an adversarial religious force. As such, 
they remained strongly opposed to modern ideas produced in the West. This attitude has not 
changed since then. In this respect, Prof. Nazeer Ahmed aptly remarked, ―The Muslims who 
had lost the power struggle with the British for the control of India, had a deep distrust for the 
foreigners whom they called Firangees. This distrust did not stop at the English language and 
culture, but extended to science, philosophy and mathematics. As a result isolation set in and 
the old system of education retreated into a corner. Even the rudimentary exposure to 
philosophy and mathematics that was introduced in the syllabus of madrassas (Dars-i-
Nizami) was abandoned because the Firangees (Britishers) were much better at these subjects 
than the Mullas (religious scholars). For survival, the Mullahs had to introduce product 
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differentiation into religious education and give it new branding. This was done by attaching 
the label ―deen‖ (religion) to the Madrassa. The bifurcation of education into deeni talim 
(religious education) and dunyavi talim (worldly/secular education) was now complete.‖ The 
Madrassa teach medieval times outdated books, some of the books and their dates are given 
in the appendix.05.  
 
Madrassa growth and profile in Pakistan 
As mentioned above the history of madrassas in the modern era started with the establishment 
of Deoband Madrassa in India in 1867. After it, madrassas sprang up in different parts of the 
country. After the partition of India, Pakistan inherited some madrassas. According to Malik 
(1996) ―it is estimated that at the time of independence, there were only 137 madrassas.‖ 
However a survey conducted in 1956 put the number of madrassas in all of Pakistan 
(excluding East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh in 1971) 244 (ICG Asia Report, 2002, 
p2). Since then the number of madrassas went on increasing and during Soviet invasion in 
Afghanistan (1979-1989) the number of madrassas increased radically. According to Dr. 
Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi (2002); former minister for religious affairs, the number of 
madrassas in Pakistan is 10,000. However, he acknowledged the problem that as all 
madrassas are not registered so the number might be more. Table 3.1 shows the growth of 
madrassas in Pakistan by province. 
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Table 3.1: Conservative Estimates of Religious Educational Institutions: 1947-2000 
Province/Region 1947 1960 1980 1988 2000 
Punjab 121 195 1012 1320 3153 
NWFP 59 87 426 678 1281 
Sindh 21 87 380 291 905 
Baluchistan 28 70 135 347 692 
AJ Kashmir 4 8 29 76 151 
Islamabad -- 1 27 47 94 
Northern Areas 12 16 47 102 185 
FATA - - - - 300 
Total 245 464 2056 2861 6761 
Source: Ministry of Religious Affairs 1979 and Ministry of Education, Islamabad 1988 
– 2000, Institute of Policy Studies, 2002. 
 
It is important to note that the government now acknowledges that the number of madrassas 
is more than twice what IPS (Institute for Policy Studies) study estimated in 2002. In his 
recent autobiography, even former President Musharff (2006, p.312), has put the number at 
approximately 14,000, disseminating education to an estimated 1 million students. P.W. 
Singer, even, gives the figure of 45,000 madrassas but quotes no source for this number 
(Singer, 2001). 
 
Teaching in Madrassas 
Madrassas in Pakistan are teaching obsolete curriculum as Christine Fair (2006) says that the 
texts used in madrassa syllabi dates back to 11th and 14th century. In addition, the teaching 
methods prevailing in madrassas are traditional. An observation of classes in session in 
madrassa shows that the teachers continually encounter problems because their lessons lack 
direction, stimuli and motivation (ibid, 2006). These problems might be because of the fact 
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that they never had any formal training in teaching methods. The most common method of 
teaching is rote learning. The teaching style of a typical teacher in a Pakistani Madrassa, 
especially, in lower grades is very autocratic and little children are punished for not 
conforming to the rules and regulations. Severe corporal punishment is the norm (Anzar, 
2003). The teacher often makes a child recite the lesson in a sing-song voice and the class 
joins in the chorus. Children rock their bodies as they chant the familiar parroted formulas. 
Essays in languages are written on the black board to be copied verbatim. Any originality, 
any questioning of given facts, any deviation from the traditional interpretation is frowned 
upon and sometimes punished. Students memorise Koran even without understanding its 
meanings. This problem is logical outcome of the fact that most of the teachers in madrassas 
by themselves don‘t know the meaning of Arabic text of Koran (Rahman, 2004). Curriculum 
and pedagogical methods being applied in madrassas clearly serve their vested interests and 
suits to their ostensible objective i.e. the preservation and transmission of fourteen hundred 
years old traditions in the modern age.  Such non-secular and un-democratic educational 
system is totally outdated in Pakistan; a county that is moving inexorably towards 
democratisation and a globalised economy. At this time and stage, a constructive, dynamic 
and democratic educational set up is desperately required. According to Siddiqui (2009) 
Education has to move from transmission to transformation for which we have to revisit our 
definitions of knowledge. This would lead to more vibrant and interactive classroom 
dynamics where students are engaged in co-construction of knowledge. For this we need to 
challenge the ideology of an existing assessment system which is memory-based and is 
unable to tap thinking skills of a higher order (ibid, 2009). 
 
Siddiqui (2009) further added that we need to strive for an assessment system which requires 
students to think critically and apply knowledge in diverse contexts. For all these changes in 
learning, pedagogy and assessment, it is important that we revisit our ideology about the very 
aim of education. The transmission mode of education that supports existing power structures 
needs to be revamped and replaced with transformation mode where the main objective is to 
reduce socio-economic gaps in society and empower the underprivileged by maximising their 
life chances. 
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Various Sects and their Madrassas 
As an Abrahamic religion, Islam follows many of the same tenets of monotheism as Judaism 
and Christianity
35.
 There are two primary sects within Islam--- Sunni: accounting for 85 per 
cent of the worldwide population of around 1.4 billion and Shia: accounting for 14-15 per 
cent. Pakistan is a Sunni Muslims majority country and Shias account for around 20 per cent 
of the population though in absolute terms, the second largest population of Shias in the 
world after Iran is found in Pakistan (around 27 million)
36.
 
 
For our purposes, it may be useful to categorise the madrassas by the sub-sects and then also 
include Shia madrassas at par with some of these sub-sects. These sub-sects are all from 
major sect Sunni. This is especially relevant since the federations of madrassas are organised 
along these lines. The three primary Sunni sub-sects in Pakistan are: Deobandi, Brailvi, Ahle 
Hadith/Salafi. Each sect has its own madrassas in which their own version of Islam is taught. 
The two primary wings of Sunni-Islam---Deobandi and Brailvi---dominate the madrassa 
system in Pakistan. 
 
Madrassas were created to preserve and propagate what these various sects viewed to be the 
correct interpretation of Islam. Brief descriptions of these sects are as follows: 
 
Deobandis 
The madrassa at Deoband, a small town in the United Province (now Uttar Pardesh) of India, 
was established by Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautwi and Maula Rasheed Gangohi in 
1867. According to Rahman (2004), ‗while earlier seminaries were loosely organised, 
Deoband had a rector (sarparast), a chancellor (muhtamim) and the chief instructor (sadr 
mudaris)‘. Its income was derived from popular contributions and the curriculum was based 
on the Dars-i-Nizami developed by Mulla Nizamuddin Sihalvi at farangi Mahal; a famous 
seminary of a family of Islamic scholars (ulema) in Lucknow (Robinson, 2002). 
Deobandi school of thought opposed folk Islam in which intercession by saints occupied a 
major place. Seeking initiation in a mystic order was considered the path to salvation and 
miracles were seen as crucial and defining attributes of saints and prophets. They do not 
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 For a popular comparative account of the Abrahamic Faiths, see Armstrong, 1998. 
36
 Estimates are based on various sources like adherents.com and islamicweb.com. 
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oppose mysticism altogether but do argue that adherence to the Islamic law (Sharia) was the 
path to mystical exaltation. They also oppose folk practices like that of fixing days for 
distributing food to gain spiritual merit and celebrating the anniversaries of religious 
personages (for more detail see Metcalf, 1982). 
 
Brailvis 
The Brailvi movement was inspired by Ahmed Raza Khan of Barailly (1856-1921) who is 
highly revered by his followers (Sanyal 1996). The Brailvis justified the 'mediational, 
custom-laden Islam, closely tied to the intercession of the pirs (saints) of the shrines' (Metcalf 
1982: 296). They believed that prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was made of Divine Radiance 
(Noor) and had knowledge of the unknown (Ilm ul Ghaib). The Deobandis and the Ahl-i-
Hadith ulema (religious scholars) challenged both these beliefs. 
 
Ahle Hadith 
The movement inspired by Sayyed Ahmed was called Wahabi because, like Mohammad bin 
Abdul Wahab (1703-1792) of Saudi Arabia, Sayyid Ahmed and his associates also wanted to 
purify and reform Islam. They claimed to follow no particular school of jurisprudcnce---
Hanafi, Shafi, Hambali, Maliki---and were called nonconformists (ghair muqallid i.e. one 
who does not follow a fixed path) by their opponents. They used the term Jama'at Ahl-i-
Hadith for themselves and appealed to the Government of India that the term Wahabi should 
not be used for them. The government ‗ordered in 1886 that the term Wahabi should not be 
used in official correspondence‘ (Ahmed 1994: 203) but it is still used by many people in 
Pakistan. The Ahl-i-Hadith madrassas emphasize the Koran and Hadith and oppose folk 
Islam and common practices like the anniversaries of saints, the distribution of food on 
religious occasions and popular mysticism. 
 
Jamaat-i-Islami 
The Jamaat-i-Islami is a revivalist political party created by Abul ala Maudoodi (also spelled 
Mawdudi) (1903-1979) whose life and achievements have been ably described by Sayyed 
Vali Reza Nasr (1996). Maudoodi believed in borrowing technology and other concepts from 
the West in order to empower the Islamic community. As such he favoured more modernist 
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education than any of the orthodox organizers of the traditional madrassas, He did, however, 
also emphasize upon the refutation of Western culture and intellectual domination and, 
therefore, his anti- Western critique is more thorough, trenchant and appealing for educated 
class than that of the traditionalist seminarians (Rahman, 2004). 
 
Madrassas of Shia 
All of the above madrassas are Sunni madrassas, with the exception of Jamaat-i-Islami. 
Theoretically Jamaat-i-Islami promotes Muslim brotherhood and claims itself to be supra-
sectarian but its ideology and mode of worship is alike to Sunni. Besides the Sunni run 
madrassas, there are also Shia run madrassas as mentioned earlier. The Shias believe that the 
successor of the Prophet (pbuh) was Ali lbn-e-Abi Talib and not the first three caliphs whom 
Sunnis take to be his successors. They mourn the battle of Karbala, fought between the 
Prophet's grandson Hussein and the Umayyad caliph Yazid bin Muawiya in AD 680. This led 
to the strengthening of the supporters of Ali and the rise of Shia Islam which has been 
described very competently by S.H.M Jafri (1979). 
 
Organisation of Madrassas 
The preponderance of Pakistan‘s madrassas is associated with one of five Islamic school 
boards (Wafaq). There are four Sunni madrassa boards (Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadees, Jamaat 
Islami and Barelvi), and one for the Shia. All madrassa boards even those run by Shias 
approve Dars-i-Nizami as curriculum for madrassas. However, all boards use different texts 
which suits their own version of Islam. For instance, every madrassa board recommends 
Tafseer (Interpretation of Koran) as a vital part of its curriculum, but each board recommends 
those texts on ‗Tafseer‘ which specifically suits its own maslak (version of Islam). In the 
same vein, Islamic Law, Islamic jurisprudence, Principles of Hadith, Fiqh, Usul-i-Fiqh etc are 
taught in all madrassas that are affiliated with these boards but in accordance to their own 
version. 
 
Each central board issues asnad (Degrees/certificates) for the graduates who study in a 
madrassa that is affiliated with it. All associated madrassas are registered to these boards and 
get instructions regarding changes in curriculum or while dealing with other administrative 
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works. In the table 3.2, complete name of each central board (Wafaq), its location and date of 
its establishment is given. 
 
Table 3.2     Central Boards of Madrassas in Pakistan 
Name Sub-sect place Date established 
Wafaq-ul-madaris-al-Arabia 
Pakistan 
Deobandi   Multan          1959 
Tanzim-ul-madaris Brailvi   Lahore          1960 
Wafaq-ul-madaris Shia Shia   Lahore           1959 
Rabta ul madaris al Islamia Jamaat-i-Islami   Lahore           1983 
Wafaq-ul-madaris-al-Salafia Ahl-i-Hadith   Faisalabad           1955 
 
Curriculum of madrassas 
Most of the madrassas in Pakistan teach Dars-i-Nizami as a standard curriculum. But before 
Mulla Nizam Uddin who standardised the curriculum different teachers taught different texts 
to students and there was no compact curriculum of religious schools. Texts taught in 
religious seminaries before Mulla Nizam Uddin were mostly religious in contents. As Francis 
Robinson (2002) in his book ‗The Ulema of Farangi Mahall and Islamic culture in South 
Asia‘ says that Pre-Dars-i-Nizami curriculum(s) emphasised largely on manqulat (transmitted 
knowledge/revealed knowledge) and it was Dars-i-Nizami that brought maqulat to forefront.  
The significance of the enhanced emphasis on ma‘ qulat in the Dars-i-Nizamiyya lies in part 
in the superior training it offered prospective lawyers, judges and administrators. As 
mentioned earlier, at that time Persian schools which impart secular education were much in 
number and Arabic schools (madrassas) were less in number. In order to enhance the 
popularity of Arabic schools, their curriculum was revamped and Darsi-Nizami was 
formulated. The study of advanced books of logic, Philosophy and dialectics were taught. 
Dars-i-Nizami continued updating of its contents and Dars-i-Nizami educated men were 
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sought for employment outside the domain of religion at that time (Rahman, 2004). Turning 
point in the history of religious schools came with the advent of East India Company when 
they confined themselves to religious sphere only. 
 
In Pakistan, Dars-i-Nizami remained mainly unchanged. 37 Canonical texts are still part of 
madrassa curriculum. The greatest critic of the madrassa curriculum was Maulana Maududi38
 
who argued that, being based on memorisation of medieval texts, the madrassas were not 
providing relevant education to the Muslim society. The Dars-i-Nizami has come to 
symbolise the stagnation and ossification of knowledge. It is taught through canonical texts 
which, however, are taught through commentaries (sharh); glosses or marginal notes 
(hashiya) and super-commentaries (taqarir). There are commentaries upon commentaries 
explained by even more commentaries. For the South Asian students, they no longer explain 
the original texts being themselves in Arabic. They have to be learned by heart which makes 
students use only their memory not their analytical powers. 
Education at Madrassas 
However, Islamic education imparted at formal religious institutions is systematized, even 
though the specific duration and content of education at each level may vary with the 
sectarian orientation of the madrassa in question and the extent to which it has augmented its 
curriculum with mainstream subjects. Thus conditions may vary. The following schedule is 
based on a standard, seventeen-year, formal Islamic education program. 
 The first level is Ibtedai (primary or elementary), where only the Koran is taught. This 
level covers the early five-year period of education that is generally equivalent to the 
primary-school level in the mainstream educational sector. 
 The second stage is Mutawassitah, or 'intermediary. It is generally three years long 
and comparable to the middle-school level at mainstream schools. 
 The third through sixth levels are each two years long. At this stage students begin the 
Alim course curriculum. Often called Dars-i-Nizami, it is modified according to the 
particular sectarian affiliation of the madrassa in question. Madrassas of different 
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 Though some modifications were made in Dars-i-Nizami yet its major contents remained unchanged and 
canonical texts are still there. 
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 Maulana Maududi is the founder of Jamaat-i-Islami. 
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sectarian affiliations will teach different versions of the curriculum. Some times this 
eight-year
39
, four-stage program is referred to as fauqani. Or it may be called the 
"Alim course," in reference to the final certificate or degree (sanad). The first of the 
four stages is Thanviyah-e-Ammah, followed by Thanviyah-e- Khasah. The next two 
stages, Aaliyah and Alimiyah, are considered advanced. When students complete the 
Alimiyah level, they have completed the Dars-i-Nizami curriculum. This degree is 
recognized by the government of Pakistan as an M.A. in two subjects (Islamic studies 
and Arabic). A person with this degree is an alim. 
 The final stage of religious study is Takmeel. Comparable to post- graduate studies, it 
can be one year or more long and comprises various specialized fields of study. 
 
In table 3.3 the certificates and degrees of madrassas along with their chronological equivalence to 
mainstream educational institutes is given: 
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 Yearly curriculum of madrassas is given in the appendix 06. 
 
 
62 
 
Table 3.3: Programs of Madaris Study and Their Chronological Equivalence to Non-religious 
School 
Level (Darja) Level Duration Certificate 
(Sanad) 
Comparable to 
mainstream education 
Ibtadai Nazra 4-5 years Shahadatul Tahfeez ul 
Koran 
Primary 
(5th Grade) 
Mutavasatta Hifz 3 years Shahadatul 
Mutavasatta 
Middle 
(8th) 
Sanviya 
Amma 
Tajveed,Qirat 2 years Shahadatul Sanviya al 
Amma 
Matric 
(10th) 
Sanviya 
Khasa 
Tehtani (Higher 
Secondary) 
2 years Shahadatul Sanviya 
Khasa 
Intermediate 
(F.A) 
Aliya Mohqufaleh 
Khasa va sada 
2 years Shahadatul Aliya B.A 
Alamiya Daura Hadees 
Sabia va Sania 
2 years Shahadatul Alamiya 
phil ulumul Arabia vul 
Islamia 
MA and recognised as 
MA in Islamic Studies 
and Arabic by GOP 
 
 
In the wake of 9/11 religious seminaries came under the gaze of national and international 
community. Before that madrassa education hardly attracted policy makers‘ attention. 
Barring the fact, till 2001 madrassas remained the victim of government‘s apathy, but 
successive governments in Pakistan, since inception, formulated policies related to madrassa 
education from time to time. However, it is debateable to what extent these policies were 
implemented in letter and spirit. In the face of external pressure, after terrorist attacks, some 
serious steps were taken on the part of Musharraf government (1999-2007) to reform 
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madrassa system but because of severe reaction from the religious political parties, no 
substantial achievement was made in this regard.  
 
Madrassas in Pre-Soviet Invasion Period 
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1980s witnessed the surge of madrassas both in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. In that time, madrassas not only increased in number but they also had 
exposure to state sponsored Jihad (armed struggle). Pre-Soviet invasion period can be taken 
as dormant phase in madrassas‘ history. 
 
Following independence in 1947, Pakistan underwent a series of political convulsions as a 
result of tensions between the military and the feudal elite. While most of Pakistan‘s early 
leaders followed Jinnah‘s model of modern education, they did not have widespread support 
in rural areas. The bureaucracy and the military were modelled after the British system which 
was resented by the Ulema (religious scholars). Though some of these scholars were 
appointed to government posts their presence was largely symbolic. 
 
The ascendance to power of the military general Ayub Khan in 1958 heralded a new era in 
Pakistani madrassas‘ history. As part of his policy of exercising control over religious 
institutions, the Ayub Khan government established an awqaf property (non- transferable 
religious endowments on which many madrassas were dependent to meet expenses) 
department to regulate shrines and madrassas. To this day there is a high-ranking civil-service 
position of 'secretary awqaf' -these officers have jurisdiction over awqaf properties.40
 
In 
response to such moves, the ulema established four wifaqs or federations of madrassas along 
sectarian lines: Wifaq al Madaaris al Arabiya (Sunni-Deobandi); Tanzim al Madaaris- al-
Arabiya (Sunni-Bareilvi); Wifaq al Madaaris-al-Salafia (Sunni- :Salafi/Ahle-Hadith) and 
Wifaq al Madaaris-al-Shia (Shia). Interestingly enough the Salafis, who are now most closely 
associated with the Saudi regime, were the first to take this initiative in 1955 even before 
Ayub Khan‘s government while the other sects established their boards in 1959 or later (Riaz, 
2005). The government's reform plan included the introduction of secular education in 
madrassas similar to what was attempted by President Musharraf. The aim was to enable 
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madrassa students to 'enter public professions' and 'play their full part as citizens.'41 The 
madrassa reform efforts of this period were largely rejected by the ulema except for some 
initial hints of approval from the Jamaat- e-Islaami. 
  
After the fall of Ayub, Z.A. Bhutto came up with the idea of socialism and nationalisation. 
The education sector was nationalized too; however, most of the madrassas remained 
independent. According to government data, 1,828 schools, 346 madrassas, 155 colleges and 
5 technical institutions were nationalized (Rahman, 2004, p. 16). Bhutto further tried to build 
alliances with the ulema by offering to grant madrassas the equivalence of public sector 
certificates and diplomas. The highest degree of the Deobandi wafaq was to be made 
equivalent with a Master's degree in Islamic Studies from a government university; given 
madrassa students cleared a Bachelor's level English course. However, this equivalence was 
largely implemented and institutionalized during the Zia administration that followed Bhutto. 
 
The new military ruler, general Zia-ul-Haq was known for his strong religious proclivities 
and he believed fervently in establishing a more ideological state. To gain the support of the 
religious seminaries, the government offered incentives such as the 1979 education policy 
that promised 5000 mosques schools and a national committee for religious institutes to 
transform madrassas into an important part of the educational system. A national survey was 
conducted by Dr A.W.J Halepota, an educator who had also been associated with Ayub 
Khan's commission for educational reform in the 1960s, which proposed improving the 
economic condition of madrassas and modernizing them with the aim of eventually 
integrating the religious and the formal education sectors while 'conserving the autonomy of 
madrassas' (Malik 1996). Some modern subjects at the primary, secondary and graduation 
levels were recommended without altering the theological texture of the curriculum. 
Following the earlier initiative during the Bhutto years, the Zia government declared the 
highest certificates of wifaq boards‘ equivalent to MA in Arabic or Islamiyat and waved off 
the condition that madrassa students should clear a Bachelor's level English course. Madrassa 
graduates were employed as teachers, to widen their horizon of employment. The primary 
motivation for this was to fill a shortage of Arabic and Islamiyat teachers in colleges and 
universities created by making coursework in these subjects compulsory at various levels of 
schooling. It was just the beginning of an age that attained its culmination in post-Soviet 
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invasion in Afghanistan era. Religious parties also flourished during this period. There were 
only 30 such parties in the country in 1979, and now there are more than 200. 
 
Madrassas in Post Soviet Invasion period 
The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets in 1979 necessitated a response from the Islamists 
as well as the Americans. The linkage between madrassas and the Soviet-Afghan war has 
been widely contested. While Western writers (Singer, 2001; Stern, 2004) as well as 
numerous Pakistani intellectuals and nongovernmental organizations (Ahmed, 2003, ICG, 
2002) affirm the linkage, the military establishment in Pakistan largely denies any direct 
connection. When interviewed for this study, General Hamid Gul, who served in the army 
during the Zia years and was later the head of the Pakistani military's Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI) towards the end of the Afghan war denied any direct support from the ISI 
for the madrassas. However, he acknowledged that the influx of Afghan refugees during this 
time necessitated the establishment of schools for the education of their children and since the 
Afghan population had a greater proclivity for religious education, madrassas started to 
emerge naturally near refugee settlements and the military provided logistical support to these 
institutions. 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Pakistani military as well as its allies in the United States at 
this time encouraged an ideologically-driven war. Islam was certainly used to galvanize 
action on the part of the Afghans that were fighting the Soviets as well as to garner public 
support within Pakistan and in this regard madrassas of Pakistan and Afghanistan played a 
pivotal role (Allen, 2006). For instance, special textbooks in Darri (Afghan Persian) and 
Pashto were written at the University of Nebraska-Omaha with US government support and 
were taught to madrassa students.
 
There are video-taped speeches of the Secretary of State 
during the Carter administration, Zbigniew Brezinski, hailing the cause of jihad against the 
‗Godless Soviets‘ and also hailing the role of madrassas for upholding the morale of 
soldiers.42 American arms and money unquestionably flowed to Afghanistan through 
Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence as a way of defeating Soviet advances in the region. The 
US decision to support the mujahideen (so-called holy warriors) was, however, guarded 
because of the Iranian revolution that occurred around the same time. Policy-makers were 
wary of supporting religious zealots but were comforted by the fact that Iran was primarily 
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Shia and Afghanistan was primarily Sunni.43 Initially the aid was relatively small; amounting 
to $30 million in 1979, the year the Soviet invasion took place. However, this was increased 
considerably both directly to Afghanistan and also to Pakistan which interestingly coincided 
with the establishment of hundreds of new madrassas in both countries. At its peak, the aid to 
Pakistan amounted to $3.1 billion annually and to Afghanistan over $600 million (Tanner, 
2002). New madrassas in Punjab (mainly in the southern belt of the Punjab) were also opened 
to strengthen ties with Arab countries, mainly Saudi Arabia. 
 
However, the fact that the United States helped the jihadists at the time is unfortunately used 
by some scholars to dignify the radicalism of the jihadists, suggesting that they are giving 
America a 'taste of their own medicine.' In particular, a recent book by Mamdani (2004) 
points the finger directly at the US, suggesting that some 'high-level' jihadists (Islamic 
militants) were trained in US camps. Mamdani states that in four years some 80,000 
mujahideen were trained from 43 Islamic countries. In Pakistan, with active US support, over 
2,500 madrassas were set up with an annual enrolment of 225,000 students (ibid, 2004). 
 
Madrassas in Post Soviet withdrawal 
Following the retreat of Soviet forces in 1989, and the ensuing civil war in Afghanistan, the 
madrassas‘ connection to conflict became clearer. For example, the Dur-ul-Uloom Haqqania 
in Akora Khattak, one of the most well-known madrassa has direct connections with the 
Taliban (whose name itself means 'the students'). European Union reported that as many as 
30 per cent of the Taliban's fighters attended madrassas44. Mullah Umar, the leader of the 
Taliban has an honorary degree from this madrassa. The head of Darul-Uloom Haqqania, 
Maulana Sami-ul-Haq was elected a member of the Pakistani Parliament in the 2002 election. 
He was chairman of the pro-Taliban anti-Western Pak-Afghan Defence Force and was once 
imprisoned by former president Musharraf, but was released. ―Haqqania is known in Pakistan 
as Jihad University, a name not bestowed on it by a sensationalist media but by the Maulana 
and his charges themselves.‖45 Haqqania madrassa has a student body of 1500 boarding 
students and 1000 day students, from 6 years old upwards. Each year over 18,000 applicants 
from poor families compete for around 500 open spaces. 
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In 1988, civilian rule came back to Pakistan to stay for a decade till 1999 when the military 
decided to take power back. None of the four elected governments could complete their 
respective tenures before being ousted by another. In the meantime, the Taliban took over 
most of Afghanistan in 1994 and the Pakistani government, under Benazir Bhutto,46 
recognized the Taliban government (Rashid, 2000). As far as the issue of madrassa epidemic 
was concerned, Benazir and Nawaz Sharif governments had hardly anything new on their 
policy papers when Pakistan witnessed martial law fourth time in its short history in October 
1999. 
 
Madrassas in post 9/11 era 
After terrorist attacks on American soil Afghanistan was attacked and Taliban government 
was toppled for providing harbour to so called terrorists. Pakistan; one of the three countries 
that recognized Taliban government was forced to play a front-line state in the war against 
terror. Owing to external pressure Pakistani government declared 8 religious groups as 
terrorist and banned them. 
In order to counter increasing militancy, Musharraf regime introduced Madrassa reforms. The 
government of Pakistan came up with some legislation in this regard. 
 Pakistan‘s Madrassa Education Board ordinance 2001 
 
 Voluntary Registration and Regulation ordinance 2002 
 
By virtue of this legislation curriculum of madrassas was destined to change. The ordinances 
stipulated the induction of secular subjects, like English, Mathematics, Computer Science, 
Economics, Political Science, Law and Pakistan Studies in madrassa curricula at different 
levels. In addition, all the madrassas were supposed to get registered so that enrolment of 
students and scrutiny of finances of madrassas could be materialised. It was also a viable way 
to have a watch over the entry of foreign students in madrassas. The government declared 
that ‗model madrassas‘ will be established. All these policies regarding madrassas met with 
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abysmal results. Initially, the legislation stipulated registration as mandatory for all madrassas 
but in the face of opposition from religious parties, the registration was declared voluntary. 
So far as the establishment of model madrassas is concerned, they are only three in number. 
Many critics believe that the failure of madrassa reforms was basically the result of half-
hearted effort on the part of government (Saleem H. Ali, 2009). 
 
 Funding of Madrassa Education 
Historically, madrassas in the subcontinent were supported by land grants and wealthy 
patrons. Their ownership has traditionally been in the form of a trust. In some ways 
madrassas are public institutions because of their social service dimension and inextricable 
linkage between Islam and the state in Pakistan. However, they are beyond government 
control and hence are private. However, as the funding sources indicate, there is a wide 
linkage of various interests which thus have figurative ownership of the establishments. Most 
of the madrassas are 'owned' by an individual religious leader; they may have a paper 
management committee or a board of governors, just for fulfilment of regulatory 
requirements. In fact, even the management committees or boards of governors are close 
relatives and hand-picked associates of the religious leader. This proprietorship dimension of 
madrassa management brings in the very important monetary or economic factor (Ali, 2009). 
Madrassas being religious schools also act as political institutions. Many madrassas are 
attached or affiliated to a religious political party and may receive support from them as well. 
For example, the madrassas organized by the Jamaat-e-Islaami in Mansoora, near Lahore, 
receive contributions from the party as well. According to estimates provided by the Punjab 
government, 1256 madrassas are affiliated with various political parties, with more than two-
thirds of these affiliated with the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI).47 
 
However, the source of the funds in turn to the parties that are earmarked for madrassas need 
to be better understood. In addition, the motivation for sending students to madrassas may 
also provide some insights into the source of funding, since much of it is intended in the form 
of scholarships for the needy. Some scholars have studied economic motivation for madrassa 
enrolment. According to Fayyaz Hussain (1994), a student who completed his ethnographic 
research on Jamia Ashrafia of Lahore in 1994, nearly half the students joined the madrassa 
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for economic reasons. According to a survey which was conducted by Mumtaz Ahmad in 
1976, ‗more than 80 per cent of the madrassa students in Peshawar, Multan, and Gujranwala 
were found to be sons of small or landless peasants, rural artisans, or village imams of the 
mosques (quoted from Ahmad, 2000: 185). A survey conducted by the Institute of Policy 
Studies (2002), says that 64 per cent madrassa students come from rural areas and belong to 
poor agrarian families. Rahman (2004) conducted a survey in eight cities of Pakistan in 
December 2002 and January 2003, madrassa students and teachers were asked about their 
income. Among those who responded, 76.6 per cent belonged to the poorer sections of 
society. The teachers of the madrassas also mostly (61 per cent) belong to the same socio-
economic bracket as their students.  
 
Nevertheless, despite their modest needs, the sheer scale of madrassa prevalence still requires 
a steady stream of funds. Some of the sources of funds that are considered most salient are as 
follows: 
 
Funding by Local and Global Philanthropists 
Philanthropic donations by local aristocrats, particularly urban based traders and rural land 
owners, are a major source of funding for most of the madrassas. Every madrassa has certain 
identified patrons, particularly in rural areas or small urban towns. These donations are 
mostly motivated by a feeling of charity called ‘Sadaqa and Khairat.’ It is also a means of 
atonement and gratitude to God for the devout. Some individuals also dedicate one of their 
children to study in a madrassa for a few years as an even greater mark of commitment. A 
study conducted in 2000 by the Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy claims that approximately 
Rs 7 billion ($120 million) are given in local philanthropy nationally in Pakistan, out of 
which a considerable proportion is given to local mosques, madrassas and religious shrines.48 
Local financial patrons such as the land owners and traders on every harvest make donations 
of wheat and cotton to local madrassas. Their financial contribution also forms a huge part of 
madrassa funding. 
 
A recent study of charitable giving from the Pakistani Diaspora in the United States, authored 
by Professor Adil Najam (2006) under the auspices of the Global Equity project at Harvard 
University, concludes that Pakistani-Americans are a ‗generous, giving and active 
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Community‘. Using a detailed survey of over 400 individuals across America and a series of 
focus group sessions, the study found that 62 per cent of the respondents reported that 
religious obligation was of ‗high or ‗very high‘ importance in their reason for charity. A 
slightly higher percentage gave motivational importance to ‗helping others in need‘ (79 per 
cent) and ‗helping family and friends‘ (69 per cent). 
 
The report also has some sobering news for the Pakistani government. About half of the 
respondents stated clearly that their contribution would be higher if they had more trust in 
institutional support across Pakistan that assured them that their contributions were being put 
to good use. One of the sponsors of this project, The Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy, has 
undertaken the task of certifying charities through a detailed audit and review process, which 
can perhaps help in building this trust. This process may have important consequences for 
addressing concerns about monitoring the financial activity of extremist organizations as 
well. 
 
By far the most significant individual charity in the Muslim world for development is the Aga 
Khan network of foundations, which have a collective asset base of almost half a billion 
dollars.49 Indeed, the Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy itself had its genesis with the Aga 
Khan Foundation as well. However, this network of charities is run with utmost 
professionalism and registered in numerous non-Muslim countries as well. While the 
community derives its funds from giving by a mild Shia denomination within Islam, they also 
have numerous commercial investments by the Aga Khan's family such as hotels and tourism 
operations in Asia and Africa whose profits are also funnelled into the charitable activities of 
the network. Much of the educational support from this foundation goes to fund mainstream 
schools, institutions of higher learning and also some Shia madrassas. 
 
 
Funds from Saudi Arabia and Iran  
The role of Saudi Arabia in funding various Islamic organizations has come under criticism 
on many accounts. First, there is the role of the state itself in promoting the Wahabi doctrine 
of Islam which is perceived to be highly puritanical. The 9/11 commission report points out 
that ‗awash in sudden oil wealth, Saudi Arabia competed with Shia Iran to promote its Sunni 
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fundamentalist version of Islam; Wahabism.‘50 Commenting on sectarian strife in Pakistan, 
Pande (2011) said, ―…during Zia regime Pakistan became a battle ground for Shi’ite Iran and 
Wahabbi Saudi Arabia.‖ The Wahabi doctrine originated in Saudi Arabia but follows a 
tradition of puritanical movements in Islam across the ages.  
 
The donation towards Islamic education emanates from two primary sources in Saudi Arabia- 
government institutions and private foundations. The primary government institution that has 
supported Islamic educational efforts abroad is the Rabita Aalam-e-Islami (The Muslim 
World League) based in Makkah. This organization was established in 1962 to promote unity 
in the Islamic world. As part of its mandate, the Muslim World League established several 
schools around the Muslim world as well. Saudi Arabia through the Muslim World League 
has certainly helped in promoting a jihadist vision, though often with the acquiescence of 
Western governments (Yousuf, 2012). As noted earlier, the Afghan jihad was directly 
supported by Saudi facilitation of foreign militants. It is widely known and acknowledged by 
US government sources that in 1980, Osama bin Laden was recruited by Prince Turki-al-
Faisal, then head of Saudi intelligence, to help organizing the mujahidin supply lines in the 
Russo-Afghan war. 
 
The second major source of funds for Islamic education comes from a series of private 
charities from Saudi Arabia, Iran and other Muslim countries. In 2003, the Saudi government 
announced that it was banning private charities and relief groups from donating money 
overseas, until new regulations are instituted to ensure that the money is not being channelled 
to terrorist organizations. 51 
 
There appears to be a common acceptance in many US policy circles that a majority of 
funding for Pakistani madrassas comes from abroad, particularly Saudi Arabia. Yousuf, 
(2012) does not single out Saudia Arabia in this regard but pointed at Iran‘s contribution as 
well. However, little empirical evidence is provided to support assertions of figures such as 
those provided by policy research institutions such as the Centre for Security Policy or the 
Cato Institute that assert that 75 per cent of Pakistani madrassa funding comes from abroad.52 
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Our analysis shows that while this may have been true of certain madrassa clusters around the 
time of the Afghan-Soviet war, it is not a credible assertion based on our contemporary 
empirical research. The policy implications of simply focusing on Saudi sources of funding 
can be profound since many of the domestic sources would thus be neglected for regulatory 
oversight. 
 
Zakat 
Zakat is a religious tithe that Muslims are obliged to pay and the rate for its payment is 2.5 
per cent of savings/assets that a person holds. Previously it was a private undertaking but in 
1979, the government of General Zia-ul-Haq, levied zakat officially and set up an elaborate 
Federal Zakat Administration, with provincial Zakat Councils and even district Zakat 
Administrations governed by the Zakat Ordinance. 
 
The purposes for which zakat funds can be spent are clearly mandated by Islamic injunctions. 
One of the key purposes is welfare of orphans and the destitute. Using this provision as an 
enabling opportunity, many madrassas that cater to orphans have been considered legitimate 
recipients of zakat funds. The Central Zakat Administration which is traditionally dominated 
by religious leaders devised a policy in the 1980s, through which zakat funds are given to 
madrassas specially those that give services to residential students. It is regulated by a policy 
called 'Revised Zakat Disbursement Procedure for Deeni Madrassas' as approved by Central 
Zakat Council on 18 May 2002. 
 
It is generally believed that zakat funding provided the major impetus for growth of 
madrassas in 1980s and 1990s. However the official data of Islamabad Zakat Administration 
shows that 22 madrassas out of a total of 117 got zakat funding. It shows that though zakat is 
a source of madrassa funding yet no longer a major source of funding. 
 
Somehow, on aggregate, zakat is also a resource flow to madrassas; approximately 150 
million rupees are given by over 100 district zakat committees (DZC) to madrassas all over 
Pakistan.53 In Islamabad, DZC gives approximately 2.0 million rupees to 20 different 
madrassas. These funds are meant for food and lodging of students; however, the DZCs give 
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these funds directly to the managers of madrassas, and these are mostly utilized for 
infrastructure development and other expenses. 
 
In principle the zakat funding is given directly to the entitled individual beneficiary. However 
in the case of madrassas, the quantum of funding is decided on the basis of student enrolment, 
but funds are not given to individual students, but payments are made directly to the manager 
of the madrassa. This gives him the authority and freedom to spend the funding. Often, such 
funding is mostly used for physical improvements and extensions in madrassas and rarely 
used for food, lodging and clothing of students, which is its authorized purpose. 
 
Miscellaneous Sources 
Every year after the annual Hajj pilgrimage, Muslims all over the world commemorate 
Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son by sacrificing a sheep, goat or cow/bull or even a 
camel: The meat of slaughtered animals is distributed among poor people and close 
neighbours. Apart from the distribution of the meat of the lambs to the poor and needy, the 
hides of the animals are also a highly prized and valuable donation. The scale of funds 
generated through this source is so huge that large political parties, charitable trusts and 
foundations and many hospitals launch a special campaign for the collection of raw animal 
hides of scarified animals. 
 
The madrassas launch very vigorous campaigns for collecting the raw hides of sacrificed 
animals. These hides fetch a very good price in the market of approximately $20 per hide. It 
is estimated that approximately 9 million small animals (sheep, goats), and one million large 
animals (bulls, and camels) are sacrificed every year in Pakistan for this festival.54 The 
revenue generated is thus significant and deserves further study to ascertain the exact amount 
that makes its way to madrassas. 
 
While the direct contribution of government funds to madrassas is relatively small, the largest 
resource transfer to madrassas is the land grants by the state for construction of madrassas. 
According a survey conducted by Saleem H. Ali (2009) shows that 90 per cent of madrassas 
in Islamabad Capital territory are built on state / public land and invariably in violation of 
building and land use regulations. Invariably a mosque is attached to a madrassa and this 
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coupling greatly hampers any regulatory initiative by the state. Any pro-active initiative will 
be portrayed as interference by the government in the affairs of the mosque and easily dubbed 
a sacrilegious action. The ban imposed by the federal government on registration of new 
madrassas under the Societies Act of 1860, had been lifted in 2004 on the persistent demand 
of MMA dominated governments of NWFP and Balochistan. This allows for the ostensibly 
legitimate further expansion of madrassas though as mentioned earlier, most of the madrassas 
are marginally registered and there is limited enforcement of registration of any schools. 
 
The Pakistani government has initiated a reform effort and is also providing funds to 
madrassas but not all are accepting this help-it is unclear as to how many madrassas these 
funds are being disbursed to. According to Rahman (2004), in 2001-02 a total of Rs 
1,654,000 was distributed among the madrassas which accepted the help. An additional aid of 
Rs 30.5 million is promised for providing computers and changing the syllabi which will 
come to approximately Rs 28.6 per student (assuming around 1.05 million recipients). 
However, as all madrassas do not accept financial help from the government, the money 
would not be distributed as evenly as the above calculations might suggest. 
 
Conclusion 
Madrassa is a controversial educational institution of Pakistani society. The tragic incidents 
of 9/11 brought these schools under the gaze of international scholarship as most of the 
operatives of the Taliban
55
 government in Afghanistan were ‗educated‘ in the religious school 
system. The incident gave rise to many a question with respect to these schools: such as, what 
are these schools?  How did they evolve? How do they function? What do they teach?  How 
do they teach? Where do they get their money?  Who supports them? How are they 
organised, so on and so forth. This chapter has tried to answer some of these questions. It 
talked about the genesis of these institutes in the Muslim world and their evolution in India 
and then in Pakistan. The chapter discussed about their kinds, their organisation, structure, 
curriculum, pedagogy and funding in detail.  
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Chapter 4 
Research Methodology 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the description of the research design and methodology employed in the 
present study which aimed to look into the attitude of students from madrassas. It is also 
destined to determine how the worldview of students coming from three different types of 
schooling systems is polarized such as what they think what education is for, what is their 
take on the position of non-Muslims in Pakistani society, what do they think about equality 
between men and women, what do they believe about Jihad (militancy/armed struggle) and 
tolerance of minorities and people of diverse sects and so on. This study is mixed method and 
was combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches in which research questionnaire 
and interview tools were the sources of data collection. This chapter starts with research aims 
and research questions followed by detailed comments on research methodology such as 
mixed method (combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies), description of 
research design (Instrumentation), participants and sampling, procedures, analysis techniques 
and reliability and ethical considerations. 
Aims of Study 
The methodology selected for any research project must be appropriate to the goals of the 
research. As this thesis utilises different approaches, the researcher intends to discuss these in 
some detail. At the preliminary stage, the aims and objectives of the research had to be 
clearly determined and the value in adopting one, or more, research methodologies had to be 
assessed (Cohen and Mannion, 1994). The first step, in developing a doctoral research 
proposal, involves a search of the existing literature. For this thesis, extensive use was made 
of several reports, official documents, journal papers and books and so on published on 
‗religious extremism in Pakistan‘ particularly in post 9/11 era. Most of the literature blamed 
madrassas as the training centres of Jehadis. In a memorandum dated 16 October 2003, then-
Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld posed the following to his Deputy Defence 
Secretaries and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
―Today, we lack the metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on 
terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists everyday 
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than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying 
against us?‖56 
 
In addition to it, there is a plethora of writings which traces, along with militancy, the 
proliferation of sectarianism, women rights violation, suppression of minorities and so on in 
madrassa education. They are of the view that madrassas are not involved in the recruitment 
of militants only, but also responsible for the development of anti-woman and anti-minority 
posture in Pakistani society. According to ICG reports, the madrassa problem goes beyond 
militancy. Students at more than 10,000 seminaries are being trained in theory, for service in 
the religious sector. But their constrained worldview and lack of modern civic education give 
rise to sectarianism, anti-woman and anti-minority behaviour in the society (2002, 2007). 
Though these writings are of good quality, yet there is hardly any empirical evidence 
provided to support their stance. In particular, little had been written about the perception of 
madrassa students about those issues, for which they are blamed for having radical and 
extremist position. In order to address this, primary data collection was necessary. Keeping in 
view the aforesaid concerns about madrassas, this study intends to find out the attitudes of 
students attending madrassas about Islamic militancy, sectarian divide, status of women, 
place of minorities in Pakistani society and about the primary purpose of education. The 
intention of this study is not to establish what percentage of madrassa students actually join 
so-called Jihad or are involved in anti-women and anti-minorities behaviour, rather this 
research explores the views of students in both madrassa and mainstream schools on a range 
of issues. As mentioned in the previous chapters, madrassas in Pakistan are not monolithic 
institutions. They adhere to different sects - Deobandi, Brailvi, Ahle Hadith, Jamaat-i-Islami 
(all these are Sunni) and Shia. Each of these groups has its own madrassas imparting its own 
version of Islam and has diverse opinion regarding jihad (holy war), suicide bombing and 
primary purpose of education and so on. Along with comparing madrassa students and 
mainstream educational institutes‘ students regarding their opinion on a range of educational 
and socio-political issues, this study also aims to take forward a comparative analysis of 
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outlook of students of different types of madrassas on these issues. The socio-political issues 
which are the focus of this study are given as under: 
 The role of women in Pakistani society 
 The position of Non-Muslims in Pakistan 
 The concept of jihad and martyrdom 
 Phenomenon of suicide bombing 
 The primary purposes of education 
 Issue of societal cohesion with reference to sectarian differences 
Moreover, the study attempts to have a comparative analysis of social behaviour of students 
with respect to different events or happenings in daily life. For instance, what students think 
that the events in daily life result primarily from their actions or these are determined by luck 
and fate? For this purpose various psychometric scales have been incorporated in the 
questionnaire. 
As mentioned previously, currently there are three types of school systems operating in 
parallel in Pakistan: English medium schools, Urdu medium schools and madrassas. A 
student coming out of an English medium school may not have ample acquaintance with the 
established societal norms and Islamic values and a student coming out of Urdu medium 
school gets least chance of acquiring good job
57
. Madrassas students are group of youngsters 
that know very little about the outside world. Perhaps, the numbers of educational system that 
are currently working in Pakistan are not producing synergy but creating conflicts and 
division among people. This hierarchy of schooling systems not only hinders social mobility 
in the society but also seem to be perpetuating polarization of worldviews among the students 
of diverse school systems (Rahman, 2004). This study is to look at education from the 
viewpoint of students coming from different types of schooling systems. The study will 
contend, whether or not students which pass through these systems have divergent ideologies 
about education such as what do think what education is for, do they think education‘s 
primary purpose is to prepare students for work and employment, education is to promote 
economic equality and social justice, education‘s aim is to encourage understanding between 
men and women, schools are to promote shared values of Pakistani society, should the 
students have their due share in the decision making process about them in the schools and so 
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on. The research will also look at whether the worldview of all students, irrespective of their 
school type, is identical on women rights, status of non-Muslims, sectarian divide, armed 
Jihad, and so on. In order to have an in-depth understanding of the issue, this study is to look 
at the historical evolutionary processes of these systems. This study is to give a historical 
overview of the development of these diverse educational institutions in British India and to 
describe how these institutions expanded in the post-independence era. The study is also to 
argue about the differences in curriculum, pedagogical style and discipline techniques being 
practiced in these schools. 
 
Research Methodology 
Research methodologies can be broadly divided into quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
In a quantitative approach, the researcher seeks to analyse data which is presented in a 
numerical form. It involves data collection procedures that result from primarily numerical 
data which is then analysed primarily by statistical methods. Typical example: survey 
research using a questionnaire, analysed by statistical software such as SPSS (Dornyei, 2007: 
24). On the other hand, a qualitative approach is one which reflects thoughts and opinions. It 
involves data collection procedures that result primarily in open-ended non numerical data 
which is then analysed primarily by non-statistical methods. Typical example: interview 
research, with the transcribed recordings analysed by qualitative content analysis (Dornyei, 
2007: 24). Moyser (1988) and Lamb (2007) highlight an apparent dilemma between the 
attractions offered by a qualitatively rich array of personal insights into a particular problem, 
as might arise from some of the less structured methodologies, against the rigour and case 
comparability of more statistical methods. This thesis sought the opinions of students of 
madrassas, Urdu medium and English medium schools, on a range of questions relating to 
status of women and minorities, militancy, sectarian difference and the primary purpose of 
education. This search for personal, subjective views made, only quantitative approach, 
inappropriate. Hence, for the core of the thesis, a qualitative means of data collection has also 
been adopted. So, in order to ensure balance between quantitative and qualitative methods, 
mixed method technique has been opted. Both quantitative and qualitative methods employed 
in the study complement each other and the findings of questionnaire are got enriched with 
the interviews of participants. 
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Having elements both from quantitative and qualitative methods, this study can be 
categorised as a mixed method research. Mixed method research involves combinations of 
qualitative and quantitative research either at the data collection or at the analysis level. 
Typical example: consecutive and interrelated questionnaire and interview studies (Dornyei, 
2007: 24). Using mixed method is practically advantageous due to the reason that it helps to 
understand ‗construct meaning‘ and ‗investigate world‘ (McCraken, 1988; Morse, 1994; 
Mertens, 2003; Bell, 1999; Patton, 2002). 
 
Once the decision was taken for mixed method research, the instruments selected for data 
collection were self-administered questionnaires and interviews. Cohen and Mannion (1994) 
argue that a questionnaire is advantageous in many research contexts. It is anonymous and 
therefore can encourage greater honesty of response. Moreover, questionnaires can be more 
economical in terms of time and money. By standardising the range of responses, 
questionnaires facilitate the comparison of views held by different individuals or across 
different groups. In the context of policy analysis, questionnaire surveys present the preferred 
tool of investigation, where information is collected from a substantial number of subjects; 
where responses can be easily standardised; and where a comparison of group or sub-group 
responses is desired. And for this purpose, a closed-ended items questionnaire is the most 
suitable choice. If a questionnaire carries too heavily open-ended questions, there is a 
possibility that the survey itself may collapse, in the sense that respondents are too free to 
interpret the questions posted and the answers sought. In such a case, a comparison of 
responses may become impossible. If the researcher wants to examine the questionnaire topic 
further, a follow-up interview to discuss the topic in more depth is the most viable option. 
Thus, the self-administered questionnaire can be exploratory in nature, and serve as a starting 
point for other methodologies. 
 
The principal purpose of an interview is to gather information on what an individual knows, 
likes or thinks. However, it can also be used to test hypotheses, or suggest new ones, and to 
go deeper into the motivations of respondents and their reasons for their responses (Cohen 
and Mannion, 1994). The opportunity to go deeper into responses to questions is one of the 
main advantages of interviews, compared to questionnaires. For this study a two-phase 
researching methodology has been opted. In the first phase, a questionnaire is given to a good 
 
 
80 
 
number of participants and on the basis of certain features the researchers find out informants 
who show either typical or extreme cases from major aspects of the study. Following the 
completion of the questionnaire some informants are requested to take part in an interview. It 
is also important to note that this kind of activity does not prove to be fruitful if the 
questionnaire is anonymous. 
 
Epistemological Position 
As mentioned before, this study has ingredients both from quantitative and qualitative 
approaches which according to Dörnyei (2007: 24; Dörnyei, 2001b: 192) is a well known 
distinction in research methodology. It is not just the utilization of ‗figures versus non-
quantitative data‘ rather; this division declares two different philosophical approaches to the 
exploration of the world and construction of meaning (ibid, 1989: 380; Dorneyi, 2001b: 192).  
The study I embarked on has elements from perspectives of positivist and interpretive 
fashion. Weber (2004) elaborates this paradigm of research in the following manner: 
Ontology: positivists supposedly believe that reality is separate from the individual who 
observes it. Epistemology: positivists supposedly try to build knowledge of a reality that 
exists beyond the human mind, hence objective and independent reality gives foundation to 
human knowledge,  Research object: positivists believe that the object they research has 
qualities that exist independent of researcher, Research method: positivists tend to use 
laboratory experiments, field experiments, and surveys as their preferred research method, 
Truth: positivists believe that a statement made by a researcher is true when it has a one-to-
one mapping to the reality that exists beyond the human mind. Validity: positivists try to 
collect data that are a true measure of reality, which has types like; construct validity, internal 
validity, external validity and statistical conclusion validity. Reliability: positivists believe 
that results can be replicated by the researcher. Lack of reliability usually is attributed to 
factors such as researcher biases, inconsistencies in research processes used, differences in 
the contexts in which research was conducted, and measurement errors (Weber: 2004). 
The terms qualitative and quantitative explain the manner of theory construction, the method 
of data collection and analysis, and general ideological orientation present in the study 
(Dornyei, 2001: 192). According to Kuhn the theory or paradigm choice depends on 
normative consensus and commitment within scientific communities, means that the natural 
 
 
81 
 
and social sciences are perhaps not that different. Since any process of research has an 
interpretive dimension, the natural sciences are just as subjective in this sense as the social 
sciences. 
Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected in this study so that an in depth 
investigation of students‘ viewpoint and attitudes on different socio-political and educational 
themes could be found out and explained. On account of the complex nature of the research 
study, there was no single paradigm that could suitably deal with all of the required 
methodological aspects. Therefore, the researcher found it necessary to combine the 
quantitative/positivist paradigm with the qualitative/interpretive paradigm. The blending of 
both paradigms provided the researcher with the ability to statistically analyse the scientific 
data whilst also recognizing the complex psychosocial and emotional factors that may help in 
understanding deeply the attitudes of students. 
 
Instrumentation 
More than one research method was employed in this study as it was believed that opting for 
a combination of methods was appropriate in order to make use of their different strengths as 
well as for the purpose of cross-checking information obtained. In the first phase of data 
collection part of the study, I conducted a survey by using self-administered questionnaire. 
The popularity of questionnaires is due to the fact that they are easy to construct, extremely 
versatile, and uniquely capable of gathering a large amount of information quickly in a form 
that is readily process able (Dornyei, 2010; Dornyei, 2003; Rasinger, 2008). To record the 
responses of the participants, questionnaire is more focused, less time consuming and 
structured source (ibid, 2003, Cohen, et al 2000). 
 
Questionnaire may give three types of data about respondents (1) Factual (2) Behavioural and 
(3) attitudinal (Dornyei, 2010: 5; Dornyei, 2003: 8). 
(1) Factual questions: this is used to find out about who the respondents are. It typically 
covers demographic characteristics (age, gender and race), residential location, 
marital and socioeconomic status, level of education, religion, occupation as well as 
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any relevant information useful to interpreting the findings of the survey (ibid, 2003: 
8). 
(2) Behavioural question: these are used to find out what the respondents are doing or 
have done in the past. They ask about peoples‘ actions, life styles, habits and personal 
history (ibid, 2003: 8). 
(3) Attitudinal questions: these are used to find out what people think. This is a broad 
category that concerns attitude, opinions, beliefs, interest and values (ibid, 2003: 8).  
 
The type of questionnaire I constructed has elements from all three categories. As it asks the 
participants what they thought, they were also asked about their background information 
(their family system and living style and standard) as well as where they got their previous 
education. The questionnaire asked 77 closed questions from the participants (Appendix.1). 
The questionnaire constructed and used in this research is not in line with any standardised 
socio-educational model, rather questions formulating the questionnaire, were chosen from 
previous surveys, keeping in view the research questions of the study. Some questions were 
adopted from the survey of Rahman (2004) and others were framed by the researcher in 
consultation with Prof. Bob Davis and researcher‘s supervisor Prof. Andy Furlong. 
 
I preferred closed-ended questionnaire items and provided respondents with ready-made 
response options to choose from and give an appropriate grade from 1 to 5. The major 
advantage of closed questions is that their coding and tabulation is straightforward.  Dornyei 
(2003) says that the closed items are also referred as objective items. They are particularly 
suited for quantitative analyses. 
 
Many questionnaires include a mixture of ‗positively-keyed‘ and ‗negatively-keyed‘ items, 
and this needs to be addressed before computing the scores or conducting analysis. If a 
questionnaire includes positively-keyed and negatively-keyed items, then the negatively-
keyed items must be ―reverse-scored‖ before computing individuals‘ total scores and before 
conducting any analyses. The questionnaire administered in this study also included 
positively-keyed and negatively-keyed items which were reverse coded before computing 
individuals‘ total score and any kind of analysis. Out of 77 questionnaire items 14 items were 
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reverse-scored. I transformed all 1‘s on these items to 5‘s and transformed all 2‘s to 4‘s.  
Similarly, I transformed high scores on the negatively-keyed items to become low scores 
(thus indicating low levels of the attribute being measured) – recoding 5‘s to become 1‘s and 
recoding 4‘s to become 2‘s.  Because the 5-point scale includes 3 as a neutral point, I left all 
3‘s unchanged.  By reverse-scoring all of the negatively-keyed items, I created consistency 
among the items. By reverse-scoring the negatively-keyed items, I ensured that all of the 
items – those that were originally negatively-keyed and those that were positively-keyed – 
are in consistent with each other, in terms of what an ―agree‖ or ―disagree‖ imply. 
  
Rating Scale  
Rating scales are undoubtedly the most popular items in research questionnaire. They require 
the respondents to make an evaluative judgment of the target by marking one of a series of 
categories organized into scale. From categories of Likert, semantic differential and numeric 
rating scale, I preferred Likert scale. 
 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to define what Likert Scale is. Likert scale is named 
after its inventor Rensis Likert. Likert scales consist of a series of statements all of which are 
related to a particular target (individual person, group of people, an institution or concept), 
respondents are asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with these items 
by marking one of the responses ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. After the 
scale has been administered, each response option is assigned a number for scoring purpose. 
Few researchers prefer using an even number of response options because of the concern that 
certain respondents might use the middle category (neither agree nor disagree not sure or 
neutral) to avoid making a real choice. 
 
In the current study, measurement of attitudes or opinions of students towards different socio-
political issues was performed by the use of Likert style questions. These methods are widely 
used techniques for attitude/opinion measurement in education, allowing the respondents to 
express opinions ranging from favourable to unfavourable. For this purpose, I used number as 
 
 
84 
 
(e.g., strongly disagree=1; disagree=2; neither agree nor disagree=3; agree=4 and strongly 
agree=5). 
Interviews 
The qualitative interviews were conducted to gain in-depth information in connection with 
the questionnaires. Kahan and Best (1986) say that the interview is in a sense an oral 
questionnaires. Instead of writing the response, the interviewee gives the needed information 
orally and face-to-face or one to one. With a skilful interviewer, the interview is often 
superior to other data gathering devices (ibid, 1986). One reason is that people are more 
willing to talk than to write. The interviewer gains rapport or establishes friendly and secure 
relationship with the interviewee, certain type of confidential information (Smith, et al. 1991: 
218). In other data collection/gathering instruments it is hard to explicitly explain the purpose 
but in interviewing the interviewer can explain the purpose (before the formal proceedings) 
and can answer the interviewees‘ queries (Kahan and Best, 1986). 
 
Interviews are of different types such as structured, unstructured and semi-structured. In this 
study I used semi-structured interview instrument. 
Semi-structured interviewing is more flexible than standardised methods such as the 
structured interview. According to Dornyei (2007: 136) such type of interviewing is 
‗compromise between two extremes‘ (such as structured and un-structured). Although the 
interviewer in this technique, usually, have some established general topics for investigation, 
this method allows for the exploration of emergent themes and ideas rather than relying only 
on concepts and questions defined in advance of the interview. The interviewer uses 
interview schedule with set questions which are asked to all respondents. The questions tend 
to be asked in a similar order and format to make a form of comparison between answers 
possible. However, there is also scope for pursuing and probing for novel, relevant 
information, through additional questions often noted as prompts on the schedule. The 
interviewer frequently has to formulate impromptu questions in order to follow up leads that 
emerge during the interview. This was very much the case in this research project, where 
there were of course prepared guiding questions and prompts, but the format was open-ended 
and the informants were asked to elaborate. The semi-structured interview is good in 
conditions when the researcher has good understanding of the phenomenon or domain in 
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question and is able to develop wide questions about the topic prior to conduct of the 
interview (ibid, 2007).  The areas which were covered in these interviews were: why students 
have particular view point about certain socio-political issue(s)? To what extent do they see 
the role of their schooling in the formulation of such stance? Did they have same views 
before joining this school/madrassa? and so on (appendix.4). 
According to Walford (1994), interviewing is the preferred tool of analysis, where it is not 
possible or desirable to pose a set series of questions only. This was, of course, the case in 
this study, where the primary goal of interviewing was not so much to receive standard 
answers to set questions, as it had been done before through survey, but rather to elicit in-
depth information about the opinions and viewpoints of the selective interviewees. Hence, 
what was of the greatest importance in these interviews was to enter the 'assumptive worlds' 
of the interviewees as the term was used by McPherson and Raab (1988). 
Participants and Sampling 
The study was conducted in South Punjab, Pakistan. South Punjab is described as an area 
comprising 13 districts: Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur, Bhakkar, Dera Ghazi Khan, Jhang, 
Khanewal, Layyah, Lodhran, Multan, Muzaffargarh, Rahimyar Khan, Rajanpur and Vehari. 
Its estimated population is 27 million. Compared to the rest of Punjab, this area has remained 
backward. The government and its agencies have exercised lesser control over South Punjab 
and have left its tribal oriented feudal structure intact. The local sardars
58
 were virtually 
running their fiefdoms in the area, going to the extent of ‗appointing‘ their favourites as local 
government functionaries. The hold of these local chiefs was, however, getting eroded for 
many years due to the expansion in influence and activities of officially supported religious 
hard line groups. These groups have been setting up their base in the area to recruit cadres 
and train them in connivance with the state for carrying out pogroms against Shias and other 
religious minorities within as well as for the jehad in Kashmir (Upadhyay, 2009). According 
to Shireen Mazari, a journalist and strategic affairs expert who hails from the area, there are 
185 registered madrassas in Dera Ghazi Khan alone of which 90 are Deobandi, 84 Barelvi, 
six Ahle Hadith while five belong to the Shia. Most receive foreign funding. The total 
number of students in Deobandi madrassas alone was 11,535. Similarly, in Bahawalpur, there 
are an estimated 1,000 madrassas. However, nothing can be said about the numbers of 
                                                          
58
 Sardar is a title of Persian origin, used for military and political leaders, but in the context of Pakistani society, 
the word is used for big landlords.  
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madrassas with certainty. Keeping in view the viability, I conducted survey in five districts of 
southern Punjab: Dera Ghazi Khan (my native town), Multan, Bahawalpur, Muzaffargarh and 
Rajanpur. 
Participants 
Participants of this cross-sectional study were students of 10
th
 level studying in Urdu medium 
government schools, English medium private schools and privately run madrassas situated in 
the aforesaid five districts of southern Punjab. Their approximate age would be 15-17 years. 
Total numbers of participants of the survey were 500. There were 70 students from each 
category of educational institutes except Urdu medium government school. The number of 
students from Urdu medium government school was 80. 
Table 4.1 
Participants of this study (N=500) 
S. no Type of Educational Institute Number of Participants 
1 Urdu medium government school 80 
2 English medium private school 70 
3 Deoband Madrassa 70 
4 Brailvi Madrassa 70 
5 Ahle Hadith Madrassa 70 
6 Shia Madrassa 70 
7 Jamaat-i-Islami Madrassa 70 
Total  500 
 
So far as the issue of sampling is concerned, it was kind of a convenience or opportunity 
sampling. Cohen, et al (2000) says that convenience sampling involves choosing the nearest 
individuals to serve as respondents and continuing the process until the required sample size 
has been obtained. In such case, the researcher simply chooses the sample from those to 
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whom he has easy access (ibid, 2003: 102). Along with the security issue, there were many 
reasons which led the researcher to choose convenience sampling for the selection of 
participants as Cohen, et al (2000) says access to sensitive areas might not only be difficult 
but problematical both legally and administratively. 
 
In addition to the questionnaire research, (N=21) participants were interviewed also. Three 
students from each category of the above educational institutes (list) were invited, on the 
basis of their responses. The questionnaire was not anonymized and the interviewees were 
purposely selected for showing certain characteristics – i.e those who have very strong views 
or mild stance on certain socio-political issues were interviewed. According to Cohen, et al 
(2000), in purposive sampling, researchers handpick the cases to be included in the sample on 
the basis of their judgement of their typicality. In this way, they build up a sample that is 
satisfactory to their needs. 
Piloting the Questionnaire  
Rasinger (2008) says that nothing is worse than handing out questionnaires to respondents, 
only to realize afterwards that it is flawed. Piloting the questionnaire is running a test with 
only a few participants in order to detect flaws (ibid, 2008). The pilot study should identify 
any problems with questions, scope of questions, and knowledge of participants (ibid, 2008). 
I piloted the research instrument, details are as under: 
Study site: English medium private school and a Brailvi madrassa situated in Dera 
Ghazi Khan 
 
Number of participants: n=50 
 
Students of 10
th
 level 
 
Month and Year: August/September 2010  
 
The present study was carried out after the ethics committee of the University of Glasgow 
scrutinized (1) EAP (2) plain language statement (3) consent form and (4) research 
instruments. At the first instance, I translated my questionnaire in Urdu and in order to ensure 
accuracy I got my questionnaire translated from my colleague teachers as well. After that a 
pilot study was conducted to ensure comprehension of the questionnaire by the students of 
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10th level and it was administered to madrassa and private schools' students only. On account 
of flood in Pakistan, summer vacations in government schools were extended up till 14th 
September 2010, as these schools were housing flood victims in South Punjab. So, no student 
from Urdu medium government school participated in the pilot study.  
 
As per plan 50 participants were given a Plain Language Statement (PLS) and consent form. 
They were apprised with their right to confidentially and anonymity. After the participants 
read the PLS and signed the consent form, research questionnaires were administered to 
them. I gave them an hour to complete the questionnaire and majority of the students returned 
the filled questionnaire before time. After getting the questionnaires filled I asked for their 
feedback regarding their comprehension about the language and subject of questions asked in 
the questionnaire. The participants were requested to extend their cooperation to reflect 
verbally on clarity, understandability and any other problems which might hinder them 
answer these questions. Guided by Gao (2004), following questions were asked: 
What will you say about time allocated for completion of questionnaire? 
Do you think that all instructions are clear?   
Are these questions clear to you? Do you feel difficulty to understand the language or 
content? 
Do you think you have any reservations with answering any items? 
What do you think about the number of pages/layout of the questionnaire and time? 
Is there anything else you would like to say about this? 
 
Their verbal feedback and their responses to the questions were good. However, some 
students from English medium school raised their concerns about question number 11 which 
inquires about the sect of students. They were of the view that they don't know about their 
sect. In order to cover every aspect of the question I incorporated the option of "Don't Know" 
in question 11 after consultation with my supervisor. Students responded almost every 
question asked in the questionnaire. Over all the response of students was good and they 
exhibited great understanding with respect to questions. 
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After the successful completion of pilot study, I prepared for the main study. I travelled to 
urban and rural parts of five districts of South Punjab. I met with principals, teachers and 
personnel of different educational institutes in order to seek permission and also their 
cooperation for the logistic arrangements such as (a) classroom for completion of 
questionnaires (b) quiet office space for the interview recordings and so on. In this regard, the 
personal contacts of my father and uncle were of much worth. Since the days of my 
grandfather; who owned a chunk of land and used to give some financial help to the imam 
(religious cleric who lead the congregational prayers) of local village mosque on the eve of 
every harvest. This tradition is still intact particularly in rural areas of Punjab where landlords 
donate a meagre part of their crops‘ yield to local village mosque/maktab and madrassa. In 
my case, my father and uncle did carry this practice until the time they lived in village and 
grew their lands. Though, now they have moved to city but they still have very good terms 
with religious clerics of the town who helped me a lot in bringing round the patrons of 
madrassas in gathering data for my project. The nature of help I got to collect data for my 
study, I don‘t see any implications for bias in the responses of students at all. The venues of 
the data collection were the classrooms of the respective educational institute. At the time of 
data collection one teacher and in some instances head teacher by himself accompanied me 
because they were of the view that the students might not recognize me and the political 
comrades might intervene in the data collection process. The questionnaires were distributed 
by the teacher and the instructions for the questionnaire were read out by me. 
 
In order to avoid any potential difficulties in data gathering process, I selected five districts of 
South Punjab, instead of all thirteen districts of the area. As mentioned above, the method of 
sampling was of convenience or opportunity sampling. So far as the numbers of madrassas 
selected for sampling are concerned, there were four Brailvi, Deobandi and Shia madrassas 
each, while the numbers of Jamaat-e-Islami madrassas selected for the study were two only. 
Eighty students from two government schools and seventy students from two A-Type private 
English medium schools participated in the survey while 70 participants from three Ahle 
Hadith madrassas took part in this study. It can be said with assurance these institutes were 
representative of other schools of their type at least situated in the five districts of South 
Punjab; the area which was focus of my research. 
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The participants were apprised with their right to confidentiality and privacy. They were told 
that they can leave or keep the questionnaire blank if they wish so. After I collected the 
completed questionnaires and the consent forms, I thanked the participants once again and 
told them about the next phase of data collection such as interview. In addition, I answered 
their questions regarding difference of education system in Pakistan and the United Kingdom. 
 
Prior to interview, I got appointments from the students who were selected for interviews. 
The interviews were conducted in the office space in some instances and in some cases a 
quiet and clean room was provided for interviewing provided with a conducive environment 
for interview recordings. In case of Shia madrassa, the interviewees and the head teacher did 
not allow to record interview, so I have to write down notes for that. I kept mineral water 
bottles for the interviewees so that they could feel relaxed. To create friendly environment 
with the participant, I sat at a 90 degree angle with the participant so to give him impression 
that the interview is cooperative rather than confrontational which might have been felt in 
case of sitting face to face (Denscombe, 2001 cited in Dornyei, 2007). 
 
I began the interview with greetings in Seraiki and Urdu languages ‗ Keevain haal hin‘ and 
‗Khush amadeed‘ that means ‗welcome‘. I also said ‗Asalam-o-Alekum‘ which is Islamic 
way of greeting Muslims when they meet. This is very common practice in Pakistan. 
Afterwards, I told the participants about the purpose of the study and informed them about 
their rights to privacy and confidentiality. I informed students that the interview is being 
recorded.  If they want, the transcriptions would be provided to them for confirmation. 
During an interview I gave back channelling signals to the participants such as (nods, ‗uh-huh 
noise ‗yeah‘) to appear sympathetic listener. I also gave gestures like ‗attentive lean, eye-
brow flash and sympathetic smile‘ as suggested by Miller and Crabtree (1999, in Dornyei, 
2007: 142). Further, I provided the interviewees reinforcement feedback showing and 
confirming that the interviewee‘s answers are worth recording. However, there were times 
when I had to give a polite negative reinforcement to the interviewees as suggested by 
Robinson (2002: 274, in Dornyei, 2007: 142) ‗ let me stop you here for a moment and go 
back to what you said earlier to make sure that I understood you well‘. I also encouraged 
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elaborations by giving ‗silent probes‘ by remaining quiet and gave ‗echo prompts‘ by 
repeating the last word spoken by the interviewee (ibid, 2007). 
 
Editing the interview (debriefing) technique was also used at the end of the interview. I gave 
pre-closing moves so that the interviewee has chance to say any additional points or correct 
anything he might have said earlier. I used ‗Is there anything else you want to say about aim 
of education and the certain socio-political issues in Pakistan‘. The interview ended with 
thanks with a smile. The interviewees were escorted to the exit door to show courtesy. 
 
Analysis Techniques and processing Questionnaire Data 
I entered the questionnaire data into the 18
th
 version of SPSS which is statistical package for 
social sciences. By virtue of it, results are typically processed by means of descriptive 
statistical analysis to provide frequencies, means, percentages and ranges. Questionnaire data 
is most usable if it is stored in a computer file for coding for analysis. Cohen et al (2000) says 
that prior to coding or data reduction, it is important to check the questionnaire to identify 
and eliminate errors made by respondents. Dornyei (2003) says that the initial data file will 
always contain mistakes so it is important to perform data cleaning (1) correct impossible 
data (2) Correct incorrectly entered values (3) correct contradicting data and (4) examine 
implausible data. The data got cleaned up when I calculated frequencies, mean and standard 
deviation. The graphs showed numerical errors in few columns. I checked the SPSS files 
again and cleaned the data and again calculated the frequencies which gave correct figures. 
The missing data was also handled by using SPSS option analyse then handling missing data. 
The SPSS gives average mean score to the missing data which helps conduct further 
analyses.  
 
The data was coded in the SPSS. For the second part of the questionnaire, same codes from 1 
to 5 were given (1=strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree). So far as the first part of 
questionnaire is concerned, it is comprised of background questions, for which coding was 
also done. The main type of questionnaire data was ordinal and background questions were 
nominal. Each response was already assigned a grade or numbered from 1 to 5. In most of the 
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background questions, the students simply had to give a grade which was a number. As 
regards dependent variables, these were reduced and coded accordingly. 
Reliability of the Questionnaires 
Questionnaires are measuring tools and they must have substantial reliability. Even in cases 
where there are no resources and opportunities for major validations, it should be taken into 
consideration that at least well-documented reliability in aspect should be checked which is 
internal consistency. Internal consistency refers to homogeneity of the items making up the 
scales within the questionnaires. If the instrument has it, one should feel safe (Dornyei, 2003: 
110). The questionnaires used for this study satisfied the reliability requirements. 
Internal consistency is measured by Cronbach Alpha. The Alpha value is between 0 and 1. 
The Apha value should be at least 0.70 even with short-scales of 3 to 4 items. If the value is 
0.60 or less that means that the questionnaire has low reliability (ibid, 2003: 112). 
Table 4.2 
Cronbach Alpha value of scales 
   Reliability Statistics 
 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.855 77 
The Cronbach Alpha value of questionnaire is 0.855 which is higher than 0.70. 
 
Data collection strategies 
Before setting out for data collection and related field work I applied for the ethical approval. 
The application was submitted with the Faculty of Education University of Glasgow, asking 
them to accord permission for data collection for the pilot and main study. The ethics 
Committee scrutinized my application and issued notification in my favour. After that, I left 
for Pakistan on field trip in the second week of July 2010. 
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Potential Issues of Access, Confidentiality and Ethics 
It is very important for the researcher to be careful and mindful of the ethical issues arising, 
(1) before the research process begins, (2) During proceedings, and (3) After completion. 
 
In many countries, observing ethical principles is enforced by legal and institutional 
requirements. In UK, the British ‗Data Protection Act‘ regulates the need to ensure consent to 
collecting data. In addition, social research is increasingly being subjected to ethical review 
from the institutional ethics committees to ensure the ethical scrutiny of research involving 
human subjects. As the current study was supervised by the School of Education, University 
of Glasgow, the authorities concerned (Ethics committee) accorded permission in response to 
an application filed by my (through proper channel). The application was supported with 
detailed statement explaining purpose of the study. 
 
Informed Consent and confidentiality 
The principle of informed consent arises from the subject‘s right to freedom and self-
determination. The consent forms were sent out to the participants containing all relevant 
information thereby the participants were entitled to exercise their right to withdraw at any 
stage of the research (Gall and Borg, 1989). So the participants were apprised with four 
elements: (1) Competence, (2) Voluntarism, (3) Full Information (4) Comprehension. 
 
It is with regard to protecting a participant‘s right to privacy through promise of 
confidentiality (ibid, 2007). The students who participated in questionnaire survey were 
informed that even if the researcher knows who has provided the information or able to 
identify the participants from the information given, they will in no way make the connection 
public. Cohen, et al. (2007) suggests that the more sensitive, intimate or discrediting the 
information, the greater is the obligation on the researcher‘s part to make sure that guarantees 
of confidentiality are carried out in spirit and letter. 
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Privacy and Anonymity 
The participants were informed straight off if they had any reservations with some kind of 
questions being asked, they could simply exercise their right and skip the question. An 
individual right to privacy is often contrasted to public right to know. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have tried to give rationale behind the employment of methodology I opt for 
my research study. It describes the population involved, the instruments utilised, and the 
procedures followed to collect and analyse the data. But before this, a brief discussion has 
been made in the initial paragraphs of the chapter to shed some light on the aims of study. 
The chapter began with aims and objects of the study in which I identified whether there is 
any difference in the worldviews of students coming from different schools about a range of 
socio-political and educational issues. This was followed by the research questions. After it, a 
careful consideration was given to research design which was to be mixed methodology and 
cross-sectional. The rationale behind using mixed methods was that it allowed researcher to 
have a robust analysis by taking advantages of the strength of each method involved in the 
study (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, cited in Ivankova et al, 2006:03). After developing 
research aims, research questions and research design, research settings were developed 
which were followed by informants and instrumentation. This further led to ethical 
considerations followed by pilot study. In the end, it was also mentioned ethical issues were 
addressed. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Sample characteristics and worldview of students about educational and social issues 
 
Introduction 
This chapter reports my findings based on the questionnaires and interviews used for this 
study. But prior to this, the chapter talks about the characteristics of the sample such as its 
residence, parental occupation, previous education etc. The first section of the chapter starts 
with the description of the background data collected through questionnaires. Background 
data includes factual and behavioural questions
59
. These questions usually cover age, gender, 
residential location, marital and socioeconomic status, level of education, religion, 
occupation, participants‘ actions, life styles, habits and personal history. After the 
background data, questionnaire items formulated to see the difference in the outlook of the 
students (that makes attitudinal questions) from different types of institutes, towards certain 
socio-political and educational issues have been reported. The questionnaire and interview 
tool used in this study attempted to measure students‘ responses on primary purpose of 
education, status of women in the society and the position of non-Muslims in a Muslim 
majority state Pakistan. The questionnaire items measuring the themes: primary purpose of 
education, status of women and position of minorities have been described with the help of 
cross tabs, mean, standard deviation, Chi square to explore the relationship/relatedness 
between variables and ANOVA i.e. analysis of variance which will be used to compare the 
variance (variability in scores) between the different schools (due to the independent 
variables; like type of institutes etc) with the variability within each of the groups. In 
addition, the interview data has been linked to have further illustrative insights on the 
questionnaire data. Along with the aforesaid themes, there are two more themes that make an 
important part of the study which are: the outlook of students towards Islamic militancy and 
sectarian diversity in the society and they will be analysed in the next chapter. In the end, this 
chapter deliberates upon the views of parents (fathers) about the selection of certain type of 
school for their children. 
 
                                                          
59
 Dornyei categorised questionnaire‘s questions in three types: Factual, Behavioural and Attitudinal questions.  
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The sample 
This part of the chapter deals with the background information of the 10
th
 grade students who 
took part in this research. 500 students from three different types of schooling systems; 
English Medium, Urdu Medium and Madrassas, from South Punjab participated in the study. 
Madrassas have further categorization, five distinct kinds, divided among sectarian and 
political lines i.e. Ahle Hadith, Deobandi, Brailvi, Jamaat-i-Islami and Shia. The three 
primary Sunni sub-sects in Pakistan are: Deobandi, Brailvi, Ahle Hadith/Salafi. Each sect has 
its own madrassas in which their own version of Islam is taught. The two primary wings of 
Sunni-Islam; Deobandi and Brailvi, dominate the madrassa system in Pakistan. The Jamat-i-
Islami is a religio-political party founded by Maulana Maududi in 1941 and is the ideological 
sister of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was set up by Hasan Banna in Egypt in 1928. The JI 
started off as an organization that was not interested in active politics but then it came to the 
conclusion that to implement its interpretation of Islam, it needed to control the levers of state 
apparatus. The Jamaat-i-Islami is a revivalist political party and wishes to destroy secular 
Islam and bring back to the world a period of religious Muslim rule. Its version of Islam is 
very much close to Deoband school of thought but it claims itself supra-sectarian and 
preaches Muslim brotherhood. The Shias believe that the successor of the Prophet 
Muhammad (pbuh) was his cousin Ali Ibn-e-Talib and not the first three caliphs whom Sunni 
take to be successors. 
Description of Sample Characteristics 
The Tables given under provide some background information of the participants. It gives us 
information about participants‘ previous schooling, their social class, familial organisation 
and religious affiliations etc. 
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Table 5.1 Previous School attended by respondents, by current school attended (%)                                                     
Madrassas 
Current School Urdu 
Medium 
School 
English 
Medium 
School  
Ahle 
Hadith 
Deobandi Brailvi Jamaat-
i-Islami 
Shia 
 
 
Number of Participants 80 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Previous Education 
Urdu Medium School 
 
91 
 
 
19 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
4 
 
0 
English Medium School 3 77 0 0 0 4 0 
Madrassa 0 0 70 77 79 61 76 
English & Urdu medium 
schools 
6 4 0 0 0 0 0 
English medium schools 
& madrassas 
0 0 0 0 0 4 0 
Urdu medium schools & 
madrassa 
0 0 30 23 21 26 24 
School Type 
Public school 
 
91 
 
19 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
4 
 
0 
Private school 3 77 70 77 79 70 76 
Both 6 4 30 23 21 26 24 
 
Irrespective of type of institutes the students came from, they have one thing in common that 
is, the majority of them did not deviate from the type of institute they have been studying in. 
Barring the fact, a large proportion of students from madrassas, like Urdu and English 
medium schools, stuck to same type schooling, yet roughly a quarter of them attended Urdu 
medium schools (Table 5.1). So far as Urdu schools students are concerned, 91% of them 
have their previous education from similar type of schools in which they were currently 
studying. Only 9 per cent students studying in government schools have their previous 
schooling from both private English medium schools and government Urdu medium schools. 
Interestingly not a single student from government school had ever been to madrassa. In case 
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of English medium schools students 77 per cent of them have their previous education in 
English schools and 23 per cent of them had their education from both Urdu and English 
schools. So far as madrassas‘ students are concerned, like Urdu and English medium school 
students, the majority of them have had their previous schooling from the same type of 
schools in which they were currently studying. 70 per cent of Ahle Hadith, 79 % Brailvi, 61% 
Jamaat-i-Islami and 76 per cent of Shia madrassas students have their education from the 
religious seminaries since the beginning of their schooling. It means that the majority of the 
students studying in these madrassas have never been to main stream schooling system. 
However, data shows that 39 per cent of students from Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas had 
exposure to Urdu and English medium schools. If we compare the schooling of Jamaat-i-
Islami students with other madrassas, we come across an interesting finding that not a single 
student from other madrassas have ever been to English medium schools while 8% of Jamaat-
i-Islami students‘ previous education has contribution from English schools. However, it is 
not clear whether the private English medium schools they attended fall in A or B category
60
. 
Overall, a large proportion of students from all types of schools stick to one type of school, at 
least, till the start of their secondary education. 
 
Table 5.2 School currently attended, by residential origin (%)  
 
Madrassas 
Type of Institute Urdu 
Medium 
School 
English 
Medium 
School  
Ahle 
Hadith 
Deobandi Brailvi Jamaat-
i-Islami 
Shia 
 
 
Number of Participants 80 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Place of living  
72 
 
76 
 
56 
 
41 
 
40 
 
49 
 
56 Urban 
Rural 28 24 44 59 60 51 44 
 
 
                                                          
60
 For detail see the 2
nd
 chapter of the thesis. 
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The background information of the participants shows that the majority of the students 
studying in mainstream educational system i.e. Urdu and English medium schools belong to 
urban areas (Table 5.2). For instance, 72% Urdu medium schools students came from urban 
areas and even in case of English schools this ratio is as much as 76%. On the other hand, the 
majority of those who study in madrassas came from rural backgrounds. 60 per cent of 
Brailvi and 59% of Deobandi and 51% of Jamaat-i-Islami madrassa students belong to rural 
areas, but in case of Shia and Ahle Hadith this figure is 44 per cent. However, such figures 
can definitely vary depending on the location of institute that is part of your study. 
Table 5.3 Occupational status of respondents’ parents (%) 
Madrassas 
Type of Institute Urdu 
Medium 
School 
English 
Medium 
School  
Ahle 
Hadith 
Deobandi Brailvi Jamaat-
i-Islami 
Shia 
 
 
Number of Participants 80 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Earning Hands  
78 
 
69 
 
86 
 
78 
 
79 
 
86 
 
84 Father 
Mother 6 3 0 5 4 3 1 
Both 16 28 4 9 7 7 6 
Not said 0 0 10 8 10 4 9 
 
The personal information of participants shows that the families of those students who come 
to study in madrassas have only one parent working. In most of the instances, it is father who 
fulfills the responsibility of family‘s livelihood. On the other hand, in case of English 
medium schools‘ students more than one quarter of them come from a family that has both 
father and mother working. Here one interesting thing is noteworthy that the trend of not 
sharing the information regarding income generator in the family is found only in participants 
from madrassas. It can be because of the reason that either there is no one working in their 
families at all or their parents‘ occupation is of such type that they even don‘t want to 
mention a bit of it. As these students didn‘t told anything about the occupation of their 
parents in the subsequent questions.  
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Table 5.4 Current occupations of respondents’ fathers (%) 
 
Madrassas 
Type of Institute Urdu 
Medium 
School 
English 
Medium 
School  
Ahle 
Hadith 
Deobandi Brailvi Jamaat-
i-Islami 
Shia 
 
 
Number of Participants 80 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Father Occupation        
Professional or 
managerial job 
5 29 1.4 0 0 3 0 
Lower professions or 
skilled labour 
39 34 44 43 43 40 44 
Farmer or unskilled 
labour 
17.5 20 35 37 36 33 29 
Services 12.5 14 4 1.4 0 4 4 
Teacher 20 0 1.4 11 7 6 9 
Not said or not applicable 6 3 14 7 14 14 14 
Father Occupation 
Category 
       
Government Sector 31 33 16 26 19 20 20 
Private sector 26 24 21 24 18 31 29 
Self-employed 37 39 53 44 47 42 37 
Not said/Not applicable 6 4 10 6 16 7 14 
 
 
The background information of respondents shows that the students who come to study in the 
English medium schools belong to a financially sound family. 29% students‘ fathers‘ 
occupations fall in the category of professional and managerial job that figure is much higher 
than those of students from other type of institutes. Professional and managerial jobs include 
doctors, engineers, Bankers, bureaucrats, advocates/lawyers, business persons, working in an 
NGO or private firm at higher position etc. In addition to it, 28 per cent of students from 
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English schools have both their parents working which definitely add on their family income. 
As in my previous chapters I have mentioned that education in A class English medium 
schools is very expensive and those who are monetarily well off, can think of receiving it. 
34% of fathers of these students are skilled labour or have lower professions, for instance, 
working in any factory as a technical hand, mechanic, shopkeeper, lorry owner/driver, 
stenographer, typist, working abroad, doing job in WAPDA or PTCL, Pakistan railway or 
other government and semi-government departments. Here one thing is notable that those 
who are doing ordinary jobs in abroad (Middle East or Europe/America) earn good wages as 
compared to those who are doing the same job in Pakistan. And interestingly, out of 34% 
English schools students‘ fathers whose occupation fall under the category of lower 
professions, 11 per cent were working abroad as lower professionals or skilled labourers. 
Urdu medium school students belong to less privileged background as compared to English 
medium schools students but far better than those who study at madrassas. Only 17.5 per cent 
Urdu schools students‘ fathers are associated with farming or unskilled labour while this 
percentage is 35% in Ahle Hadith, 37% in Deobandi, 36% in Brailvis, 33 per cent in Jamaat-
i-Islami and 29 per cent in Shia madrassas‘ students. Apart from it, there are some students 
who didn‘t fill up the part of questionnaire that asked about their parents occupations. Data 
also shows that, so far as their occupations are concerned, the fathers of students coming 
from madrassas are relatively less associated with the government and private sector, the 
majority of them are self employed i.e. they work for themselves instead of government or a 
private employer. 
Table 5.5 Respondents whose mother is currently employed (%) 
Madrassas 
Type of Institute Urdu 
Medium 
School 
English 
Medium 
School  
Ahle 
Hadith 
Deobandi Brailvi Jamaat-
i-Islami 
Shia 
 
 
Number of Participants 80 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Working Mother        
Yes 22.5 31 4 13 11 10 7 
No 77.5 69 82 79 76 86 70 
Not said 0 0 14 8 13 4 23 
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The question that intends to see if the mothers of participants are ‗working or not‘ come up 
with interesting results. More than 30 per cent English schools students response was in 
positive and almost quarter of the Urdu schools students responded the question positively, 
but in case of madrassas students, the results are very different. Another interesting finding 
we came across is that some of the students only from madrassas didn‘t answer this question 
and they also didn‘t tell about their mothers‘ occupation in the subsequent questions. It can be 
because of the fact that some conservative sections of society consider the working of women 
as an objectionable act, and if it happens, they feel embarrassment in sharing information 
about it; however nothing can be said with conviction in this very case. 
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Table 5.6 Current occupation of respondents’ mothers (%) 
 
Madrassas 
Type of Institute Urdu 
Medium 
School 
English 
Medium 
School  
Ahle 
Hadith 
Deobandi Brailvi Jamaat-
i-Islami 
Shia 
 
 
Number of Participants 80 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Mother Occupation        
Professional or 
managerial job 
0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Lower professions or 
skilled labour 
7 7 3 7 3 1.4 4 
Farmer or unskilled 
labour 
1.4 1.4 0 3 4 6 0 
Services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Teacher 12.5 20 1.4 3 4 1.4 1.4 
Household 77.5 69 83 74 73 87 83 
Not said or not applicable 1.4 0 13 13 16 4 11 
Mother Occupation 
Category 
       
Government Sector 16 26 1.4 9 4 1.4 4 
Private sector 5 6 0 1.4 1.4 1.4 0 
Self-employed 1.4 0 3 9 6 7 3 
Not said/ Not applicable 78 69 96 81 89 90 93 
 
Table 5.6 takes our attention towards a very common trend in Pakistani society that 
irrespective of familial and social background, the majority of the women are confined to 
household activity only. Nearly seven in ten mothers (69 per cent) of English schools 
students are non-working that is lowest ratio among other types of institutes‘ students. 
Secondly, if women happen to work, the most popular profession among them is teaching. 
Presence of women in professional or managerial jobs is very rare. One can construe the 
uncommonness of women representation in professional or managerial jobs from the fact that 
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there were only two students from English medium schools (3%) whose mothers were 
doctors among the whole sample of 500 students from different types of schools. Thanks to 
Musharraf government that introduced quota for women in government and semi-government 
sectors, even in the parliament of the country. After having a look on the categorization of 
occupations on the basis of government and private sector, one comes to know that the 
majority of the working mothers of students are associated with government sector. 
 
Table 5.7 Dwelling places of participants (%) 
Madrassas 
Type of Institute Urdu 
Medium 
School 
English 
Medium 
School  
Ahle 
Hadith 
Deobandi Brailvi Jamaat-
i-Islami 
Shia 
Number of Participants 80 70 70 70 70 70 70 
House 43 13 39 47 50 56 50 
Rented home 
Owned home 56 79 44 51 46 44 46 
Not said 1.4 8 17 1.4 4 0 4 
House Type 56 86 44 44 39 53 51 
Pakka (bricks made) 
Kacha (mud made/grass 
thatched) 
36 6 46 53 56 43 40 
Not said 8 8 10 3 6 4 9 
Rooms 51 39 66 54 61 65 56 
1-2 
3-4 30 33 19 26 20 20 33 
4-5 14 20 11 11 12 9 8 
More than 5 5 8 4 9 7 6 3 
 
Along with the occupation of parents, type of house; pakka or kacha, rented or owned, big or 
small (with respect to number of rooms in it) are also the indicators which are part of 
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background information of students in order to determine their social status. 13 per cent of 
students from English schools live in rented house while this figure is 43% in Urdu schools‘ 
students, 39% in Ahle Hadith, 47% in Deobandi, 56% Jamaat-i-Islami and 50% in Brailvi 
and Shia madrassa students. Like information about their parents‘ occupation, some students 
did not share information regarding their homes. Keeping in view the data, one can notice a 
visible difference between English school students and other type of institutes‘ students in 
connection with the type of accommodation they have. Such difference can be observed 
clearly when we look at the kind of house they are living in i.e. kacha and pakka. 86% of 
students from English medium schools live in pakka (brick and cement made) houses and 
only 44% of students from Ahle Hadith and Deobandi madrassas students are dwelling in 
pakka houses. However, in rural areas families of even monetarily sound background prefer 
to live in kacha houses but in case of urban areas situation is quite opposite. 
 
So far as the number of rooms in houses is concerned 65% of students from Jamaat-i-Islami 
madrassas live in small houses having 1-2 rooms, Brailvi 61%, Ahle Hadith 66%, Shia 56%, 
Deobandi 54%, Urdu schools 51% and English schools 39%. In the same vein, houses of 
30% Urdu medium schools students are comprised of 3-4 rooms. From English medium 
schools and Shia madrassa students this percentage is 33%, 19% in Ahle Hadith, 26% 
Deobandi and 20% in Brailvi and Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas‘ students. 
 
Table 5.8: Respondents’ current family system i.e. Joint family or nuclear family (%) 
 Madrassas 
Type of Institute Urdu 
Medium 
School 
English 
Medium 
School  
Ahle 
Hadith 
Deobandi Brailvi Jamaat-
i-Islami 
Shia 
 
Number of Participants 80 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Family System 59 39 58 60 64 67 60 
Joint family 
Nuclear family 41 61 39 40 34 33 40 
Not said 0 0 3 0 1.4 0 0 
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In the sub-continent, joint family system has been in existence since ancient times. The father 
is considered as the head of the family. His wife, sons, daughters-in-law and grandchildren 
together constitutes a joint family. However, with the passage of time, the joint family system 
is disintegrating, giving rise to the nuclear family system. Many a studies on India and South 
Asia suggest that the modernizing forces which entered the system since independence--
parliamentary democracy, universal suffrage, land reforms, modern education, urbanization, 
and industrial technology etc affected the familial structure (Singer & Cohn, 1968). These 
studies trace the change of social structure with changing relations of politics, law, language, 
caste system and particularly of economics in the society. In the wake of independence, 
Pakistani society also gone through this transformation and in this regard the economic 
viability was one of the important factors. This very fact can be seen in this study as well. 
Keeping in view the data about parents‘ occupation of students from English medium 
schools, one can assess their relative better financial position as compared to other students 
and the trend to have nuclear family system might be the reflection of their affluence. 
 
Table 5.7 shows that there is no substantial difference in the data with regard to number of 
rooms; as the size of homes is not solely dictated by social status. There are other factors 
which have their impact on the number of rooms in a house, for example, size of family, type 
of family system; joint or nuclear etc. And interestingly the data shows that the trend of joint 
family system is more common in those students who study in madrassas or government 
schools as compared to those who study at English medium schools. So far as the statistics 
about family system are concerned, 61 per cent of students from English medium schools 
have nuclear family system while only 41% students from Urdu medium schools have 
nuclear families. There is not much difference between madrassa students and Urdu medium 
schools students in this regard. 40% Deobandi and Shia madrassa students have nuclear 
family system, 39% students of Ahle Hadith madrassas, 33% of Jamaat-i-Islami and 34% of 
Brailvi madrassas students came from families where nuclear family system prevails. 
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Table 5.9: Participants’ siblings (%) 
Madrassas 
Type of Institute Urdu 
Medium 
School 
English 
Medium 
School  
Ahle 
Hadith 
Deobandi Brailvi Jamaat-
i-Islami 
Shia 
 
Number of Participants 80 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Siblings  
 
17 
 
 
32 
 
11 
 
3 
 
 
7 
 
13 
 
3 1-2 
3-5 44 62 40 42 50 52 48 
6-8 28 6 44 44 33 26 46 
More than 8 
Not said 
11 0 5 11 10 9 3 
 
By virtue of background information of the participants, one comes to know that the students 
who study in madrassas have very big families as compared to those who study in English 
schools. For instance, 32% students of English medium schools have small families, 
comprised of 1-2 siblings. This figure is 17% in Urdu medium school students and 11%, 3%, 
7%, 13% and 3% in Ahle Hadith, Deobandi, Brailvi, Jamaat-i-Islami and Shia respectively. 
The percentage of students of English schools who have up to five siblings is 94% and this 
figure is 61% in Urdu schools, 51% in Ahle Hadith, 51% in Shia, 57% in Brailvi, 65% in 
Jamaat-i-Islami and only 45% in Deobandi madrassa students. Rests of the students have 
families even larger than 5 siblings. Tendency of having big families particularly among 
those who study at madrassas can be attributed to several factors like lack of knowledge 
about family planning, religious factor and most importantly a deeply embedded mentality 
that the more male members we have the more we would have earning hands. This definitely 
leads to increase in child labour in the society. Religious factor is also there to play its role as 
many people consider family planning haram (not approved in Islam). 
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Table 5.10: Main decisions in the families of respondents are taken by: (%) 
 
Madrassas 
Type of Institute Urdu 
Medium 
School 
English 
Medium 
School  
Ahle 
Hadith 
Deobandi Brailvi Jamaat-
i-Islami 
Shia 
 
Number of Participants 80 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Family Decision Maker  
 
48 
 
 
31 
 
63 
 
60 
 
 
71 
 
60 
 
53 Father 
Mother 14 19 6 11 5 7 4 
Jointly 37 50 31 29 24 33 29 
Not said 1.4 0 0 0 0 0 14 
 
 
Table 5.11: In comparison to girls boys are given more importance in respondents’ family: 
(%) 
 
Madrassas 
Type of Institute Urdu 
Medium 
School 
English 
Medium 
School 
Ahle 
Hadith 
Deobandi Brailvi Jamaat-
i-Islami 
Shia 
Number of Participants 80 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Importance in Family  
45 
 
24 
 
57 
 
51 
 
64 
 
57 
 
51 Yes 
No 55 76 40 48 36 43 43 
Not Said 0 0 3 1.4 0 0 6 
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In order to know whether it is their education only that propagates male dominance or there is 
any contribution of family environment in promoting this division, two questions were asked 
in background information. First question says ―who makes important decisions in your 
family?‖ and give multiple options; father, mother, jointly, other. Second question asked was, 
―In my family boys are given more importance than girls‖ with answer options ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘. 
These questions brought some interesting information. 31% students from English schools 
said that it is their father who takes important decisions of family but this percentage was 
71% in Brailvi madrassa students, 63% in Ahle Hadith and 60% in Deobandi and Jamaat-i-
Islami madrassas students. In this regard the situation of Urdu medium school students is not 
very different. 48 per cent students of Urdu medium schools believe that main decisions of 
family are made by their fathers and 53% students from Shia madrassas think in the same 
manner. However, 14% of students from Shia madrassa refrained from answering this 
question. More or less similar variation in responses among different types of schools‘ 
students was observed in the second question as well. 45% students from Urdu schools think 
that boys are given more importance than girls in their families. This percentage is 24 in 
English school students while the majority of students from madrassas believe that in their 
families boys are given more importance than girls. 
 
Table 5.12: Concerns in family if respondents have friendly relations with people of other 
sect? (%) 
 
Madrassas 
Type of Institute Urdu 
Medium 
School 
English 
Medium 
School  
Ahle 
Hadith 
Deobandi Brailvi Jamaat-
i-Islami 
Shia 
 
Number of Participants 80 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Friends from other Sects        
Yes 11 7 13 47 10 3 30 
No 89 91 81 51 87 96 57 
Not said 0 1.4 6 1.4 3 1.4 13 
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To trace the probable contribution of family in promoting sectarian division in the society, a 
question was asked saying, ―Do you think your parents will mind if you have friendship with 
boys from different sect‖. Interestingly a large proportion of students from all types of 
institutes said ‗no‘ only with the exception of Shia madrassas students. Though the majority 
of Shia madrassas students (57%) also were of the view that their parents will not mind if 
they have friends from other sect yet 30 per cent, that is almost one third of total Shia 
madrassa students, said that they think their parents will mind if they have friends out from 
their sectarian circle and 13 per cent of them didn‘t answer the question. Maximum numbers 
of students saying ‗no‘ were from Jamaat-i-Islami i.e. 96% even more than English medium 
school students (91%). 
 
Table 5.13: Respondents foremost association is with: (%) 
Madrassas 
Type of Institute Urdu 
Medium 
School 
English 
Medium 
School  
Ahle 
Hadith 
Deobandi Brailvi Jamaat-
i-Islami 
Shia 
 
Number of Participants 80 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Identification  
 
60 
 
 
57 
 
14 
 
41 
 
 
26 
 
31 
 
29 Pakistani 
Muslim 40 43 76 59 67 69 51 
Digerian/Multani/Bahawalpuri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Seraiki/Balouch/Pashtoon/ 
Punjabi/Sindhi 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Deobandi/Ahle Hadith/Shia/ 
Brailvi/Jamaat-i-Islami 
0 0 10 0 7 0 20 
 
More or less similar kind of association with sect was displayed by 20 per cent Shia 
madrassas students when they were asked, how they identify themselves, as Pakistani, 
Muslim or Shia. 57 per cent of students from English medium school said, they identify 
themselves as Pakistani and 43% as Muslims. In case of Urdu medium schools students, 
those who identify themselves as Pakistani were 60% and 40 per cent were those who think 
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that their first identification is as Muslims. In case of madrassas students, the trend of Muslim 
nationhood was far stronger than that of Pakistani nationalism. A large proportion of 
madrassas students consider Muslim as their foremost identity. 
 
Respondents’ views 
After personal and familial information of the participants, we will discuss about their views 
on certain socio-political and educational issues that make the attitudinal part of the 
questionnaire. In order to know about the opinion of students from seven different types of 
institutes with respect to primary purpose of education, gender inequality, status of 
minorities, sectarian divide and Islamic militancy, the questionnaire data has been analyzed 
with descriptive statistics at first. All the questionnaire statements are multiple items of the 
variables ‗primary purpose of education‘, ‗gender inequality‘, status of minorities‘, 
‗sectarianism‘, ‗Islamic militancy‘ and ‗IELOC‘ in the questionnaire (Appendix.1). The data 
of the study is to show, to what extent there is homogeneity in the views of students from 
different types of schooling systems is found on these core socio-political and educational 
issues. What is really disturbing is the fact that the students of these institutions (English 
medium schools, Urdu medium schools and madrassas) have such different opinions as to 
live in different worlds. This might have happened because their textbooks and methods of 
learning are different from each other and also because their teachers, the discourses they are 
exposed to inside and outside school, and even their families are so different from each other. 
Indeed, all these influences are from ‗worlds‘ which are strange, and even hostile, to each 
other. To understand these different institutions and their products is to understand how 
dangerously polarized Pakistani society is and how this has hampered national cohesion and a 
sense of commitment to unified policies (Rahman, 2004). In the first instance, items under 
the title ‗primary purpose of education‘ will come under discussion. 
What is education for? 
First theme that will come under discussion is purpose of education. Purpose of education is a 
question that has to be thrashed out continually and every nation must grapple with this issue 
not once, but every generation or more often. But here I am not going to deliberate upon the 
philosophy of education, nor the policies of nation states on education, is the subject of 
discussion. In fact, my goal is to know about the viewpoint of 10
th
 grade students of Pakistan 
from different types of schools on this issue. For this purpose 19 questions were incorporated 
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in the questionnaire (Appendix01) that covered several aspects of educational objectives 
ranging from the development of economic and social equality to the encouragement of 
gender equality and greater understanding with diverse cultures and faiths in Pakistani 
society. And in this regard questions regarding the role of schools also make the part of 
questionnaire. 
It is said oftenly that "education is the underpinning of development". Now the word 
development may have different connotations. In one very broad sense, it may suggest that 
national development begins with education since schooling is the way of breaking out 
narrowness and to free people from the shackles of convention and provide them with the 
imagination and larger view of life that would allow them to dream of unseen things and 
create a better world for them. Yet, for others development may imply economic gains only, 
and this translates into jobs.   In order to cover all these aspects of education, a range of 
questions regarding the primary purpose of education have been asked in the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire items of primary purpose of education have been presented here with the 
help of crosstab are given under:  
 A key aim of education is to prepare students for work and employment [Career 
oriented education] 
 Education should promote economic equality and social progress [Social mobility] 
 A key aim of education is individual freedom and choice in life [Freedom of choice] 
 A key aim of education is to prepare students to take their place in Pakistani society [ 
Becoming part of society] 
 A key aim of education is to increase awareness and appreciation of the world beyond 
Pakistan [Understanding global society] 
 Education should promote enterprise and economic development [Economic progress] 
 A key aim of education is to initiate students into the knowledge and truth of Islam 
[Exploring Islam] 
 A key aim of education is to promote understanding of, and respect for, other faiths 
and cultures in Pakistan [Tolerance for diversity] 
 Education should encourage greater understanding between men and women [Gender 
equality] 
 Education should encourage greater equality between men and women [ Discourage 
misogyny] 
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 Schools should respect the wishes of families in teaching about religion [Religious 
education with parents‘ consent] 
 Schools should respect the wishes of families in all aspects of a student‘s education [ 
Child education with parents‘ consent]  
 Schools should promote the shared values of Pakistani society [Pluralist society] 
 Schools should promote the shared values of Pakistani society even if this conflicts 
with the wishes of parents [Pluralism in the face of parents‘ opposition] 
 Students should be encouraged to question the institutions of Pakistani society [ Defy 
conventional institutions] 
 Students should be encouraged to debate social and religious questions in schools 
[Discussion on socio-religious issues] 
 Students should be enabled to participate in the decisions made about them in schools 
[Participation in decision making] 
 Students should be consulted on what is studied in the school curriculum [consultation 
with students] 
 Students should be prepared in school for their roles in family life [Preparation for 
familial life]  
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Composite Table 5.14: Views regarding educational priorities (% agree and strongly agree) 
Questionnaire 
Items 
Ahle 
Hadith 
Brailvi Deobandi Govt. 
School 
Jamaat-i-
Islami 
Private 
School 
Shia 
Madrassa 
Career oriented 
education 
39 43 43 70 47 74 52 
Social mobility  67 70 71 80 70 79 71 
Freedom of choice 66 73 67 83 66 89 69 
Becoming part of 
society 
71 74         73 79 77 71 79 
Understanding 
global society 
60 64 70 79 67 89 67 
Economic 
progress 
71 66 63 83 76 90 66 
Exploring Islam 74 81 73 73 89 64 79 
Tolerance for 
diversity 
67 61 61 71 77 79 71 
Gender equality 36 26 33 71 33 86 40 
Discourage 
misogyny 
32 24 33 64 36 89 40 
Religious 
education with 
parents’ consent 
71 77 69 71 76 69 76 
Child education 
with parents’ 
consent 
71 77 70 71 74 67 74 
Pluralist society 64 65 63 69 77 82 73 
Pluralism in the 
face of parents’ 
opposition 
22 28 36 
  
51 35 55 23 
Defy conventional 
institutions 
70 69 67 70 74 60 63 
Discussion on 
socio-religious 
issues 
46 49 47 55 54 49 41 
Participation in 
decision making 
69 64 59 48 70 63 72 
Consultation with 
students 
36 31 38 50 69 71 27 
Preparation for 
familial life 
76 60 69 70 76 76 76 
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Interestingly, the data of this study shows that the 10
th
 grade students from seven different 
types of educational institutes of South Punjab have diverse responses towards the basic 
question, what is education for? In response to a statement in the questionnaire ‗A key aim of 
education is to prepare students for work and employment‘ 74 per cent students from English 
medium private schools expressed their agreement and only 9 per cent of them disagreed. 
More or less similar response has been given by students from government funded Urdu 
medium schools students as opposed to those of from madrassas. A large proportion of 
students from all types of madrassas either disagreed with the statement or was undecided. 
Some of the students from madrassas even come up with a statement on the questionnaire, 
―the first and foremost aim of education is to serve religion (Islam).‖ However, their response 
in this regard was endorsed further through interviewing. Among students from all types of 
madrassas, these were only Shia madrassas‘ students whose responses exceeded slightly 
above 50% in favour of the statement. 
 
Aware of education's potential as an engine for progress in all dimensions of development- 
political, economic, social and cultural, Pakistan Human Development Fund and the National 
Commission for Human Development (NCHD), in partnership with UNDP (United Nations 
Development Programme) have established more than 9,000 adult literacy centres and 
enrolled nearly 1.5 million children in schools. One of the fundamental aim of this venture is 
to promote economic equality and social progress and to eradicate extreme poverty and 
hunger. In response to the question ‗Education should promote economic equality and social 
progress‘ students from all types of schools seem unanimous in favour of the statement. 
Though majority of the students from madrassas also expressed their agreement with the 
statement, yet they ranked below than government and private schools which is 80 per cent 
and 79 per cent respectively. More or less similar response was observed among the 
participants for the question ‗A key aim of education is individual freedom and choice in life‘. 
  
Global education is a recent addition in schools curriculum. Like other societies, Pakistani 
society is changing rapidly and an urgent call for schools to address and instil global 
awareness into curriculum instruction is being felt. These new developments have made the 
role of education more crucial than ever, in increasing awareness and understanding of the 
global society. For this very reason a question ―A key aim of education is to increase 
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awareness and appreciation of the world beyond Pakistan‖ has been included in the 
questionnaire. Interestingly majority of the students from all schools supported the notion but 
students from private schools ranked highest with 89 per cent followed by Urdu medium 
schools students that is 79 per cent. In the same vein, majority of the students from all types 
of schools cheered the idea that education should promote tolerance for cultural diversity. 
  
Education is a purposeful activity. For some, education might be a process of social progress 
and for others it is not merely a means of earning a living; nor is it only a nursery of thought 
or a school for citizenship. It is initiation into the life of spirit and training of human souls in 
the pursuit of so-called truth and the practice of virtue. In order to have the take of students 
from different types of schools, a question ‗A key aim of education is to initiate students into 
the knowledge and truth of Islam‘ was included in the questionnaire. Interestingly an 
overwhelming majority of madrassa students particularly from Jamaat-e-Islami and Brailvi 
madrassas supported the conception the most. In the same vein, regarding the role of schools 
in dispensing religious education, students from madrassas gave their commendation with 
same degree. 
  
One probable purpose of education can be to change people‘s perception about sex role. It is 
necessary to raise people‘s awareness about gender equality through education, because many 
people consider house duties as the only task of women. Education can help to raise men‘s 
awareness about their responsibilities both at home and in the society, so they may be willing 
to share households with their wives and letting their wives to actively participate in the 
social and managerial works beyond the boundary wall of house. In order to know how 
differently the students from different schools see the role of education in promoting gender 
equality, two questions regarding the role of education in promoting equality between men 
and women have been incorporated under the theme ‗primary purpose of education‘ and one 
of the questionnaire item has been included in the composite table. 
  
There is little agreement on what schools should be doing. Some may want schools to implant 
a new set of values in young people who did not pick these up from their family or society 
and others may demand from schools to preserve what the community could not save. And 
 
 
117 
 
for some, the school ought to reflect the living culture, instead of serving as a museum for the 
exhibit of the past glories of the religion and culture. Everyone may want a piece of education 
for their own purposes. Keeping in view the diverse demands with respect to the role of 
schools, some questions about ‗what schools should be doing‘ have been included in the 
questionnaire. (See Appendix.01) 
 
There are two questionnaire statements under the heading ‗primary purpose of education‘ that 
talk about the role of schools in the promotion of shared values of the society. In response to 
first statement ‗Schools should promote the shared values of Pakistani society‘ the majority 
of the students, irrespective of their schools‘ type, expressed agreement with the statement; 
even more than 3/4
th
 of the students from Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas stood for the statement, 
that figure comes at second highest only after private schools students i.e. 82 per cent. But 
interestingly, when the same statement was asked to the student only with the addition ‗even 
if this conflicts with the wishes of parents‘ the result of responses changed drastically. The 
questionnaire statement ‗Schools should promote the shared values of Pakistani society even 
if this conflicts with the wishes of parents‘ got negative reply. 
  
 Only 22 per cent of Ahle Hadith madrassas students showed agreement with the statement. 
In case of other types of madrassas, the response is not very different. Data shows that 
madrassas students don‘t want schools to promote shared values of Pakistani society at the 
cost of their parents‘ will. Though, students from private and government schools still seem 
to agreeing with the statement, yet one cannot ignore a visible difference in their responses 
with respect to the schools‘ role in the promotion of shared value in two different situations. 
 
In modern times, the need of students‘ involvement in the decision making activities, at least, 
at school level has become acute. Many schools wrestle with exactly which decisions to 
allow students to make. There is plethora of arguments that advocates for a vast role of 
students ranging from the nomination of school principal and other employees to the 
assortment of curriculum, spending of school funds, selection of text books to teaching 
methods by the students etc. Under the theme of primary purpose of education, I have 
included some questions about the role of students at school level and wanted to determine 
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the take of Pakistani students on it. Like other individual questionnaire items, the students 
coming from different schools‘ types have varied opinion about the question whether there is 
any need of consultation with students on what is studied in the school curriculum. 
Interestingly unlike other madrassa students, students from Jamaat-i-Islami madrassa are 
among the ones who support pupils‘ involvement in the framing of curriculum. They ranked 
second after private school. It might be because of the fact that Jamaat-i-Islami has been critic 
of other madrassas‘ obsolete curriculum and take pride in teaching secular subjects along 
with religious education. Maulana Maududi; founder of Jamaat-i-Islami had been the greatest 
critic of the madrassa curriculum and censured the practice of memorisation of medieval texts 
in the madrassas which, he believed, was not providing relevant education to the Muslim 
society. No doubt, at least so far as the curriculum is concerned, it is not a sacrosanct thing 
near Jamaat-i-Islami madrassa students and it might be because of this reason that they 
favoured the opinion that students should be consulted on what is studied in the school 
curriculum. 
 
Along with analyzing some of the important individual questionnaire items of the theme 
‗primary purpose of education‘ the coming paragraphs will make an analysis of the theme 
‗primary purpose of education‘ as a whole as well. A comparison between the outlook of 
madrassas students and Urdu and English medium schools students will be made with respect 
to the general question what education is for? In the coming paragraphs, it would also be 
argued whether the difference in the world view of madrassas students and their counterparts; 
English and Urdu medium schools students is statistically significant. Along with it, effect 
size will also be calculated. 
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Variation of responses across different educational institutes’ students on educational 
priorities 
Table 5.15 
 
  N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean Minimum Maximum 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound     
Ahle Hadith 70 3.6481 .33233 .03972 3.5689 3.7274 2.95 4.42 
Brailvi 70 3.6767 .34580 .04133 3.5942 3.7591 2.79 4.42 
Deobandi 70 3.6135 .36408 .04352 3.5267 3.7003 2.32 4.37 
Govt. School 80 3.9224 .37638 .04208 3.8386 4.0061 3.00 5.00 
Jamaat-i-
Islami 
70 3.8023 .32413 .03874 3.7250 3.8795 3.05 4.47 
Private 
School 
70 4.0519 .37969 .04538 3.9613 4.1424 3.21 4.79 
Shia 
Madrassa 
70 3.6857 .35323 .04222 3.6015 3.7699 2.74 4.42 
Total 500 3.7745 .38341 .01715 3.7408 3.8082 2.32 5.00 
 
 
The data reveals that a large proportion of students, irrespective of their school type, have 
homogenous outlook towards the fundamental question, what education is for? All students 
regardless of school type seems supporting the stance that education is to prepare students for 
work and employment, it is to prepare students to take their place in Pakistani society and 
aim of education is to promote understanding of, and respect for, other faiths and cultures in 
Pakistan. They approve the role of schools in promoting the shared values of Pakistani 
society (Table 5.15). However, there is a difference in the degree of their support for the 
afore-mentioned aims of education. In addition, some students from madrassas, during their 
interviews didn‘t approve the aforesaid role of education, which will come in the coming 
paragraphs of the chapter. The overall mean score of private English schools students, for the 
theme ‗aim of education‘ is (M=4.05) that is highest among all other schools students. Urdu 
medium schools students got second highest mean score (M=3.92), followed by Jamaat-i-
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Islami madrassas students (M=3.80). The lowest mean score among all types of schools is of 
Deobandi madrassa that is (M=3.61). The mean score value below (M=3.00) indicates that 
students disagree with a particular stance and above 3:00 indicates students agreement with 
that viewpoint while the value 3:00 shows that students neither agree nor disagree with the 
question asked in the questionnaire. The statistics of the (Table 5.15) demonstrates that all 
types of schools‘ students agree with the purposes of education asked in the questionnaire. 
 
Results of ANOVA 
Table 5.16 
 
 
Analysis of variance has been used to compare the variance (variability in scores) between 
the different schools (due to the independent variable; type of institutes) with the variability 
within each of the groups. An F ratio has been calculated, that represents the variance 
between the groups divided by the variance within the groups. A large F ratio indicates that 
there is more variability between the groups (caused by the independent variable) than there 
is within each group. A significant F test indicates whether there is any significant difference 
between different groups or not. And in this particular case, by virtue of it, we can reject the 
null hypothesis, which states that all the schools score exactly the same and there is no 
difference in the responses of students from different schools towards the aim of education. 
So, basically analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests just found out that there is statistically 
significant difference between the schools but in order to know where these differences 
actually lie, we have to carry out Post Hoc test. 
 
ANOVA 
Aim_of_Education 
11.342 6 1.890 15.028 .000 
62.014 493 .126 
73.356 499 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
 
 
121 
 
Variance in responses between the students from different schools about educational 
priorities 
One-way analysis of variance tests were conducted to look at how the responses of students 
about aim of education diverge according to their schools type. The results are presented in 
(Table 5.16). 
Table 5.17 
Primary purpose of education 
(I) Type of Institute (J) Type of Institute 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Ahle Hadith Brailvi -.02857 .05995 .999 -.2061 .1489 
  Deobandi .03459 .05995 .997 -.1429 .2121 
  Govt. School -.27425(*) .05805 .000 -.4461 -.1024 
  Jamaat-i-Islami -.15414 .05995 .137 -.3316 .0234 
  Private School -.40376(*) .05995 .000 -.5812 -.2263 
  Shia Madrassa -.03759 .05995 .996 -.2151 .1399 
Brailvi Ahle Hadith .02857 .05995 .999 -.1489 .2061 
  Deobandi .06316 .05995 .941 -.1143 .2406 
  Govt. School -.24568(*) .05805 .001 -.4175 -.0738 
  Jamaat-i-Islami -.12556 .05995 .358 -.3030 .0519 
  Private School -.37519(*) .05995 .000 -.5527 -.1977 
  Shia Madrassa -.00902 .05995 1.000 -.1865 .1685 
Deobandi Ahle Hadith -.03459 .05995 .997 -.2121 .1429 
  Brailvi -.06316 .05995 .941 -.2406 .1143 
  Govt. School -.30883(*) .05805 .000 -.4807 -.1370 
  Jamaat-i-Islami -.18872(*) .05995 .029 -.3662 -.0112 
  Private School -.43835(*) .05995 .000 -.6158 -.2609 
  Shia Madrassa 
-.07218 .05995 .893 -.2497 .1053 
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(I) Type of Institute (J) Type of Institute 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Govt. School Ahle Hadith .27425(*) .05805 .000 .1024 .4461 
  Brailvi .24568(*) .05805 .001 .0738 .4175 
  Deobandi .30883(*) .05805 .000 .1370 .4807 
  Jamaat-i-Islami .12011 .05805 .373 -.0517 .2920 
  Private School -.12951 .05805 .281 -.3014 .0423 
  Shia Madrassa .23665(*) .05805 .001 .0648 .4085 
Jamaat-i-Islami Ahle Hadith .15414 .05995 .137 -.0234 .3316 
  Brailvi .12556 .05995 .358 -.0519 .3030 
  Deobandi .18872(*) .05995 .029 .0112 .3662 
  Govt. School -.12011 .05805 .373 -.2920 .0517 
  Private School -.24962(*) .05995 .001 -.4271 -.0721 
  Shia Madrassa .11654 .05995 .452 -.0609 .2940 
Private School 
  
  
  
  
  
Ahle Hadith .40376(*) .05995 .000 .2263 .5812 
Brailvi .37519(*) .05995 .000 .1977 .5527 
Deobandi .43835(*) .05995 .000 .2609 .6158 
Govt. School .12951 .05805 .281 -.0423 .3014 
Jamaat-i-Islami .24962(*) .05995 .001 .0721 .4271 
Shia Madrassa .36617(*) .05995 .000 .1887 .5437 
Shia Madrassa Ahle Hadith .03759 .05995 .996 -.1399 .2151 
  Brailvi .00902 .05995 1.000 -.1685 .1865 
  Deobandi .07218 .05995 .893 -.1053 .2497 
  Govt. School -.23665(*) .05805 .001 -.4085 -.0648 
  Jamaat-i-Islami -.11654 .05995 .452 -.2940 .0609 
  Private School -.36617(*) .05995 .000 -.5437 -.1887 
 
 
A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of 
school type on the response of students towards the primary purpose of education, as 
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measured by the 19 question items that dealt with different aspects of aims of education 
ranging from social progress and individual freedom to the promotion of shared values of 
Pakistani society. Subjects are 10
th
 level (class) students from seven different types of schools 
of more or less similar age group. There was a statistically significant difference at the p<.05 
level in Aim of Education scores for the seven different schools‘ types groups [F (6, 
493)=15.02, p=.000]. Although we have found a statistically significant difference between 
the seven sets of scores, we also need to assess the effect size of this result. The effect size, 
calculated using eta squared, is .15, which in Cohen‘s (1988, pp. 284–7) terms would be 
considered as a large effect size. Cohen classifies .01 as a small effect, .06 as a medium effect 
and .14 as a large effect. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the 
mean scores for private schools (M=4.05, SD=.379) and government schools (M=3.92, 
SD=.376) were significantly different from all religious seminaries; Ahle Hadith (M=3.65, 
SD=.332), Brailvi (M=3.68, SD=.345), Deobandi (M=3.61, SD=.364), Jamaat-i-Islami 
(M=3.80, SD=.324) and Shia Madrassas (M=3.69, SD=.353). However, it is not the case that 
there is no significant difference within the religious seminaries; Deobandi madrassa 
(M=3.61, SD=.364) did differ significantly from Jamaat-i-Islami madrassa (M=3.80, 
SD=.324), less than .05, and that the differences between Ahle Hadith and Brailvi; Shia and 
Jamaat-i-Islami are not statistically significant. So one can analyze this table in quiet a lot of 
depth to look at these what it known as is pair-wise comparison. 
 
Perhaps the most fundamental characteristic of (Table 5.17) is that the mean scores of 
English medium private schools and Urdu medium government schools‘ students are higher 
than those of madrassas‘ students. The students from English and Urdu medium schools 
expressed more appreciation towards the roles of education in promoting shared values of 
Pakistani society and bridging gap between man and women as compared to those of 
madrassa students. 
 
With regard to the views of students about primary purpose of education, the responses in the 
interview data corroborate with the questionnaire data. However, there are some interesting 
points which students took up in one to one interview. As discussed in the questionnaire, the 
students from English and Urdu medium schools were more inclined towards the notion that 
education should promote shared values of Pakistani society and play its part in diminishing 
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gap between man and women along with its role in getting jobs, as compared to those of 
madrassa students. As far as the views of students with respect to primary purpose of 
education is concerned, there is a visible difference in the stances of students coming from 
different educations systems. 
Ali: Worldly education is motivated by material gains. We have nothing like that in 
our mind. Our only and only objective is to serve Islam………………….And we God 
willing will get thousand times better reward from our God. 
It is quite obvious from the views of a student from a Deobandi madrassa that near him the 
only purpose of education is the service of Islam. While speaking about the purpose of 
education, a student from Brailvi madrassa said: 
Akram: I am not against English schools or government schools…………….. Everyone 
(every education system) has its own utility. If we all go to worldly schools (non-
religious schools like private and govt. schools) who will help Islam!!! 
Amjad: God has categorically stated in the Holy book (Koran) (he read a verse from 
Koran in Arabic and then translated for me in native language)that the purpose 
behind the creation of Human being is no other than to pray to Me…………………… The 
main purpose of education is and should also be to serve Islam. But today’s education 
has totally forgotten its basic objective (he was pointing towards mainstream 
education systems)………….. That is why everywhere poverty and crime is rampant. 
Corruption is because of the fact that people have distanced themselves from Islam.   
Here the views of students from three different type of madrassas has been quoted and all of 
them are upholders of the notion that purpose of education is the service of Islam, though 
from the views of a madrassa student, it seems that he has no disliking for non-religious 
schools but he considers madrassas equally important for the assistance of Islam. When asked 
to what extent he sees the contribution of his education at the school/madrassa in formulating 
his opinions, a student from Deoband madrassa said: 
Ali: It is said that first learning place for a child is his mother’s cradle. But for me first 
and may be last learning place is Madrassa Rahmania (Name of madrassa)……………. 
Today I am alive because of this madrassa. Everything is because of it……………………… 
Government is trying to abolish these madrassas because their only crime is that they 
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fight for Haqq (truth).  They give religious education to many poor and orphans like 
me. 
A visible contrast comes in place when the views of madrassas students are compared with 
the views of students from Urdu and English medium schools. An Urdu medium school 
student shared his views about the purpose of education in this way: 
 
Khalid: To get a job is prime objective of education, who will go to school if they are 
told that no job will be given to them after completing their education…………I am not 
saying everyone who attends school gets a good job but there is a hope.…………..I love 
my school……..My parents are illiterate, whatever I am and I learnt is because of my 
school………………..When I was a child I used to think that children are sent to schools 
as a punishment (for bothering their parents) but now I know it is all for our good.  
 
Gender Inequality 
Often religion is considered as an obstacle in the way of progressive social change needed to 
materialize developmental goals such as gender equality. Religion has been particularly 
controversial in development discourse and planning in the arena of gender equality (Bano, 
2010). And interestingly, a little empirical research has been done so far, particularly in 
Pakistan, which could evaluate the views of those who are involved on religion or could 
examine the role of religion in social mobilization and activism. In this research, I have tried 
to determine the viewpoint of students of madrassas and main stream schools of Pakistan 
with regard to position of women in Pakistani society. Under this very theme 6 questions 
were included in the questionnaire covering a range of aspects regarding the role of women in 
Pakistani society. Responses of students towards these questionnaire items have been 
described in the table given under: 
 
 Equal rights should be given to men and women as in Western countries [Gender 
equality like Western societies] 
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 It is desirable that equal opportunities should be given to both men and women to 
become head of state [Head of the sate] 
 Women should work shoulder to shoulder with men in all spheres of life [ 
Participation in all spheres of life] 
 Women should be confined to domestic responsibilities [Limited to household chores] 
 The presence of women in Pak army is a progressive development [Participation in 
armed forces] 
 A fixed quota of jobs for women across a range of occupations is a positive step on 
the part of government [Women‘s quota] 
 
Composite Table 5.18: Views regarding gender equality issues (% agree and strongly 
agree) 
Questionnaire 
Items 
Ahle 
Hadith 
Brailvi Deobandi Govt. 
School 
Jamaat-i-
Islami 
Private 
School 
Shia 
Madrassa 
Gender equality 
like western 
societies 
15 20 18 54 10 77 13 
Head of the sate 19 23 19 57 9 79 13 
Participation in 
all spheres of 
life 
19 21 19 58 10 80 11 
Limited to 
household 
chores 
10 14 20 66 9 80 19 
Participation in 
armed forces 
19 21 19 54 10 76 10 
Women’s quota 19 20 20 53 10 74 14 
 
 
 
 
127 
 
The first item, among the six items that were included in the questionnaire to determine the 
responses of students with regard to ‗place of women in Pakistani society‘ was Equal rights 
should be given to men and women as in Western countries. A large proportion of students 
from madrassas disagreed with this notion; however, overwhelming number of students from 
English schools backed the statement. The response of majority of the Urdu schools students 
was also in favour of the statement. So far as madrassa students are concerned, as told before, 
they strongly disapproved the proposal that men and women should have equal rights. Further 
explanation in this regard will be acquired in the light of interviews from madrassas students. 
 
On November 16, 1988, Pakistan People‘s Party (PPP) headed by Benazir Bhutto won the 
single largest bloc of seats in the National Assembly and as a result Bhutto was sworn in as 
Prime Minister of a coalition government on December 2. Becoming the first woman to head 
the government of a Muslim-majority state in modern times caused much commotion in the 
circles of the religious parties and factions. They raised hue and cry by declaring that the 
becoming of a woman as a head of a Muslim state was not in conformity with the spirit of 
Islam. Various fatwas (religious verdicts) were issued against her. Bearing in mind such 
political background, a question was incorporated in the questionnaire that states, It is 
desirable that equal opportunities should be given to both men and women to become head of 
state. No surprise as data shows students from all madrassas overwhelmingly opposed the proposal. 
 
It is very unfortunate that domestic violence is highly prevalent in Pakistan. There are many 
forms of domestic violence against women ranging from psychological abuse in the form of 
controlling behaviour, economic abuse or pressures and social isolation; physical in the form 
of torturing or beating, and sexual abuse in the form of forced sexual intercourse etc. The 
prevailing systems of Purdah (veiling) and Izzat (sign of honour) are misused to push the 
social isolation of women and thus, women are more confined to their homes. According to 
Jehanzeb Noor (2004) this discrimination against women begins from home. The parents of a 
girl often do not educate her because she is not required to seek employment. They also fear 
that education would make her independent, modem and liberal. If family income is low, the 
male children claim all the family‘s affection and resources. The girl on the other hand is 
condemned to perform domestic chores, including looking after younger siblings without any 
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appreciation or compensation. Women have little choice but to accept these roles (Noor, 
2004). 
 
In order to have the take of Pakistani students from different types of schools about the place 
of women in Pakistani society, a question: ‗Women should be confined to domestic 
responsibilities’ was slotted in the questionnaire. All madrassa students commended the 
stance. If we look at the statistics of other item statements of the same variable ‗Gender 
Inequality‘, there is not any substantial difference in responses. For instance, a statement 
which probes the opinion of students about the ‗fixed quota of jobs for women‘ carries more 
or less similar figures. Most of the students from madrassas opposed the statement ‗A fixed 
quota of jobs for women across a range of occupations is a positive step on the part of 
government.‘ The ratio of students in the support of statement didn‘t exceed even 20 per cent 
in any madrassa, while the majority of Urdu and 3/4
th
 students of English schools backed the 
policy of government to fix quota in jobs for women. A clear impression comes from the 
interviews with madrassa students that women should be confined within the household 
chores. Further explanation in this regard will be made in the interview section. 
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Variation of responses across different educational institutes’ students on status of 
women 
Table 5.19 
Descriptives 
Gender Inequality  
 
 
The data of the (Table 5.19) tells that it is only private and government schools students who 
advocate equality between men and women. They favour equal participation of women in all 
walks of life, while on the other hand all students from madrassas irrespective of their type 
censure the idea of gender equality. The views of students regarding status of women would 
be further analyzed in interview section. The descriptive statistics (Table 5.19) gives us an 
idea what the means for each group are, and how big the gaps between the groups are. 3.00 is 
the mean, we can see that private English medium schools students and government Urdu 
medium schools students tend to score above the mean while students from all madrassas 
scored below the mean. 
  
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean Minimum Maximum 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound     
Ahle Hadith 70 2.0452 1.04755 .12521 1.7955 2.2950 1.00 5.00 
Brailvi 70 2.2381 1.06985 .12787 1.9830 2.4932 1.00 4.67 
Deobandi 70 2.1476 1.04779 .12523 1.8978 2.3975 1.00 5.00 
Govt. School 80 3.4604 1.07890 .12062 3.2203 3.7005 1.17 5.00 
Jamaat-i-
Islami 
70 1.8095 .86871 .10383 1.6024 2.0167 1.00 4.33 
Private School 70 4.1000 .91613 .10950 3.8816 4.3184 1.33 5.00 
Shia 
Madrassa 
70 1.8476 .92415 .11046 1.6273 2.0680 1.00 4.50 
Total 500 2.5400 1.29330 .05784 2.4264 2.6536 1.00 5.00 
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Results of ANOVA 
Table 5.20 
 ANOVA 
      Gender Inequality  
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 343.327 6 57.221 57.417 .000 
Within Groups 491.317 493 .997     
Total 834.644 499       
 
 
ANOVA test has been conducted to determine whether there are any statistically significant 
differences between the groups. An F ratio has been calculated, that represents the variance 
between the groups divided by the variance within the groups. A large F ratio indicates that 
there is more variability between the groups (caused by the independent variable i.e. type of 
institute in this very case) than there is within each group. A significant F test indicates 
whether there is any significant difference between different groups or not. And in this 
particular case, by virtue of it, we can reject the null hypothesis, which states that all the 
schools score exactly the same and there is no difference in the responses of students from 
different schools towards the questions dealing with status of women. So, basically analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) tests just found out that there is statistically significant difference 
between the schools but in order to know where these differences actually lie, Post Hoc test is 
to be carried out. 
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Variance in responses between the students from different schools on Gender Inequality 
One-way analysis of variance tests were conducted to look at how the responses of students 
about gender inequality diverge according to their schools type. The results are presented in 
(Table 5.21). 
Table 5.21 
Multiple Comparisons 
 
Dependent Variable: Gender Inequality  
Tukey HSD  
(I) Type of Institute (J) Type of Institute 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Ahle Hadith Brailvi -.19286 .16874 .914 -.6924 .3067 
  Deobandi -.10238 .16874 .997 -.6020 .3972 
  Govt. School -1.41518(*) .16338 .000 -1.8989 -.9315 
  Jamaat-i-Islami .23571 .16874 .803 -.2639 .7353 
  Private School -2.05476(*) .16874 .000 -2.5543 -1.5552 
  Shia Madrassa .19762 .16874 .905 -.3020 .6972 
Brailvi Ahle Hadith .19286 .16874 .914 -.3067 .6924 
  Deobandi .09048 .16874 .998 -.4091 .5900 
  Govt. School -1.22232(*) .16338 .000 -1.7060 -.7386 
  Jamaat-i-Islami .42857 .16874 .148 -.0710 .9281 
  Private School -1.86190(*) .16874 .000 -2.3615 -1.3623 
  Shia Madrassa .39048 .16874 .239 -.1091 .8900 
Deobandi Ahle Hadith .10238 .16874 .997 -.3972 .6020 
  Brailvi -.09048 .16874 .998 -.5900 .4091 
  Govt. School -1.31280(*) .16338 .000 -1.7965 -.8291 
  Jamaat-i-Islami .33810 .16874 .414 -.1615 .8377 
  Private School -1.95238(*) .16874 .000 -2.4520 -1.4528 
  Shia Madrassa .30000 .16874 .564 -.1996 .7996 
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(I) Type of Institute (J) Type of Institute 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Govt. School Ahle Hadith 1.41518(*) .16338 .000 .9315 1.8989 
  Brailvi 1.22232(*) .16338 .000 .7386 1.7060 
  Deobandi 1.31280(*) .16338 .000 .8291 1.7965 
  Jamaat-i-Islami 1.65089(*) .16338 .000 1.1672 2.1346 
  Private School -.63958(*) .16338 .002 -1.1233 -.1559 
  Shia Madrassa 1.61280(*) .16338 .000 1.1291 2.0965 
Jamaat-i-Islami Ahle Hadith -.23571 .16874 .803 -.7353 .2639 
  Brailvi -.42857 .16874 .148 -.9281 .0710 
  Deobandi -.33810 .16874 .414 -.8377 .1615 
  Govt. School -1.65089(*) .16338 .000 -2.1346 -1.1672 
  Private School -2.29048(*) .16874 .000 -2.7900 -1.7909 
  Shia Madrassa -.03810 .16874 1.000 -.5377 .4615 
Private School Ahle Hadith 2.05476(*) .16874 .000 1.5552 2.5543 
  Brailvi 1.86190(*) .16874 .000 1.3623 2.3615 
  Deobandi 1.95238(*) .16874 .000 1.4528 2.4520 
  Govt. School .63958(*) .16338 .002 .1559 1.1233 
  Jamaat-i-Islami 2.29048(*) .16874 .000 1.7909 2.7900 
  Shia Madrassa 2.25238(*) .16874 .000 1.7528 2.7520 
Shia Madrassa Ahle Hadith -.19762 .16874 .905 -.6972 .3020 
  Brailvi -.39048 .16874 .239 -.8900 .1091 
  Deobandi -.30000 .16874 .564 -.7996 .1996 
  Govt. School -1.61280(*) .16338 .000 -2.0965 -1.1291 
  Jamaat-i-Islami .03810 .16874 1.000 -.4615 .5377 
  Private School -2.25238(*) .16874 .000 -2.7520 -1.7528 
 
 
A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of 
school type on the views of students about status of women in Pakistani society, as 
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determined through 6 question slotted in the questionnaire. Participants of this survey are 10
th
 
level (class) students from seven different types of schools of more or less similar age group. 
There was a statistically significant difference at the p<.05 level in Gender Inequality scores 
for the seven different schools‘ types groups [F (6, 493)=57.41, p=.000]. Although we have 
found a statistically significant difference between the seven sets of scores, we also need to 
assess the effect size of this result. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, is .41 which, 
according to generally accepted criteria (Cohen 1988, pp. 284–7), is considered quite a large 
effect. Using the commonly used guidelines proposed by Cohen (1988, pp. 284–7) 
(.01=small, .06=moderate, .14=large effect), this result suggests a very large effect size. Post-
hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean scores for private schools 
(M=4.10, SD=.916) and government schools (M=3.46, SD=1.08) were significantly different 
from all religious seminaries; Ahle Hadith (M=2.05, SD=1.05), Brailvi (M=2.24, SD=1.07), 
Deobandi (M=2.15, SD=1.05), Jamaat-i-Islami (M=1.80, SD=.869) and Shia Madrassas 
(M=1.85, SD=.924). Interestingly, there is no significant difference within the religious 
schools. The (Table 5.19) shows that these are only the students from private and government 
schools who scored above the mean score i.e. M=3.00, otherwise madrassas‘ students scored 
below the mean and they seem to be disapproving the idea that men and women should enjoy 
equal status and should have equal opportunities. 
 
With respect to the views of students about status of women, the responses in the interview 
data substantiate the questionnaire data. Some of the interesting points which students took 
up in one to one interview are discussed here under: 
 
Majeed: Concerning women, we should obey the Koran, not the West….. Women 
cause all incitement to evil in the society. Allah says women should be covered and 
the Angraiz61 want us to undress our women, whom we should listen to, Allah or the 
West!!!............They (women) shouldn’t leave the house unless covered. This is what 
Koran says about women, they should stay at home……Introducing quota in jobs for 
                                                          
61
 In contrast to its literal meaning which is ―English people‖ the common folks in Pakistan used the term 
Angraiz for all Europeans and Western people. 
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women was a devilish deed on the part of Musharraf62 that incurred the wrath of 
God and now, look, he cannot even come to Pakistan. 
 
A student from Jamaat-e-Islami madrassa expressed his views regarding status of women and 
took an extreme position and censured the notion that equal rights should be given to men 
and women as in Western society. More or less similar views were shared by a student Nasir 
from Shia madrassa regarding the place of women in Pakistani society. 
 
Abbas: Women must be confined to household works……………Today’s vulgarity in our 
Islamic society is because of women liberty. Un-Islamic laws are being implemented 
with respect to women’s place in society…………………It is a shame for men that they 
accept women rule on them albeit God has made men superior to women……….Qari 
Naeem sb (Teacher’s name) always says that the day government will ban women to 
go outside, there will be no  vulgarity in our society. 
 
A student from Deobandi madrassa, like his counterparts from religious seminaries takes an 
ardent stance with respect to the position of women in Pakistani society as shown by his 
views expressed under: 
 
Khan: Education is a duty for both men and women. It suits a woman better when she is 
covered. She needs to go out covered. There is a command in the Koran, “promotion of virtue 
and prevention of vice”. All incitement to evil is caused by women. I can only advise her to 
the best of my capacity. In today’s society it is a verbal jihad. All we can do is advise them. If 
they don’t accept it, it is out of our hands. Because it has become a custom all over the 
world, so we can’t do much. Killing a woman without hijab is not in the Koran.  When Sharia 
law is in force, we hope they will not come out without a hijab. 
 
                                                          
62
 Former Army Chief and President of Pakistan who is in self-imposed exile since his removal as president. 
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There has also been included the views of two students; one from Urdu medium school and 
the other from English medium school, though both of them agreed that women should be 
granted much more rights than the ones not approved by madrassa students, but the student 
from Urdu medium school consider teaching an appropriate occupation for women as 
compared to military. 
 
Kabeer: Women make half part of our country and they should work shoulder to 
shoulder…………..I don’t think that women should be given permission to join 
army..……….Teaching is a very good profession for women……………Why not! Benazir 
Bhuttoo was a woman and she was a great leader………I think those are illiterate who 
oppose women right to rule a country. 
 
Zahid: Girls are not inferior to us in any respect. If we think honestly they are even 
far better than us……You can see the results of Board of Intermediate and Secondary 
Education, top 16 positions of the board went to girls. It is very good that girls, I 
mean women joined Pak army……………………They should work shoulder to shoulder 
with men in every field. Confining girls to the occupations of doctor or teacher only is 
very bad, my own sister is studying the engineering course in a university out of this 
city. 
 
 
 As discussed in the questionnaire, the students from English and Urdu medium schools were 
more inclined towards the notion that equal rights should be granted to women as opposed to 
men and the students from madrassas come up with some kind of misogynistic views. 
  
Status of Minorities 
Religious discrimination in Pakistan is a serious issue. Christians and Ahmadis are routinely 
discriminated against. Most recently, the issue of forced conversions of young Hindu girls got 
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media attention. Minorities are refused jobs, loans, housing and have had their postal service 
stopped. Churches and Ahmadi mosques are regularly attacked and worshipers physically 
assaulted (Bales, 2012). The International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD) 
conducted a study in November 2011 which says that Pakistan‘s public schools and 
particularly madrassas negatively portray the country‘s religious minorities and reinforce 
biases which fuel acts of discrimination, and possibly violence, against these communities. 
This phenomenon is not new at all but the role of free national media especially after 2004 
brought such issues to the lime light. Keeping in view the alleged role of educational 
institutes in promoting schism between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens of Pakistan, these 
questions were incorporated in the questionnaire and the position of students from south 
Punjab on this very issue was found out. The questionnaire statements dealing with the theme 
‗status of non-Muslims in Pakistani society‘ contains 11 multiple items in the questionnaire. 
These items are grouped to prove or disprove this very traditional concept that madrassa 
students are intolerant towards minorities in Pakistan. Responses of questionnaire items have 
been explained with the help of crosstab tables which are given hereunder: 
 
 Equal rights should be accorded to Ahmedis in all jobs [Jobs for Ahmedis] 
 Equal rights should be accorded to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs [Jobs for Hindus] 
 Equal rights should be accorded to Pakistani Christians in all jobs [Jobs for 
Christians] 
 Ahmedis should have right to perform their religious practices freely [Religious 
freedom for Ahmedis] 
 Ahmedis should have right to occupy key positions in Pakistan without any 
discrimination [Key positions for Ahmedis] 
 Ahmedis should have right to propagate their religion freely [Propagation of religion] 
 The constitutional clause that says that the highest officials of the state must be 
Muslims is justifiable [Must be a Muslim] 
 Every Pakistani whether Muslim or non-Muslim must read Islamic Studies as a 
compulsory subject [Islamic Studies obligatory] 
 There should be no compulsion on private schools to teach Islamic Studies to their 
students [Private schools and Islamic Studies] 
 All non-Muslims in Pakistan should have the right to celebrate their religious festivals 
freely [Freedom for religious celebrations] 
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 As Pakistan is an Islamic country, so all the restrictions on non-Muslims are justified [ 
Justification for discrimination] 
 
 Composite Table 5.22: Views regarding status of minorities (% agree and strongly agree) 
Questionnaire 
Items 
Ahle 
Hadith 
Brailvi Deobandi Govt. 
School 
Jamaat-i-
Islami 
Private 
School 
Shia 
Madrassa 
Jobs for Ahmedis 19 17 15 41 19 64 14 
Jobs for Hindus 40 47 39 39 79 79 30 
Jobs for Christians 53 49 47 53 48 76 61 
Religious 
freedom for 
Ahmedis 
54 36 36 56 40 73 51 
Key positions for 
Ahmedis 
23 21 23 38 30 49 42 
Propagation of 
religion 
50 37 36 56 40 73 49 
Must be a Muslim     60      47        60      35       50      16        51 
Islamic Studies 
obligatory 
    46      34        40      35       27      17        34 
Private schools 
and Islamic 
Studies 
    33      39        36      48       21      60       30 
Freedom for 
religious 
celebrations 
    57     59       56     78      61      79       59 
Justification for 
discrimination 
   39     33      47     31      37     14       46 
 
Interestingly, the data shows that students from madrassas did express a bit of intolerance 
towards non-Muslims in Pakistan. Their responses showed that Ahmedis
63
 are victim of their 
                                                          
63
 Ahmedis are those who consider Ghulam Ahmed Qadian as the last messenger of God instead of Muhammad 
(pbuh); who by all Muslims is believed to be the last prophet. Ahmedis were declared non-Muslims in 1973 
constitution of Pakistan as a result of severe agitation by all religious parties of Pakistan. 
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bigotry much more than Hindus and Christians. One can make an analogy between Muslims 
and Ahmedis in the same manner as between Christians and Mormons, so far as the 
difference of believes is concerned. In response to the statement ‗Equal rights should be 
accorded to Ahmedis in all jobs’ a large proportion of students from madrassas expressed 
their censure, even this time the majority of students from Urdu schools also shared the 
viewpoint of madrassas students. 
 
If we look at the responses of madrassas students towards the similar questions only with the 
replacement of Ahmedis with Hindus and Christians, one interesting finding comes in place. 
Ahle Hadith, Brailvi and Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas students showed their agreement to the 
statement which says ‗Equal rights should be accorded to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs‘ and 
even Shia and Deoband madrassas students also share similar response with rest of the three 
madrassas when it is the question of equal rights to Pakistani Christians. Its explanation can 
be found by virtue of interview with a madrassa student who considers Christians more close 
to Islam than that of Hinduism because ―Christianity like Islam is a revealed religion.‖ If we 
look at the responses of students towards the issue of religious freedom to all non-Muslims, a 
clear dichotomy in views can be observed. Madrassas students seem unwilling to accord 
equal rights to non-Muslims in general and Ahmedis in particular when it is the question of 
giving equal opportunities in jobs. They opposed the idea that ―Ahmedis should have right to 
occupy key positions in Pakistan without any discrimination‖ and stood by the stance that 
―The constitutional clause that says, the highest officials of the state must be Muslims is 
justifiable‖ but at the same time they favoured the thought that ―All non-Muslims in Pakistan 
should have the right to celebrate their religious festivals freely.‖ It is quite obvious from the 
data that a clear majority of students from all types of madrassas gives their approval for 
religious freedom to non-Muslims in Pakistan. Even the percentage of students from Jamaat-
i-Islami madrassas is higher than government schools students and ranks second highest only 
after private schools students. This can be because of the fact that Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas 
advocate pluralistic view of Islam and unlike other madrassas they teach reformed syllabus 
that includes secular subjects like geography, science and even foreign languages like English 
and Arabic. And so far as Shia madrassas students are concerned, they themselves are victims 
of intolerance at the hands of Sunni majority and are backers of maximum religious freedom. 
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Pakistan‘s first foreign minister Sir Zafar Ullah Khan was an Ahmedi. In 1953 anti-
Ahmediya movement headed by Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami ignited a 
series of violent riots in the city of Lahore. Unable to contain the increasingly 
widespread civil disorder, civilian government handed over the administration of the city to 
the army and first ever martial law in the history of Pakistan was imposed in Lahore. In the 
face of opposition from religious circles, Sir Zafar Ullah had to quit his position as foreign 
minister of Pakistan in 1954. Anti-Ahmedia movement or popularly known as Tehreek-i-
Khatame Naboowwat made three demands. 
 Removal of Muhammad Zafarullah Khan from the foreign ministry; 
 Removal of Ahmedis from top government offices; 
 Declaration of Ahmedis as non-Muslims. 
 
One can gauge the influence of religious groups in Pakistan by viewing the fact that all of 
their demands were not only accepted but also in later years no civilian or military 
government dared to offer key positions to Ahmedis. Data of the study also corroborates with 
this fact when we see that majority of students from all types of madrassas opposed the 
notion that ‗Ahmedis should have right to occupy key positions in Pakistan without any 
discrimination‘. 
 
Theoretically, in Pakistan it is mandatory for only Muslim students up to Secondary school 
level to study Islamic Studies as a compulsory subject, but the practice tells another story. 
Executive Director of National Commission for Justice and Peace (NCJP) Peter Jacob in his 
study titled ‗Life on the Margins‘ disclosed that 27 per cent minority women (Christian and 
Hindu) faced discrimination in admissions to educational institutions and were forced to take 
Islamic studies for absence of any alternative subject (2013). In 2013, Shehzad Roy
64
 
produced and hosted the 22-episode documentary series titled "Chal Parha" [translated 'Let's 
Educate']. In this show, issues in public education, for example medium of instruction, 
curriculum, teachers, corporal punishment were highlighted. Roy travelled across 80 cities in 
Pakistan and visited more than 200 public schools. The documentary showed that in some 
government schools of Pakistan Hindus and Christians were being taught Islamic Studies, 
even in Sindh a Hindu teacher was asked by the school administration to teach Islamic 
                                                          
64
 Shehzad Roy is a renowned singer, a celebrity in Pakistan. 
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Studies. After on-airing of just couple of episodes of the show, a massive protest started 
against Roy, especially on social media. The show was stated as anti-Islamic and against 
national interests.  
 
If we see the responses of students towards the questionnaire item Every Pakistani whether 
Muslim or non-Muslim must read Islamic Studies as a compulsory subject, a large proportion 
of students from all types of madrassas either agreed with the statement or was undecided. As 
far as private school students are concerned only 17 per cent supported the stance Every 
Pakistani whether Muslim or non-Muslim must read Islamic Studies as a compulsory subject 
and overwhelming majority that is 60 per cent favoured the notion that ‘There should be no 
compulsion on private schools to teach Islamic Studies to their students’. 
 
Variation of responses across different educational institutes’ students about the place of 
non-Muslims in Pakistani society 
Table 5.23 
Descriptives 
Status of Minorities  
  N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean Minimum Maximum 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound     
Ahle Hadith 70 2.9325 .52593 .06286 2.8071 3.0579 1.73 4.09 
Brailvi 70 2.9390 .62020 .07413 2.7911 3.0868 1.36 4.27 
Deobandi 70 2.7883 .65933 .07880 2.6311 2.9455 1.36 4.18 
Govt. School 80 3.3091 .59068 .06604 3.1776 3.4405 1.73 4.45 
Jamaat-i-Islami 70 2.9390 .48073 .05746 2.8243 3.0536 2.00 3.91 
Private School 70 3.9325 .56119 .06707 3.7987 4.0663 2.82 4.91 
Shia Madrassa 70 2.9740 .51870 .06200 2.8503 3.0977 1.55 4.09 
Total 500 3.1202 .67110 .03001 3.0612 3.1791 1.36 4.91 
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The data in the (Table 5.23) shows that the students from English medium private schools 
and Urdu medium government schools scored above M=3.00 that is the mean; otherwise rest 
of the institutes‘ students (students from religious seminaries) scored below the mean score. 
From their responses, it is evident that only private and government schools students believe 
equality for the non-Muslims in the Pakistani society and object to any discrimination with 
minorities on the basis of religion. On the other hand madrassa students regardless of their 
type back this discriminatory treatment of non-Muslims in Pakistan on the premise that 
Pakistan is a Muslim majority country and all the legal and constitutional restrictions on non-
Muslims are justified. Further analysis on this point will be made in the interview section in 
the later part of this chapter. 
 
Results of ANOVA 
Table 5.24 
ANOVA 
                Status of Minorities 
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
65.311 6 10.885 33.661 .000 
Within Groups 159.426 493 .323     
Total 224.737 499       
 
 
Analysis of variance has been used to compare the variance (variability in scores) between 
the different schools (due to the independent variable; type of institutes) with the variability 
within each of the groups. An F ratio has been calculated, that represents the variance 
between the groups divided by the variance within the groups. A large F ratio indicates that 
there is more variability between the groups (caused by the independent variable) than there 
is within each group. A significant F test indicates whether there is any significant difference 
between different groups or not. And in this particular case, by virtue of it, we can reject the 
null hypothesis, which states that all the schools score exactly the same and there is no 
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difference in the responses of students from different schools towards the questions asked 
about the status of minorities in Pakistani society. The value is less than .05 and is .000 that 
indicates that there is statistically significant difference between the schools but in order to 
know where these differences actually lie; only ANOVA test is not sufficient, for it we will 
have to carry out Post Hoc test. 
Variance in responses between the students from different schools about Status of 
Minorities 
Table 5.25 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: Status of Minorities  
Tukey HSD  
(I) Type of Institute (J) Type of Institute 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Ahle Hadith Brailvi -.00649 .09612 1.000 -.2911 .2781 
  Deobandi .14416 .09612 .745 -.1404 .4287 
  Govt. School -.37662(*) .09307 .001 -.6522 -.1011 
  Jamaat-i-Islami -.00649 .09612 1.000 -.2911 .2781 
  Private School -1.00000(*) .09612 .000 -1.2846 -.7154 
  Shia Madrassa -.04156 .09612 1.000 -.3261 .2430 
Brailvi Ahle Hadith .00649 .09612 1.000 -.2781 .2911 
  Deobandi .15065 .09612 .703 -.1339 .4352 
  Govt. School -.37013(*) .09307 .002 -.6457 -.0946 
  Jamaat-i-Islami .00000 .09612 1.000 -.2846 .2846 
  Private School -.99351(*) .09612 .000 -1.2781 -.7089 
  Shia Madrassa -.03506 .09612 1.000 -.3196 .2495 
Deobandi Ahle Hadith -.14416 .09612 .745 -.4287 .1404 
  Brailvi -.15065 .09612 .703 -.4352 .1339 
  Govt. School -.52078(*) .09307 .000 -.7963 -.2452 
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(I) Type of Institute (J) Type of Institute 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  Jamaat-i-Islami -.15065 .09612 .703 -.4352 .1339 
  Private School -1.14416(*) .09612 .000 -1.4287 -.8596 
  Shia Madrassa -.18571 .09612 .460 -.4703 .0989 
Govt. School Ahle Hadith .37662(*) .09307 .001 .1011 .6522 
  Brailvi .37013(*) .09307 .002 .0946 .6457 
  Deobandi .52078(*) .09307 .000 .2452 .7963 
  Jamaat-i-Islami .37013(*) .09307 .002 .0946 .6457 
  Private School -.62338(*) .09307 .000 -.8989 -.3478 
  Shia Madrassa .33506(*) .09307 .006 .0595 .6106 
Jamaat-i-Islami Ahle Hadith .00649 .09612 1.000 -.2781 .2911 
  Brailvi .00000 .09612 1.000 -.2846 .2846 
  Deobandi .15065 .09612 .703 -.1339 .4352 
  Govt. School -.37013(*) .09307 .002 -.6457 -.0946 
  Private School -.99351(*) .09612 .000 -1.2781 -.7089 
  Shia Madrassa -.03506 .09612 1.000 -.3196 .2495 
Private School Ahle Hadith 1.00000(*) .09612 .000 .7154 1.2846 
  Brailvi .99351(*) .09612 .000 .7089 1.2781 
  Deobandi 1.14416(*) .09612 .000 .8596 1.4287 
  Govt. School .62338(*) .09307 .000 .3478 .8989 
  Jamaat-i-Islami .99351(*) .09612 .000 .7089 1.2781 
  Shia Madrassa .95844(*) .09612 .000 .6739 1.2430 
Shia Madrassa Ahle Hadith .04156 .09612 1.000 -.2430 .3261 
  Brailvi .03506 .09612 1.000 -.2495 .3196 
  Deobandi .18571 .09612 .460 -.0989 .4703 
  Govt. School -.33506(*) .09307 .006 -.6106 -.0595 
  Jamaat-i-Islami .03506 .09612 1.000 -.2495 .3196 
  Private School -.95844(*) .09612 .000 -1.2430 -.6739 
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A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of 
school type on the response of students towards the theme ‗status of minorities in Pakistan‘ as 
deliberated by the 11 question items that dealt with the place of non-Muslims in different 
aspects ranging from religious freedom to equal opportunities to hold key governmental 
positions. There was a statistically significant difference at the p<.05 level in ‗Status of non-
Muslims‘ scores for the seven different schools‘ types groups [F (6, 493)=33.66, p=.000]. 
Though we have found that there is a statistically significant difference between the seven 
sets of scores, yet in order to measure its magnitude, we need to assess the effect size of the 
result. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, is .29, which in Cohen‘s (1988, pp. 284–
7) terms would be considered as a large effect size. Cohen classifies .01 as a small effect, .06 
as a medium effect and .14 as a large effect. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test 
indicated that the mean scores for private schools (M=3.93, SD=.561) is significantly 
different from government schools (M=3.31, SD=.591) and all religious seminaries; Ahle 
Hadith (M=2.93, SD=.526), Brailvi (M=2.94, SD=.620), Deobandi (M=2.79, SD=.660), 
Jamaat-i-Islami (M=2.94, SD=.481) and Shia Madrassas (M=2.97, SD=.519). For the themes 
Aim of Education and Gender Inequality, there was no significant means difference between 
the scores of two main stream educational institutes, but here English medium and Urdu 
medium schools‘ score difference is statistically significant, that is less than .05. However, so 
far as the scores of madrassas are concerned, there is no statistically significant difference 
within them. 
 
The views of students regarding status of minorities in Pakistan, the responses in the 
interview data corroborate with the questionnaire data. However, there are some interesting 
points which students took up in one to one interview. As discussed in the questionnaire, the 
students from English and Urdu medium schools were more inclined towards the notion that 
equal rights should be accorded to minorities in jobs and to practice their religion, as 
compared to those of madrassa students. As far as the views of students with respect to the 
position of non-Muslims is concerned, there is a visible difference in the stances of students 
coming from different educations systems. A student from Shia madrassa says, 
Kazim: Islam has categorically stated 14 hundred years ago that Christians and Jews 
can never be your (Muslims) friends………It is proved today. If we say this thing openly 
people call us extremists but how long they will neglect this reality………………..I have 
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no hatred for any sect…………..Pakistan is for Muslims only…there is no example that 
Hindus, Christians or Jews have shed their blood for it (for the creation of Pakistan) 
instead they all opposed it, so why they should be given jobs. 
More or less similar views were expressed by Jamaat-i-Islami madrassa student: 
Rana: God says in the Koran, “Believers, take neither Jews nor Christians for your 
friends.” Don’t be on good terms with the Jews and Christians. You or me cannot 
deny the verse from the Koran, it is a straight verse…“Believers, take neither Jews nor 
Christians for your friends.” Earth has been created for the Muslims….They will have 
to accept Islam or pay Jazia or will fight them….And that was how the prophet 
fought. As our Muslim brothers are under attack in Afghanistan, so it is duty of every 
man and woman to join the jihad. Koran says ‘don’t be friends with the infidels. God 
can grant you honour and He can smite you. It is not in human hands… 
A student from Brailvi madrassa also questions the loyalty of Ahmedis with Muslim majority 
state and disqualifies them from holding key sensitive positions.  
Sajjad: Whether Hindus or Muslims, all of us are Pakistanis, if we look our 
relationship in this way, there will not be any conflicts……Every non-Muslim be it 
Christian, Hindu or Ahmedi should have religious liberty. As far as their part in jobs is 
concerned, they should have their due share…….I don’t think Ahmedis are qualified 
for every job, as they are traitors. Along with head of the state and head of the 
government, all sensitive positions should go to Muslims only. 
The views of students from three different types of madrassas have been quoted above and all 
of them upheld the notion that equality of rights should be denied to minorities in Pakistan. 
And a visible contrast comes in place when the views of madrassa students are compared 
with the views of a student from English medium school that are given hereunder: 
Rafiq: It doesn’t make any sense to me that why should people be discriminated 
because of their religious beliefs. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter is mainly comprised of detailed analyses of data and presents the findings. But 
before moving to analysis, the 5th chapter described the sample characteristics and gave an 
account of background information of the participants. The chapter began with the 
description of background information of participants that includes their demographic 
characteristics, lifestyles, habits and personal history, such as respondents‘ age, gender, 
residential location, socio-economic status, religion, and level of education and so on and so 
forth. As far as background information is concerned, it can be seen that differences do exist 
between madrassa, Urdu medium and English medium schools‘ students, be it their social 
class, their family system or previous education. After reporting background information of 
the participants, detailed analysis of data was presented. In the analysis and findings section, 
difference in the outlook of students from three different types of schooling systems with 
respect to three important themes of the study was reported. The themes included in this 
chapter are primary purpose of education, status of women and position of minorities. The 
findings of the study were reported by virtue of cross tabs, mean, standard deviation, Chi 
square to explore the relationship/relatedness between variables and ANOVA i.e. analysis of 
variance which was used to compare the variance (variability in scores) between the different 
schools (due to the independent variables; like type of institutes) with the variability within 
each of the groups. In addition, the interview data was linked to have further illustrative 
insights on the questionnaire data. From the findings of data, it can be seen then that 
differences do exist between the outlooks of students coming from three different types of 
schooling systems regarding their views on primary purpose of education, woman rights and 
status of minorities in Muslim majority state Pakistan. Data showed that the students from 
madrassas are the most extremist in their views and English medium ones are the least. The 
questionnaire data was further endorsed with the interviews of students from respective 
schools. 
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Chapter 6 
Views regarding sectarian rift and Islamic militancy 
Introduction 
Religious extremism, in Pakistan, has witnessed unprecedented heights in recent times. 
Extremism has many facets ranging from the practice of sanctifying oppression against 
women and minorities to intolerance towards people of other sect and even pursue armed 
struggle to impose vested agenda. In the context of Pakistan, extremism manifests an absolute 
position taken by the people or groups of people, who reject plurality of society and want to 
enforce a uniform viewpoint or ideology, even by using violence by giving it the name of 
Jihad (holy war). The trend of Jihad/armed struggle in madrassas was introduced in the wake 
of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan when the students of madrassas were trained to fight Soviet 
forces and madrassas students acted as proper foot soldiers for the war. This very exposure of 
madrassa students towards armed violence turned them into security threat and they started to 
be known as ‗Jihadi factories‘ and ‗terrorist dens‘. Madrassa critics also sustain the view that 
students are taught to be intolerant towards people of other sect and blame the tradition of 
‗radd65‘ and related literature for contributing sectarian conflict in Pakistan. They are of the 
view that madrassas are also bent upon preaching their code of ethics on women in the name 
of Islamic teachings and curtailing women‘s mobility to participate in social life 
(Borchgrevink, 2011). 
 
In the previous chapter, I have discussed the difference in the students from three different 
types of school systems with regard to their opinions about the ‗educational priorities‘, the 
‗position of women‘ and the ‗status of minorities‘. In this chapter, two more themes such as 
the take of students on the ‗sectarian issues‘ and Islamic militancy‘ would be deliberated 
upon. 
  
Sectarian Issues 
                                                          
65
 The literal meaning of radd is ‗to refute‘. Refutation constitutes an important component of the training 
students at most of the madrassas. Special attention is paid towards training madrassa students to counter or 
refute the theological worldviews of other sub-sects, beliefs they consider heretical. 
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There are many reports that declare religious schools as hatcheries of sectarian hatred; but, by 
and large, these reports are based on observations and are not substantiated by proper 
practical proof. To have empirical evidence in this connection, 14 item questions were 
incorporated in the questionnaire. These questions are to cover not only various areas of 
participants‘ lives ranging from personal to familial, with relation to sectarian difference, but 
also have tried to look into the religious and socio-political interests of students as citizens of 
a Muslim nation state. Here are responses of the students towards these questionnaire items. 
 
 I get along well with people from different sects [Interaction] 
 I think a person should be elected on the basis of his personal character instead of his 
sectarian affiliation [Personal conduct] 
 I don‘t make friends with people who are from different sects [No amity] 
 Inter-marriages among different sects are acceptable [Inter-marriage] 
 I have no problem in offering my prayer in a mosque of different sect [Place of 
worship] 
 I have no problem in offering my congregational prayer behind an Imam from 
different sect [ Congregational prayer] 
 If the head of the state/government belongs to different sect, it makes me to feel that I 
and people from my sect are going to be marginalised [Head of the state] 
 Every Muslim must have right to celebrate his/her religious festival freely [ Right for 
religious celebrations] 
 I think that the word ‗sect‘ should be removed from all governmental documentations 
requiring personal information [Personal information] 
 All political parties divided on sectarian lines should be banned [Political parties] 
 I think there should be different schools for students belonging to different sects 
[Sectarian schools] 
 I didn‘t have any problem with attending the funeral prayer of a person from different 
sect [Funeral prayer] 
 I didn‘t have any problem in marrying a girl from different sect [Marriage with 
diverse sect girl] 
 I didn‘t have any problem with female from my family getting married with a man 
from other sect [Marriage with diverse sect male] 
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Composite Table 6.1: Views regarding sectarian issues (% agree and strongly agree) 
Questionnaire Item Ahle 
Hadith 
Brailvi Deobandi Govt. 
School 
Jamaat-
i-Islami 
Private 
School 
Shia 
Madrassa 
Interaction 60 64 56 73 70 77 50 
Personal conduct 62 60 67 75 66 81 58 
No amity 20 17 34 13 23 11 23 
Inter-marriage 12 24 35 63 54 72 19 
Place of worship 64 61 70 61 80 83 60 
Congregational 
prayer 
70 23 67 60 70 64 11 
Head of the state 17 17 31 8 17 11 20 
Right for religious 
celebrations 
51 61 61 79 61 87 77 
Personal 
information 
51 56 44 60 57 60 73 
Political parties 9 14 13 69 23 69 44 
Sectarian schools 17 17 30 9 17 11 20 
Funeral prayer 56 19 63 70 64 71 14 
Marriage with 
diverse sect girl 
72 63 69 73 71 77 23 
Marriage with 
diverse sect male 
21 19 24 57 33 55 10 
 
The data shows that large proportion of students from all types of institutes doesn‘t have any 
problem with people from other sects. They get along well with people from different sects. 
Except Shia madrassas students, the percentage of students who disagreed with the statement 
is even less than 25%. However, a clear contradiction in responses comes in the way, 
particularly in case of madrassas students, when we compare their questionnaire answers with 
the viewpoint upheld by them during interviews. During interviewing all questions from the 
questionnaire were not asked rather the question items were prioritized and this very question 
was asked by all the interviewees. 
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In the same vein, the data results for the questionnaire statement, ‗I think a person should be 
elected on the basis of his personal character instead of his sectarian affiliation‘ shows that 
they hardly give any consideration to sectarian affiliation while electing their representatives. 
More than sixty per cent of students from madrassas (except Shia madrassas) and three-fourth 
students from English and Urdu medium schools think, it should be one‘s personal conduct, 
instead of sectarian association, that should matter in the process of election. Keeping in view 
the common trend in some parts of the country, that is, people usually vote for those 
candidates who belong to their sect, this question was incorporated in the questionnaire, but 
the responses of students from South Punjab do not seem endorsing this practice. 
  
More or less similar responses of students from all types of institutes were observed towards 
statements like: I don’t make friends with people who are from different sects, or If the head 
of the state/government belongs to different sect, it makes me to feel that I and people from 
my sect are going to be marginalized. In the light of responses from all types of schools‘ 
students, one interesting finding comes in place that sectarian affiliation hardly plays any role 
when it comes the turn of participants‘ personal or individual entity or their role as a citizen 
of a state but we see a clear difference in the demeanour of students, especially those from 
madrassas, when they responded to the question items that are about their familial relations. 
 
For instance, majority of the students from madrassas (except Jamaat-i-Islami) expressed 
their disagreement with the statement ‗Inter-marriages among different sects are acceptable‘, 
more or less similar responses were found for the statement ‗I didn’t have any problem with 
female from my family getting married with a man from other sect‘ as both the aforesaid 
statements deal with familial relations. With regard to first statement, 63 per cent Shia 
madrassa students disagreed with the notion that inter-marriages among different sects are 
acceptable. It is noteworthy that this is the highest number among all types of institutes, and 
the lowest percentage among madrassas only is 26% that is of Jamaat-i-Islami madrassa, as 
the later claims (see chapter 2)  to be supra-sectarian in nature. Overall the students from the 
madrassas disapproved the idea of inter-marriages among different sects, however the 
responses of students from Urdu schools and particularly from English schools were quite 
opposite. Only 10 per cent students from private schools and 14 per cent from government 
schools disagreed with the proposal of inter-marriages. 
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Similarly, if we look at the opinions of madrassas students towards the statement ‗I didn’t 
have any problem with female from my family getting married with a man from other sect‘ 
they expressed their disapproval, but if we compare it with the statement ―I didn’t have any 
problem in marrying a girl from different sect‖ a kind of variation in response was noticed; a 
large proportion of students from madrassas except Shia commended the viewpoint. Barring 
the fact that the majority of madrassa students censured the idea of inter-marriages among 
different sects, yet most of the madrassas students do not see any problem in marrying a girl 
from other sect. And a clear dichotomy in responses can be found when we look at the 
statistics about the marriage of a girl from their families to any man from other sect. This 
might be because of the reason that in Pakistani society women usually follow their 
husbands‘ sect after marriage. 
 
The questionnaire responses on statement ‗I think that the word ‘sect’ should be removed 
from all governmental documentations requiring personal information‘ intrigues one‘s 
attention on account of its uniqueness. All types of schools students agree with the statement 
and in this regard the students from Shia madrassas seem very much vocal even more than 
the students of English schools. It might be because of the fact that there is a common 
perception among Shias that they are discriminated because of their sect. This will be further 
explored in interview section. 
 
A dozen of Muslims gathered in one of the local mosques. It was time for prayer. One of the 
men was asked to act as the imam
66
. He moved forward and led the prayer. The imam 
happened to be a Shia but the people praying behind him did not know about it until during 
the prayer some of them noticed that the imam stood in prayer with his hands down as Shias 
normally do. After the prayer was completed one moqtadi
67
 bluntly asked the imam whether 
he was a Shia, to which he replied that he was. This started a discussion among the Sunni
68
 
moqtadis with most of them saying that their prayer was null and void. The imam himself 
                                                          
66
 A person who leads prayer. 
67
 The meaning of term Moqtadi is ‘One who follows’. In congregational prayer an imam leads the prayer and 
all men who follow him are called moqtadis. 
68
 Ahle Hadith, Brailvis and Deobandis are Sunnis. Though Jamaat-e-Islami  claims to be supra-sectarian but can 
be categorised as Sunni.  
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went into a corner of the mosque and started to read the Holy Qur`an. The discussion went on 
for a while and eventually it was decided that the Sunnis should repeat their prayer behind 
a Sunni imam, which is what was done (Shafqaat, 1983). In another incident an Ahle Hadith 
Muslim (also called Wahabi) went to offer his prayer in a mosque that belonged to Brailvi 
sect. After the end of congregational prayer, it was discovered that a person from another sect 
was among the moqtadis (ibid, 1983). He was not only insulted and thrown out of mosque; 
rather the mosque was washed afterwards. These events can explain the sectarian segregation 
prevailing in Pakistan. Keeping in view this situation a few questions like I have no problem 
in offering my prayer in a mosque of different sect and I have no problem in offering my 
congregational prayer behind an Imam from different sect were included in the 
questionnaire. Interestingly majority of students even from madrassas have no problem in 
offering their prayer in a mosque from different sect. That response might be because of the 
perception that mosques do not really belong to any particular group or individual but to God. 
Such perception is preached by all sects at least theoretically. In answer to the question I have 
no problem in offering my congregational prayer behind an Imam from different sect, a 
divided opinion was observed among madrassa students. Deobandi, Ahle Hadith and Jamaat-
i-Islami madrassas students‘ viewpoint is in favour of the notion while students from Brailvi 
and Shia madrassas did not commend the idea at all. 
  
Darul Iman Jamia Masjid Qurtuba; a newly-built mosque in Islamabad calls upon its 
followers to shun discrimination along sectarian lines and to start praying together – in 
whichever way they like – under the same roof. The Imam and Khateeb are both from 
different sects – and the mosque administration says it will have no problem if a Shia or an 
Imam from other sect leads prayers. Zahid Iqbal, a business man who purported this idea and 
purchased land for the mosque shared his views about the reaction of community. I am 
thrilled by the reaction I received from people. People from different sects are already 
praying there together. He further added that there has been individual criticism as well. Iqbal 
told that more than ten members of the Taliban came to his mosque and he debated them for 
hours and convinced them to stop opposing his interpretation of Islam (zaidi, 2013). Pakistani 
society needs a space to counter sectarianism and fortunately this mosque is providing a place 
where members of different sects can find commonality for inter-sectarian harmony and 
peaceful co-existence.  
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Variation of responses across different educational institutes’ students about 
Sectarian Issues 
Table 6.2 
Descriptives 
Sectarian Issues  
  N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean Minimum Maximum 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound     
Ahle Hadith 70 3.3367 .42808 .05117 3.2347 3.4388 2.36 4.14 
Brailvi 70 3.2224 .42118 .05034 3.1220 3.3229 2.36 4.07 
Deobandi 70 3.3122 .42041 .05025 3.2120 3.4125 2.14 4.14 
Govt. School 80 3.9000 .39527 .04419 3.8120 3.9880 2.64 4.93 
Jamaat-i-Islami 70 3.6347 .44074 .05268 3.5296 3.7398 2.36 4.50 
Private School 70 4.0367 .43059 .05147 3.9341 4.1394 2.64 4.79 
Shia Madrassa 70 3.0949 .38909 .04651 3.0021 3.1877 2.00 4.00 
Total 500 3.5133 .53237 .02381 3.4665 3.5601 2.00 4.93 
 
 
The data reveals that a large proportion of students, regardless of their school type, have 
homogenous outlook towards sectarian issues. All students irrespective of the school they 
came from seem discouraging sectarianism in every form. The questions asked to judge their 
outlook with respect to sectarianism includes, ―I get along well with people from different 
sects‖; ―Every Muslim must have right to celebrate his/her religious festival freely‖; ―I think 
that the word ‗sect‘ should be removed from all governmental documentations requiring 
personal information‖; ―I think there should be different schools for students belonging to 
different sects‖ and ―All political parties divided on sectarian lines should be banned‖ and so 
on and so forth. Interestingly, the schools in which madrassas students are studying are 
divided on sectarian lines and there are many a political parties that are based on the edifice 
of their sect like Jamaat-i-Islami, still students from madrassas, like English schools and Urdu 
medium schools, opposed the division of parties and schools on the basis of sectarian 
differences.  There were overall 14 item questions that were slotted in the theme of sectarian 
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issues in the questionnaire and all types of institutes students disapprove sectarian division 
which is quite unusual phenomenon. However, some students from madrassas, during their 
interviews, didn‘t endorse the stance taken by them in the survey. Though all schools scored 
above the mean score i.e. M=3.00, yet there is a difference in the scale of their disapproval 
for sectarianism. Mean score of private English schools students, for the theme ‗sectarian 
issues‘ is (M=4.04) that is highest among all other schools students. Urdu medium schools 
students got second highest mean score (M=3.90), followed by Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas 
students (M=3.63). The lowest mean score among all types of schools is of Shia madrassa 
that is (M=3.09). 
 
Results of ANOVA 
Table 6.3            ANOVA 
                               Sectarian Issues 
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
55.361 6 9.227 52.853 .000 
Within Groups 86.066 493 .175     
Total 141.427 499       
 
 
Analysis of variance has been conducted to compare the variance (variability in scores) 
between the different schools (due to the independent variable; type of institutes) with the 
variability within each of the groups. An F ratio has been calculated, that represents the 
variance between the groups divided by the variance within the groups. A large F ratio 
indicates that there is more variability between the groups (caused by the independent 
variable) than there is within each group. A significant F test indicates whether there is any 
significant difference between different groups or not. And in this particular case, by virtue of 
it, we can reject the null hypothesis, which states that all the schools score exactly the same 
and there is no difference in the responses of students from different schools towards the 
questions asked under the theme sectarian issues. By virtue of ANOVA we can only find out 
that there is statistically significant difference between the schools as the value is .000 which 
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is less than .05, but in order to know where these differences actually lie, we have to carry out 
Post Hoc test. 
Variance in responses between the students from different schools on Sectarian 
Issues 
One-way analysis of variance tests were conducted to look at how the responses of students 
about sectarian issues diverge according to their schools type. The results are presented in 
(Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: Sectarian Issues  
Tukey HSD  
(I) Type of Institute (J) Type of Institute 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Ahle Hadith Brailvi .11429 .07062 .671 -.0948 .3234 
  Deobandi .02449 .07062 1.000 -.1846 .2336 
  Govt. School -.56327(*) .06838 .000 -.7657 -.3608 
  Jamaat-i-Islami -.29796(*) .07062 .001 -.5070 -.0889 
  Private School -.70000(*) .07062 .000 -.9091 -.4909 
  Shia Madrassa .24184(*) .07062 .012 .0327 .4509 
Brailvi Ahle Hadith -.11429 .07062 .671 -.3234 .0948 
  Deobandi -.08980 .07062 .865 -.2989 .1193 
  Govt. School -.67755(*) .06838 .000 -.8800 -.4751 
  Jamaat-i-Islami -.41224(*) .07062 .000 -.6213 -.2032 
  Private School -.81429(*) .07062 .000 -1.0234 -.6052 
  Shia Madrassa .12755 .07062 .545 -.0815 .3366 
Deobandi Ahle Hadith -.02449 .07062 1.000 -.2336 .1846 
  Brailvi .08980 .07062 .865 -.1193 .2989 
  Govt. School -.58776(*) .06838 .000 -.7902 -.3853 
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(I) Type of Institute (J) Type of Institute 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
  Jamaat-i-Islami -.32245(*) .07062 .000 -.5315 -.1134 
  Private School -.72449(*) .07062 .000 -.9336 -.5154 
  Shia Madrassa .21735(*) .07062 .036 .0083 .4264 
Govt. School Ahle Hadith .56327(*) .06838 .000 .3608 .7657 
  Brailvi .67755(*) .06838 .000 .4751 .8800 
  Deobandi .58776(*) .06838 .000 .3853 .7902 
  Jamaat-i-Islami .26531(*) .06838 .002 .0629 .4678 
  Private School -.13673 .06838 .416 -.3392 .0657 
  Shia Madrassa .80510(*) .06838 .000 .6027 1.0076 
Jamaat-i-Islami Ahle Hadith .29796(*) .07062 .001 .0889 .5070 
  Brailvi .41224(*) .07062 .000 .2032 .6213 
  Deobandi .32245(*) .07062 .000 .1134 .5315 
  Govt. School -.26531(*) .06838 .002 -.4678 -.0629 
  Private School -.40204(*) .07062 .000 -.6111 -.1930 
  Shia Madrassa .53980(*) .07062 .000 .3307 .7489 
Private School Ahle Hadith .70000(*) .07062 .000 .4909 .9091 
  Brailvi .81429(*) .07062 .000 .6052 1.0234 
  Deobandi .72449(*) .07062 .000 .5154 .9336 
  Govt. School .13673 .06838 .416 -.0657 .3392 
  Jamaat-i-Islami .40204(*) .07062 .000 .1930 .6111 
  Shia Madrassa .94184(*) .07062 .000 .7327 1.1509 
Shia Madrassa Ahle Hadith -.24184(*) .07062 .012 -.4509 -.0327 
  Brailvi -.12755 .07062 .545 -.3366 .0815 
  Deobandi -.21735(*) .07062 .036 -.4264 -.0083 
  Govt. School -.80510(*) .06838 .000 -1.0076 -.6027 
  Jamaat-i-Islami -.53980(*) .07062 .000 -.7489 -.3307 
  Private School -.94184(*) .07062 .000 -1.1509 -.7327 
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A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was carried out to explore the impact of 
school type on the views of students about sectarian issues, as determined through 14 
question items incorporated in the questionnaire.  Participants of this study are 10th level 
(class) students from seven different types of schools of more or less similar age group. There 
was a statistically significant difference at the p<.05 level in the scores of theme Sectarian 
Issues for the seven different schools‘ types groups [F (6, 493)=52.85, p=.000]. Discovering 
the fact that there is a statistically significant difference between the seven sets of scores does 
not answers all the questions. We also need to assess the magnitude of that difference which 
is only possible by calculating the effect size of the result. The effect size, calculated using 
eta squared, is .39 which, according to generally accepted criteria (Cohen 1988, pp. 284–7), is 
considered quite a large effect. Using the commonly used guidelines proposed by Cohen 
(1988, pp. 284–7) (.01=small, .06=moderate, .14=large effect), this result suggests a very 
large effect size. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean 
scores for private schools and government schools were significantly different from all 
religious seminaries; Ahle Hadith, Brailvi, Deobandi, Jamaat-i-Islami and Shia Madrassas. 
However, it is not the case that there is no significant difference within the religious 
seminaries; Ahle Hadith madrassa did differ significantly from Jamaat-i-Islami and Shia 
madrassa: Brailvi madrassa mean score is significantly different from Jamaat-i-Islami 
madrassa and there is a significant difference between the mean scores of Deobandi madrassa 
and Jamaat-i-Islami and Shia madrassa. Shia madrassas‘ mean score is significantly different 
from all types of institutes except Brailvi madrassas‘ mean score. 
 
With regard to the views of students about sectarian issues in Pakistan, the responses in the 
interview data corroborate with the questionnaire data. However, there are some interesting 
points which students took up in one to one interview. As discussed in the questionnaire, the 
students from English and Urdu medium schools were more inclined towards sectarian 
harmony as compared to those of madrassa students. As far as the views of students with 
respect to sectarianism are concerned, there is a visible difference in the stances of students 
coming from different educations systems. 
 
Masood: It is obvious that their madrassas are teaching them sectarianism, hatred 
and violence. You better know that we (Brailvis) have never been found in such 
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activities. We respect non-Muslims even………………………….By birth no one is criminal 
rather Islam says that newly born baby is innocent even if it takes birth in non-
Muslim family…………………….Our madrassa deliver religious education only. Unlike 
Ahle Hadith madrassas we don’t take money from Saudi Arab and equip students 
with gun instead of pen…………………………Who are Taliban??? You better know that 
they are Americans and Jews agents…………………..By saying them martyrs you better 
know we are humiliating Jihad and martyrdom…………………..By Allah Almighty’s grace 
you will see America and its agents will be ruined. (By America’s agents he means 
Taliban and other Deobandi organizations). 
 
Masood; a student from Brailvi madrassa condemned Deobandi and Ahle Hadith madrassas 
as dens of terrorists and accuse them for preaching sectarianism. However, a visible contrast 
can be observed when we compare the views of Brailvi madrassa student with that of Jamaat-
i-Islami madrassa student. Jamaat-i-Islami claim to be a supra-sectarian entity and have never 
been involved in sectarian scuffle. 
  
Shahid: I have no problem with boys from other sects at all. Some of my friends are 
Shias but we never have discussion on religion…….There should be liberty to all sects 
rather non-Muslims too to celebrate their religious festivals freely…….I personally 
don’t have any objection with inter-marriage but I do know it is not going to be 
acceptable by the overall community……..First of all we are Muslims than anything 
else. 
 
The Deobandi madrassas, which grew at a faster rate in post-Soviet invasion era (1979-1989), 
were more radical and closely linked with sectarian activities in 1980,s. These madrassas 
have continued to become even more radicalized over the years. In a recent study of religious 
institutions in Ahmedpur Sharqi (East), S. H. Ali (2009) found that 80 per cent of the 166 
Deobandi madrassas were involved in sectarian activities. The views of Munir, a student 
from Deoband madrassa confirm the perception established about Deobandi madrassas over a 
period of time, by virtue of his views during interview. 
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 Munir: Allah Almighty says that “your friendship and enmity should be for My 
pleasure” so the one who commits shirk (polytheism) can’t be friend of mine at all 
(Here the participant was pointing to Brailvi and Shia Muslims)…….I wish that all Shia 
and Brailvi madrassas should be banned as they are harming instead of serving 
Islam. 
 
If we compare the views of madrassa students particularly of Deoband madrassa student with 
that of students from Urdu and English medium school students, a notable difference comes 
in place. 
 
Faiz: Inter-marriage among different sects is a commendable proposal; it can 
diminish inter-sect enmity and can give rise to Muslim brotherhood. All mosques are 
sacred and equally dear and sacrosanct to me…………All parties those fuel sectarian 
strife in Pakistan should be dealt iron-handedly. (Student from Urdu medium school) 
 
Ahmed: Taliban are enemies of Pakistan……………….If I were the ruler I will close all 
madrassas………….We all are Pakistani but in madrassas, students are indoctrinated 
to identify themselves as Shia and Sunni, Deobandi and Wahabi (a term used for Ahle 
Hadith)…………….They are brainwashed to attack each other’s mosques….. (student 
from English medium school) 
 
Intra-Muslim rivalry, particularly between Shias and Sunnis has a long history. Relations 
between different Islamic groups/sects have been strained for much of Muslim history. Many 
of them see each other as apostates or even as enemies of Islam. In some countries, such as in 
parts of Pakistan today, Shia-Sunni conflict has taken seriously violent forms. Although in 
many cases there are crucial political and economic factors that fuel this conflict, the 
sectarian dimension acts as a powerful factor in further exacerbating these relations especially 
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between Shias Sunnis. Halting efforts have been made in the past, and continue to be made 
today, to promote Inter-Sect dialogue. However, on the whole, it can be safely said, most 
conservative and traditional ulema have been reluctant, if not openly hostile, to any 
suggestion of genuine Islamic ecumenism. Literature branding the sectarian other as 
inveterate foes of Islam continues to be produced and distributed, mostly, although not 
entirely, penned by conservative ulema. Although such literature has been in existence for 
centuries, in recent decades it appears to have been given a major boost, particularly in the 
wake of Iranian Revolution in 1979
69
. 
 
According a recent report of Brooking Institution (2013) Zia regime in Pakistan that 
coincided with Islamic revolution in Iran widened the schism between Shias and Sunnis in 
Pakistan. It brought Shia-Sunni sectarian warfare in Pakistan that was an alien concept 
before. Shia-Sunni rift tore down the very fabric of society. Intermarriage between Sunnis 
and Shia which was not uncommon until late 1970s has now become a historical norm. 
Nadim (2013) in his recent article rightly pointed out that the lack of inter-sectarian marriages 
in Pakistan and severe opposition to this idea is also one of the reasons why Pakistan has not 
been able to fully become a nation. In order to promote harmony among different Islamic 
sects in the Muslim World overall, recently Qatar-based Sunni Islamic scholar Shaikh Yusuf 
al-Qaradawi issued a fatwa (religious verdict) which clearly says that he does not regard such 
a marriage as forbidden (haram).
70
 Barring the fact, Islam allows inter marriages between the 
people of the book, yet it is very unfortunate that students from religious seminaries are the 
one who disapprove this idea the most when we compare their views with the students of 
English and Urdu medium schools students. 
 
As mentioned earlier madrassas are divided on sectarian lines and they strongly promote their 
own religious perspective and genealogy. This practice on the part of madrassas tends to 
perpetuate an exclusionary worldview within Islamic sects and seem to result in violent 
conﬂict with rival Muslim groups. Many a studies have pointed this aspect of madrassa 
                                                          
69
 In Iran Shia clergy ousted the secular regime of Reza Shah Pehlvi and start propagating its revolutionary 
ideals across the borders. Shia clergy started the proliferation of its own version of Islam (Shia Ideology) in 
neighbouring countries and was met with a severe reaction in Sunni Muslim majority country Pakistan at 
societal and governmental level. 
70
 The fatwa is accessible on the website www.islam-online.net  
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education but the study of Saleem H Ali (2009), in this regard, is the interesting one which is 
an empirical study on madrassa demographics and sectarian adherence. The region studied by 
Saleem H. Ali experiences considerable sectarian violence, especially between Deobandis 
and Shias. Findings of the study show that ties with international terrorism are found in a few 
politically charged madrassas, but this is not as systematic a problem as the sectarianism 
fostered by madrassas. Analysis of police arrest data for sectarian attacks between Shias and 
Sunnis clearly shows that sectarian activity in areas of greater madrassa density per 
population size was found to be higher, including incidents of violent unrest (Ali, 2009). 
Brailvi madrassas which were traditionally very tolerant propagate . . . have also started 
showing violent and sectarian tendencies. In many instances this is a response to violent and 
aggressive attitudes of some Deobandi institutions and their managers (ibid, 2009). Along 
with it, there are many other studies and reports that suggest that madrassa education is 
inherently sectarian and bound to make its students more likely to engage in violence against 
other religious sects (Mir, 2009), (Malik, 2002), (Malik, 2008), (Jamal, 1996), (Chandran, 
2003) and (ICG, 2002). According to an ICG (2002) report, the students of those madrassas 
who took part in Afghan Jehad during Soviet Invasion, not only involved in outward Afghan 
Jehad but also looked inwards, fighting a jehad against sectarian rivals in Pakistan. Splinter 
Deobandi groups, such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba, emerged during the Afghan jihad. With the 
spread of jihadi madrasas throughout Pakistan and a massive increase in their students, 
sectarian strife has become endemic and increasingly violent. According to Chandran (2003) 
the madrassas not only accentuates existing sectarian cleavage in the society but also 
provided manpower for sectarian organizations for sectarian engagements on the streets of 
Pakistan. 
 
Sectarianism is a serious and palpable internal challenge for Pakistan, and madrassas in this 
regard are found to be contributing to this challenge. Barring the fact, currently, some type of 
madrassas are more radical in their outlook as compared to others, yet still a sizeable number 
of madrassas are against sectarian violence, and seem willing to overcome this menace 
(Zaidi, 2013). However, they are also not amenable to stop propagating their sect, even at the 
risk of exclusivity from religious harmony amongst sects in Pakistani society. Thus, the 
potential for polarized worldviews promulgated by these institutions sprouting seeds of 
sectarian violence is quite real (ibid, 2013). The worldview of the madrassa graduate is often 
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exclusionary and there is a tremendous need to inculcate the Islamic tradition of pluralism in 
these institutions. 
 
Islamic Militancy 
The madrassas of Pakistan have been making headlines since the incident of 9/11. There is a 
plethora of reports that enunciate the religious seminaries as hotbeds of terrorism and root 
cause of Islamic militancy. On the other hand there is another opinion that considers 
madrassas as true centres of religious and moral education. This study is an attempt to clarify 
their role in the society. For this purpose a survey was conducted and the questionnaire bore 
17 multiple questions to see if there is any militant inclination in their outlook with relation to 
certain national and international issues. Responses of the participants for the questionnaire 
items of the theme ‗Islamic Militancy‘ are given under: 
 
 Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir question by force [War] 
 Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir question by supporting Jihadi groups against 
Indian army [Jihadi groups] 
 Pakistan should resolve Kashmir issue by peaceful means only [Peaceful means] 
 Suicide attacks are Ja‘aiz (approved) in Islam [Suicide attacks] 
 Suicide bombers are Shaheed (martyrs) [Martyrdom] 
 Talibans fighting against Pakistani army are mujahideen (holy warriors) [Holy war 
against compatriots] 
 Talibans fighting against Western forces and Karzai government are mujahideen (holy 
warriors) [Holy war against West] 
 America and its allies are at war with Islam [At war with Islam] 
 America and its allies are at war with international terrorism [At war with global 
terrorism] 
 Talibans fighting against Pak army are terrorists [Terrorists who fight against Pak 
army] 
 Talibans fighting against Pak army are gumrah (misled) [Deluded who fight against 
Pak army] 
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 Army operations in Swat and FATA are against fellow Muslims [Operation against 
fellow Muslims] 
 Army operations in Swat and FATA are against extremists [Operation against 
radicals] 
 Military personnel killed during the operations are Shaheed (martyrs) [Army men 
martyrs] 
 Islamic militants killed during the operations are Shaheed (martyrs) [Militants 
martyrs] 
 9/11 attack was a justifiable act [9/11 attack rightful] 
 9/11 attack was an unjustifiable terrorist activity [9/11 attack indefensible] 
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Composite Table 6.5: Views regarding Islamic militancy (% agree and strongly agree) 
Questionnaire Items Ahle 
Hadith 
Brailvi Deobandi Govt. 
School 
Jamaat-
i-Islami 
Private 
School 
Shia 
Madrassa 
War 64 50 70 44 63 14 60 
Jihadi groups 60 41 68 45 63 13 45 
Peaceful means 32 38 29 52 27 60 34 
Suicide attacks 58 8 53 32 32 10 21 
Martyrdom 51 6 51 30 41 13 13 
Holy war against 
compatriots 
51 9 54 14 57 7 7 
Holy war against 
West 
64 21 83 63 79 26 42 
At war with Islam 81 71 86 62 84 40 70 
At war with global 
terrorism 
11 23 13 25 9 47 23 
Terrorists who fight 
against Pak army 
20 47 20 63 17 76 79 
Deluded who fight 
against Pak army 
30 59 26 65 27 79 76 
Operation against 
fellow Muslims 
64 9 83 14 79 7 7 
Operation against 
radicals 
26 71 16 59 17 70 84 
Army men martyrs 50 79 27 68 39 76 92 
Militants martyrs 56 17 69 34 47 17 17 
9/11 attack rightful 51 49 49 26 43 10 47 
9/11 attack 
indefensible 
17 28 22 60 16 78 19 
 
The data shows that among all types of institutes‘ students, these are the only private English 
schools students who opposed the idea of use of force as a way to resolve the issue of 
Kashmir unequivocally. In case of students from Urdu schools 44% of them supported the 
notion and more than 16 per cent were undecided. So far as madrassas students are concerned 
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they grade this proposal with agreement. They also support the view that Jihadi groups 
should be used against Indian army to figure out the Kashmir issue except Shia. Even in 
interviews, students from Shia madrassas expressed their outright disapproval for jihadi 
organizations and commended government‘s measures to ban them. These responses on the 
side of Shia madrassas students might be the result of historical fact that in many instances 
these jihadi groups were also involved in the massacre of Shias. 
 
So far as the responses of Urdu school students are concerned, interestingly, there is a clear 
contradiction in their opinions; as many of them backed the thought that Kashmir issue 
should be resolved by the use of force or by supporting religious militants but at the same 
time, a good number of them agreed with the statement that Pakistan should resolve Kashmir 
issue by peaceful means only. 
 
In Pakistan, suicide attack is a new phenomenon. Before military operations in tribal areas of 
Pakistan, the notion that suicide might be used to kill others was considered alien. Indeed, 
when such attacks began appearing, the community‘s initial response was to reject the 
possibility that Pakistanis themselves might be involved. Many writers tried to establish a 
perception that foreign hands are involved to destabilize the country by sending suicide 
bombers into Pakistan. But the very unfortunate incident of Lal Masjid
71
 in Islamabad, not 
only brought regularity in suicide bombings but also gained a kind of legitimacy in some 
sections of the society. There would be hardly any religious scholar, who could denounce 
suicide attackers unconditionally; even religious scholars from Ahle Hadith, Jamaat-i-Islami 
and Deoband schools of thought refused to issue a religious verdict declaring suicide 
bombing haram (forbidden) in Islam in the wake of Lal Masjid operation. Unfortunately, 
suicide attacks are no longer entirely alien to any place or any people. Worldwide the number 
of terrorist groups employing them has grown over the past two decades.  In some of the 
world‘s conflict areas they have come to be widely accepted, and even supported, by 
                                                          
71
 Lal Masjid Incident was a confrontation in July 2007 between Islamic fundamentalist militants and the 
Government of Pakistan led by General Pervez Musharraf. The focal points of the operation were the Lal Masjid 
("Red Mosque") and the Jamia Hafsa madrasah complex in Islamabad, Pakistan. In the result of army operation 
in that madrassa of Deoband school of thought, hundreds of students including women students were killed. The 
BBC reported that the number of those killed was 173 but others have claimed casualties of more than 1000. 
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populations who might once have recoiled at the idea. Pakistan has yet to reach such a stage; 
with luck it never will. In the questionnaire some questions with relation to suicide bombings 
were included and there was a clear and visible difference of outlook among the students of 
different institutes. 
 
In response to statement ‗Suicide attacks are Ja’aiz (approved) in Islam‘ students from 
madrassas have very varied viewpoint. More than 57 per cent of participants from Brailvi 
madrassas grade this statement with strong disagreement that is even higher than those of 
English schools students. Overall 83 per cent of the Brailvi madrassas students disagreed with 
the notion that suicide attacks are approved in Islam but at the same time the majority of 
students from Ahle Hadith and Deoband madrassas think suicide attacks are approved in 
Islam. Like Brailvi madrassas, the students of Shia madrassas, with more or less similar 
force, opposed the conception that suicide attacks are approved in Islam. Almost similar 
varied views were maintained by these students for the statement ‗Suicide bombers are 
Shaheed (martyrs)‘. Difference of opinions to such extent within the madrassas exposes the 
fallacy of perception of those writers who take madrassas as a monolithic body. These 
madrassas differ rather contradict with each other in certain socio-political and religious 
takes. 
 
Army operation against Taliban is in progress in Tribal areas of Pakistan. Pak army started its 
proper military operation against Taliban in 2004 and ensued mixed response from Pakistani 
society. For some they are holy warriors who are sacrificing their lives for a great cause and 
for others they are terrorists who massacre people in the name of Islam and create mischief in 
the land are punishable by death. In order to know the opinion of students from different 
schools, a few questions about Taliban and army operations were made the part of 
questionnaire. The data shows that like Pakistani society, students from different schools 
have different viewpoint about Taliban. For instance, majority of students from Ahle Hadith, 
Deobandi and Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas think that army operations in Swat and FATA are 
against fellow Muslims while an overwhelming majority of students from Brailvi and Shia 
madrassas and private schools believe that army operations in Swat and FATA are against 
extremists. More or less same response was observed when students were asked who is 
martyr near them- army men or Taliban. More than 90 per cent students from Shia madrassas 
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believe that army men are martyrs. For them, those Soldiers of the Pakistani armed forces 
that fight against this turmoil are the real Mujahideen (Holy Warriors). On the contrary 
students from Ahle Hadith, Deobandi and Jamaat-i-Islami believe that Talibans fighting 
against Pakistani army are mujahideen. 
 
  
Variation of responses across different educational institutes’ students on Islamic 
Militancy 
Table 6.6 
Descriptives 
Islamic Militancy 
 
 
The data in the (Table 6.6) reveals that along with private English medium and Urdu medium 
schools, there are some madrassas also that scored below the mean score, as far as their 
support for Islamic militancy is concerned. Students from Ahle Hadith, Deobandi and 
Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas tend to support the notion of Jihad (holy war). In order to 
determine the viewpoint of students with regard to Islamic militancy such questions were 
asked in the questionnaire: ―Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir question by force‖; ―Suicide 
attacks are Ja’aiz (approved) in Islam‖; ―Islamic militants killed are martyrs‖ Taliban are 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean Minimum Maximum 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound     
Ahle Hadith 70 3.5588 .44267 .05291 3.4533 3.6644 2.47 4.71 
Brailvi 70 2.6294 .33236 .03972 2.5502 2.7087 2.06 3.65 
Deobandi 70 3.7345 .38719 .04628 3.6421 3.8268 2.65 4.47 
Govt. School 80 2.7441 .45247 .05059 2.6434 2.8448 1.71 3.82 
Jamaat-i-Islami 70 3.5866 .39517 .04723 3.4923 3.6808 2.53 4.59 
Private School 70 2.1252 .37578 .04491 2.0356 2.2148 1.18 3.18 
Shia Madrassa 70 2.6084 .49071 .05865 2.4914 2.7254 1.53 3.76 
Total 500 2.9931 .70445 .03150 2.9312 3.0550 1.18 4.71 
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Mujahiden (holy warriors) etc. The table revealed some very unusual results; as students from 
Brailvi madrassas that makes the second largest chain of madrassas in Pakistan, and Shia 
madrassas differed with their counterparts. The overall mean score of private English schools 
students, for the theme ‗Islamic militancy‘ is (M=2.13) that is lowest among all other schools 
students. Shia madrassa students got second lowest mean score (M=2.61), followed by 
Brailvi madrassas students (M=2.63). Both of these madrassas scored less than government 
schools students even. The highest mean score among all types of schools is of Deobandi 
madrassa that is (M=3.73). The mean score value below (M=3.00) indicates that students 
disapprove the notion of militancy and above 3:00 indicates students agreement with the 
notion of Jihad and martyrdom. The statistics of the (Table 6.6) demonstrates that madrassas 
are not a monolithic entity and are divided on sectarian lines and on some important issues 
they have entirely diverse views. 
 
Results of ANOVA 
Table 6.7                  ANOVA 
        Islamic Militancy  
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 162.833 6 27.139 157.787 .000 
Within Groups 84.794 493 .172     
Total 247.626 499       
 
 
Analysis of variance has been used to compare the variance (variability in scores) between 
the different schools (due to the independent variable; type of institutes) with the variability 
within each of the groups. An F ratio has been calculated, that represents the variance 
between the groups divided by the variance within the groups. A large F ratio indicates that 
there is more variability between the groups (caused by the independent variable) than there 
is within each group. A significant F test indicates whether there is any significant difference 
between different groups or not. And in this particular case, by virtue of it, we can reject the 
null hypothesis, which states that all the schools score exactly the same and there is no 
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difference in the responses of students from different schools towards Islamic militancy. So 
the ANOVA table tells us whether there are any statistically significant differences between 
the groups or not, so that is sort of what is known as omnibus test. The ANOVA table does 
not tell where these differences actually lie. In order to know where these differences actually 
lie, we have to carry out Post Hoc test. 
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Variance in responses between the students from different schools on Islamic 
Militancy 
One-way analysis of variance tests were conducted to look at how the responses of students 
about Islamic militancy diverge according to their schools type. The results are presented in 
(Table 6.8). 
Table 6.8 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: Islamic Militancy  
Tukey HSD  
(I) Type of Institute (J) Type of Institute 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Ahle Hadith Brailvi .92941(*) .07010 .000 .7219 1.1370 
  Deobandi -.17563 .07010 .160 -.3832 .0319 
  Govt. School .81471(*) .06788 .000 .6138 1.0157 
  Jamaat-i-Islami -.02773 .07010 1.000 -.2353 .1798 
  Private School 1.43361(*) .07010 .000 1.2261 1.6412 
  Shia Madrassa .95042(*) .07010 .000 .7429 1.1580 
Brailvi Ahle Hadith -.92941(*) .07010 .000 -1.1370 -.7219 
  Deobandi -1.10504(*) .07010 .000 -1.3126 -.8975 
  Govt. School -.11471 .06788 .623 -.3157 .0862 
  Jamaat-i-Islami -.95714(*) .07010 .000 -1.1647 -.7496 
  Private School .50420(*) .07010 .000 .2967 .7117 
  Shia Madrassa .02101 .07010 1.000 -.1865 .2285 
Deobandi Ahle Hadith .17563 .07010 .160 -.0319 .3832 
  Brailvi 1.10504(*) .07010 .000 .8975 1.3126 
  Govt. School .99034(*) .06788 .000 .7894 1.1913 
  Jamaat-i-Islami .14790 .07010 .348 -.0596 .3554 
  Private School 1.60924(*) .07010 .000 1.4017 1.8168 
  Shia Madrassa 1.12605(*) .07010 .000 .9185 1.3336 
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(I) Type of Institute (J) Type of Institute 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Govt. School Ahle Hadith -.81471(*) .06788 .000 -1.0157 -.6138 
  Brailvi .11471 .06788 .623 -.0862 .3157 
  Deobandi -.99034(*) .06788 .000 -1.1913 -.7894 
  Jamaat-i-Islami -.84244(*) .06788 .000 -1.0434 -.6415 
  Private School .61891(*) .06788 .000 .4180 .8199 
  Shia Madrassa .13571 .06788 .416 -.0652 .3367 
Jamaat-i-Islami Ahle Hadith .02773 .07010 1.000 -.1798 .2353 
  Brailvi .95714(*) .07010 .000 .7496 1.1647 
  Deobandi -.14790 .07010 .348 -.3554 .0596 
  Govt. School .84244(*) .06788 .000 .6415 1.0434 
  Private School 1.46134(*) .07010 .000 1.2538 1.6689 
  Shia Madrassa .97815(*) .07010 .000 .7706 1.1857 
Private School Ahle Hadith -1.43361(*) .07010 .000 -1.6412 -1.2261 
  Brailvi -.50420(*) .07010 .000 -.7117 -.2967 
  Deobandi -1.60924(*) .07010 .000 -1.8168 -1.4017 
  Govt. School -.61891(*) .06788 .000 -.8199 -.4180 
  Jamaat-i-Islami -1.46134(*) .07010 .000 -1.6689 -1.2538 
  Shia Madrassa -.48319(*) .07010 .000 -.6907 -.2757 
Shia Madrassa Ahle Hadith -.95042(*) .07010 .000 -1.1580 -.7429 
  Brailvi -.02101 .07010 1.000 -.2285 .1865 
  Deobandi -1.12605(*) .07010 .000 -1.3336 -.9185 
  Govt. School -.13571 .06788 .416 -.3367 .0652 
  Jamaat-i-Islami -.97815(*) .07010 .000 -1.1857 -.7706 
  Private School .48319(*) .07010 .000 .2757 .6907 
 
 
A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of 
school type on the response of students towards the theme Islamic militancy, as measured by 
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the 17 question items that dealt with different aspects of militancy ranging from the foreign 
policy of Pakistan towards India to the phenomenon of suicide bombing. Subjects are 10
th
 
level (class) students from seven different types of schools of more or less similar age group. 
There was a statistically significant difference at the p<.05 level in Islamic militancy scores 
for the seven different schools‘ types groups [F (6, 493)=157.787, p=.000]. Although we 
have found a statistically significant difference between the seven sets of scores, we also need 
to assess the effect size of this result. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, is .66, 
which in Cohen‘s (1988, pp. 284–7) terms would be considered as a large effect size. Cohen 
classifies .01 as a small effect, .06 as a medium effect and .14 as a large effect. Post-hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean scores for Ahle Hadith 
madrassas (M=3.56, SD=.443) were significantly different from all school except Deoband 
(M=3.73, SD=.387) and Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas (M=3.59, SD=.395). Brailvi madrassas‘ 
(M=2.63, SD=.333) mean score difference is statistically significant from all institutes except 
government schools (M=2.74, SD=.452) and Shia madrassas (M=2.61, SD=.491). In the 
same vein, English medium private schools (M=2.13, SD=.376) mean score difference is 
statistically significant from all other schools. 
 
With regard to the views of students about Islamic militancy, the responses in the interview 
data corroborate with the questionnaire data. However, there are some interesting points 
which students took up in one to one interview. As discussed in the questionnaire, the 
students from madrassas were more inclined towards the militant outlook, particularly of 
Deobandi, Ahle Hadith and Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas, as compared to those of students from 
English and Urdu medium schools. As far as the views of Deobandi, Ahle Hadith and 
Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas‘ students with respect to Jihad and suicide attacks are concerned, 
there is a visible difference in the stances of students coming from Urdu and English medium 
schooling systems. 
 
Ali: Every Muslim knows fighting infidels is a duty. There are 400 Koranic verses that 
are clearly about jihad. God give us good news in the sacred book (Koran) that if you 
become a martyr you will go to paradise. (Deobandi madrassa student) 
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Munir: For a Muslim, this world is a test…… “I only created Jinn and humans to 
worship me”. My aim is to spend my life in the way of God. I will spend it earning 
God’s pleasure……..In answer to a question about approval of suicide in Islam, the 
participant replied, God says, “Prepare against them what force and steeds you can, 
to frighten the enemy of God and your enemy…” Based on this, God commands us to 
fight the infidels with any weapon available and a suicide bomber use his life/body as 
a weapon against the enemies of Allah………..God says “when the infidels attack and 
assault you, defend yourself any way you can. I have heard that a suicide bomber has 
no feelings about dying and has no other feelings entwined with worldly gains at all, 
no pain, nothing. They have chosen the afterlife over this one………..The Holy Koran 
calls the fight against the infidels a Jihad (holy war). (Deobandi madrassa student) 
 
Rana: As our Muslim brothers are under attack in Afghanistan, so it is duty of every 
man and ‘woman’ to join the jihad….(Here he specially pointed that woman are also 
bound to be part of Jihad because the interviewer asked whether it is justified in 
Islam to use woman72 for suicide bombing purposes, and the answer was Yes). 
(Jamaat-i-Islami madrassa student) 
 
Saleem: America and its allies have openly declared war against Islam. Traitors 
within us are on their side but it is Allah’s promise that His religion will, God willing, 
prevail. (By traitors he means Pakistan army as he elaborated later during his 
conversation)………………….By the grace of God my madrassa has equipped me with 
Illm-e-Deen (religious knowledge) and radiance. It made me capable to hold Holy 
Koran in my chest (it means he has memorized the whole Koran)…….I am ready to 
serve my God and His religion Islam in any capacity, be it the sacrifice of life. (Ahle 
Hadith madrassa student) 
                                                          
72
 A female suicide bomber struck for the first time in the region in the Afghan province of Kunar, on June 21, 
2010 and as a result two US soldiers were killed two Afghan children were wounded. The next female suicide 
attack took place on Dec. 24, 2010, in Pakistan's tribal agency of Bajaur. The suicide bomber killed 42 Pakistani 
civilians in an attack at a World Food Program ration distribution point. These heinous attacks ignited hot 
debate on Pakistani media on new phenomenon of the use of women for suicide bombing purposes. 
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Zahid: Koran never teaches violence……These are Pathans (an ethnic group) who 
have defamed Islam………..All madrassas are not bad…………………….I believe these are 
their madrassas that teach such kind of stuff (Interviewee thought that madrassas of 
their province are bad not of Punjab madrassas)…………………Later the interviewee 
turned against all madrassas in the country and said, Pakistani government should 
ban all madrassas in the country as they preach violence on the name of Jihad and 
martyrdom………… My family could never think of it that I or any of my brothers go to 
madrassa. (English medium school student) 
  
Masood: Islam is a religion of peace and Taliban at the behest of non-Muslims are 
tarnishing its real image….. To commit suicide is haram (not allowed) in Islam and 
those who are involved in suicidal attacks are neither Muslims nor shaheed 
(Martyrs)…….What Taliban call Jihad is not jihad at all, my teacher says it is “Fasad fil 
arz” (quoted a verse from Koran which translates as anarchy on the land of 
God)………Yes! America is at war with Islam and using its agents (Taliban) to attack 
the holy shrines and mosques of ours….I think Pakistan army should attack India to 
liberate Kashmiri brothers instead of sending jihadis…..It is not the duty of army only 
but the whole nation to contribute in the liberation of Kashmir…..Had all Muslims 
been united, there would have been no sign of Kufr (non-believers) in the world. 
(Brailvi madrassa student) 
 
Barring the fact, Brailvi madrassas are considered relatively the most moderate and non-
militant in their activities among other madrassas, as they have no militant organisations 
fighting in Kashmir and Afghanistan, yet like other madrassas they are petty minded and 
possess a narrow outlook out of tune with reality. According to Saleem H Ali (2005, 2009) 
though the majority of madrassas do not provide recruits and there are only few that directly 
provide ‗foot soldiers‘ for jihadi activities but all of the madrassas produce such students 
which usually have very narrow perspective of the world. Such students are not only 
 
 
175 
 
intolerant towards non-Muslims but also people of other sects. They are not receptive to 
modern ideas at all (ibid, 2009).   
 
The aspect of madrassa that caught the gaze of national and international media the most is its 
alleged connection with Islamic militancy. These schools have been seen as ‗jihad factories‘ 
or ‗weapons of mass instruction‘. 9/11 commission report named madrassas as ‗incubators of 
violent extremism‘, The Sunday Telegraph translated the Arabic word madrassa as ‗terrorist 
training school‘, while The Daily Mirror wrote them as ‗Terror Schools‘ (as quoted by 
Dalrymple, W., 2005). More or less similar views were expressed by Coulson (2004) who 
named madrassas as ‗weapons of mass instruction‘. Goldberg (2000) referred to madrassa 
education as ‗education of the holy warrior‘ and according to Ahmad (2002) madrassas are 
the ‗cheaper more Islamic alternative to education‘. Though most of these studies are based 
on personal observations yet there some findings that are supported by concrete empirical 
research like Tariq Rahman (2004) and Saleem H Ali (2005). According to Rahman who 
conducted a survey in all three types of schools, the madrassa students are the most militant 
and the English-medium ones are the least. The findings of my study also corroborate with 
the results of Rahman‘s survey. Saleem H. Ali, in an empirical study of madrassas in Pakistan 
(under a grant from the United States Institute of Peace), conducted a survey of every single 
madrassa in one district of rural Punjab, Ahmedpur, and found that only 39 out of 363 
surveyed madrassas were registered with the Government. This study also found evidence of 
a link between a large number of seminaries and sectarian violence, particularly in rural 
Punjab. Analysis of Police arrest data for sectarian attacks between Shias and Sunnis clearly 
shows that "sectarian activity in areas of greater madrassa density per population size was 
found to be higher, including incidents of violent unrest. So the militancy in sectarian conflict 
can be attributed to the teaching in the madrassas. He also held some madrassas responsible 
for the supply of ‗foot soldiers‘ for Islamic jihad (ibid, 2005, 2009).  
 
Along with determining the viewpoint of students from different type of schooling systems, 
about five themes named: educational priorities, gender inequality, status of minorities, 
sectarianism and Islamic militancy, the study did include a psychometric scale to test that to 
what extent the students believe that they can control events that affect them. The data results 
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showed that there was no significant difference among the responses of students with respect 
to the questions asked in the scale, so the details has not been included in the study. 
 
Correlations within scales 
In order to attempt to refine the analysis the construction of composite variables to represent 
the latent constructs in relation to the main areas of investigation was undertaken. The first 
step in this process was to identify highly correlated items within each of the sub-scales from 
the survey instrument. 
1. The purposes of education 
In relation to the section on the purpose of education, there is very little variation in many of 
the responses with a majority agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statements. There are 
some exceptions (with over 25% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing) and these include: 
prepare for work and employment; understanding between genders; equality between 
genders; shared values if conflict with parents; debate social and religious issues; and 
students should be consulted.  
However, there are some very strong correlations between the following pairs of statements:  
 A key aim of education is to promote understanding of, and respect for, other faiths 
and cultures in Pakistan and Schools should promote the shared values of Pakistani 
society (r = .937, p<0.001) 
 Schools should respect the wishes of families in teaching about religion and Schools 
should respect the wishes of families in all aspects of a student’s education (r = .948, 
p<0.001) 
 Education should encourage greater equality between men and women and Education 
should encourage greater understanding between men and women (r = .945, p<0.001) 
 
2. Gender inequalities 
If we look at the correlations between Items for the section on gender equality a number of 
very strong correlations can be found. Indeed the exception is the relatively modest 
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correlations (around 0.3) of Item ‗Women should be confined to domestic responsibilities‘ 
with the other items. 
Following pairs of statements have very strong correlations: 
 Equal rights should be given to men and women as in Western countries and It is 
desirable that equal opportunities should be given to both men and women to become 
head of state (r = .948, p<0.001) 
 Equal rights should be given to men and women as in Western countries and Women 
should work shoulder to shoulder with men in all spheres of life (r = .872, p<0.001) 
 Equal rights should be given to men and women as in Western countries and The 
presence of women in Pak army is a progressive development (r = .937, p<0.001) 
 Equal rights should be given to men and women as in Western countries and A fixed 
quota of jobs for women across a range of occupations is a positive step on the part of 
government (r = .947, p<0.001) 
 It is desirable that equal opportunities should be given to both men and women to 
become head of state and Women should work shoulder to shoulder with men in all 
spheres of life (r = .915, p<0.001) 
 It is desirable that equal opportunities should be given to both men and women to 
become head of state and The presence of women in Pak army is a progressive 
development (r = .889, p<0.001) 
 It is desirable that equal opportunities should be given to both men and women to 
become head of state and A fixed quota of jobs for women across a range of 
occupations is a positive step on the part of government (r = .896, p<0.001) 
 Women should work shoulder to shoulder with men in all spheres of life and The 
presence of women in Pak army is a progressive development (r = .828, p<0.001) 
 Women should work shoulder to shoulder with men in all spheres of life and A fixed 
quota of jobs for women across a range of occupations is a positive step on the part of 
government (r = .823, p<0.001) 
 The presence of women in Pak army is a progressive development and A fixed quota 
of jobs for women across a range of occupations is a positive step on the part of 
government (r = .899, p<0.001) 
 Now, it is to be assessed whether there are any connections between these items across 
sections? For instance – the two highly correlated items on gender and education from the 
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section on Purposes of Education could justifiably be added to the highly correlated items 
from the Gender Inequality section to make the new composite variable: Gender Issues. 
 
Table: 6.9 
 
Gender Issues 
Descriptives 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Ahle Hadith 70 2.4327 1.02121 .12206 2.1892 2.6762 1.00 4.57 
Brailvi 70 2.6469 .99888 .11939 2.4088 2.8851 1.29 5.00 
Deobandi 70 2.4857 .95426 .11406 2.2582 2.7133 1.00 5.00 
Govt. School 80 3.5554 .94951 .10616 3.3441 3.7667 1.71 5.00 
Jamaat-i-Islami 70 2.2653 .75487 .09022 2.0853 2.4453 1.00 5.00 
Private School 70 4.1531 .78447 .09376 3.9660 4.3401 1.43 5.00 
Shia Madrassa 70 2.2000 .85935 .10271 1.9951 2.4049 1.00 4.57 
Total 500 2.8346 1.13605 .05081 2.7348 2.9344 1.00 5.00 
  
  
Table: 6.10 
Gender_Issues 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 236.415 6 39.402 47.659 .000 
Within Groups 407.596 493 .827   
Total 644.011 499    
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Table:6.11                                                Multiple Comparisons 
Gender_Issues 
Tukey HSD 
      
(I) Type of Institute 
(J) Type of 
Institute 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Ahle Hadith Brailvi -.21429 .15369 .805 -.6693 .2407 
Deobandi -.05306 .15369 1.000 -.5081 .4020 
Govt. School -1.12270
*
 .14881 .000 -1.5633 -.6821 
Jamaat-i-Islami .16735 .15369 .931 -.2877 .6224 
Private School -1.72041
*
 .15369 .000 -2.1754 -1.2654 
Shia Madrassa .23265 .15369 .737 -.2224 .6877 
Brailvi Ahle Hadith .21429 .15369 .805 -.2407 .6693 
Deobandi .16122 .15369 .942 -.2938 .6162 
Govt. School -.90842
*
 .14881 .000 -1.3490 -.4678 
Jamaat-i-Islami .38163 .15369 .168 -.0734 .8367 
Private School -1.50612
*
 .15369 .000 -1.9611 -1.0511 
Shia Madrassa .44694 .15369 .058 -.0081 .9020 
Deobandi Ahle Hadith .05306 .15369 1.000 -.4020 .5081 
Brailvi -.16122 .15369 .942 -.6162 .2938 
Govt. School -1.06964
*
 .14881 .000 -1.5102 -.6291 
Jamaat-i-Islami .22041 .15369 .783 -.2346 .6754 
Private School -1.66735
*
 .15369 .000 -2.1224 -1.2123 
Shia Madrassa .28571 .15369 .509 -.1693 .7407 
Govt. School Ahle Hadith 1.12270
*
 .14881 .000 .6821 1.5633 
Brailvi .90842
*
 .14881 .000 .4678 1.3490 
Deobandi 1.06964
*
 .14881 .000 .6291 1.5102 
Jamaat-i-Islami 1.29005
*
 .14881 .000 .8495 1.7306 
Private School -.59770
*
 .14881 .001 -1.0383 -.1571 
Shia Madrassa 1.35536
*
 .14881 .000 .9148 1.7959 
Jamaat-i-Islami Ahle Hadith -.16735 .15369 .931 -.6224 .2877 
Brailvi -.38163 .15369 .168 -.8367 .0734 
Deobandi -.22041 .15369 .783 -.6754 .2346 
Govt. School -1.29005
*
 .14881 .000 -1.7306 -.8495 
Private School -1.88776
*
 .15369 .000 -2.3428 -1.4327 
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                 (J) Type 
(i)Type of Institute 
of Institute 
 
 
Shia Madrassa 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
 
.06531 
Stad. Error 
 
 
.15369 
Sig 
 
 
1.000 
95% Confidence  
 
Interval 
 
Lower Bound 
-.3897 
Upper Bound 
.5203 
Private School Ahle Hadith 1.72041
*
 .15369 .000 1.2654 2.1754 
Brailvi 1.50612
*
 .15369 .000 1.0511 1.9611 
Deobandi 1.66735
*
 .15369 .000 1.2123 2.1224 
Govt. School .59770
*
 .14881 .001 .1571 1.0383 
Jamaat-i-Islami 1.88776
*
 .15369 .000 1.4327 2.3428 
Shia Madrassa 1.95306
*
 .15369 .000 1.4980 2.4081 
Shia Madrassa Ahle Hadith -.23265 .15369 .737 -.6877 .2224 
Brailvi -.44694 .15369 .058 -.9020 .0081 
Deobandi -.28571 .15369 .509 -.7407 .1693 
Govt. School -1.35536
*
 .14881 .000 -1.7959 -.9148 
Jamaat-i-Islami -.06531 .15369 1.000 -.5203 .3897 
Private School -1.95306
*
 .15369 .000 -2.4081 -1.4980 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.    
 
 
Status of minorities and Sectarianism 
Using cut off point of +/- 0.500 the following pair of items is strongly correlated in the 
section status of minorities: 
 Every Pakistani whether Muslim or non-Muslim must read Islamic Studies as a 
compulsory subject and As Pakistan is an Islamic country, so all the restrictions on 
non-Muslims are justified (Pearson’s r= 0.573, p<0.001) 
In relation to the section on Sectarianism there is very strong correlation between the 
following pairs of statements: 
 If the head of the state/government belongs to different sect, it makes me to feel that I 
and people from my sect are going to be marginalised and I don’t make friends with 
people who are from different sects (r = 0.600, p<0.001) 
 I think there should be different schools for students belonging to different sects and I 
don’t make friends with people who are from different sects (r = 0.809, p<0.001) 
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 I think there should be different schools for students belonging to different sects and If 
the head of the state/government belongs to different sect, it makes me to feel that I 
and people from my sect are going to be marginalised (r = 0.696, p<0.001) 
After identifying and reporting very strong correlations between the items from the section 
‗Status of Minorities‘ and ‗Sectarianism‘, a composite variable is to be created which sums 
these strongly correlated items together. The new composite determines the insularity and 
conservatism in the outlook of students in relation to inter-faith and inter-sect 
synchronization. 
Table: 6.12 
Descriptives 
Insularity_and_Conservatism       
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Ahle Hadith 70 2.6714 .70939 .08479 2.5023 2.8406 1.20 5.00 
Brailvi 70 2.5629 .82236 .09829 2.3668 2.7589 1.00 5.00 
Deobandi 70 2.8971 .77253 .09234 2.7129 3.0813 1.60 5.00 
Govt. School 80 2.3100 .77027 .08612 2.1386 2.4814 1.00 4.20 
Jamaat-i-Islami 70 2.4914 .85104 .10172 2.2885 2.6944 1.00 4.20 
Private School 70 1.9343 .78147 .09340 1.7480 2.1206 1.00 4.20 
Shia Madrassa 70 2.7714 .83077 .09930 2.5733 2.9695 1.20 4.60 
Total 500 2.5156 .84093 .03761 2.4417 2.5895 1.00 5.00 
 
 
Table: 6.13 
ANOVA 
Insularity_and_Conservatism     
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 43.705 6 7.284 11.615 .000 
Within Groups 309.173 493 .627   
Total 352.878 499    
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Table: 6.14                                                        Multiple Comparisons 
Insularity_and_Conservatism 
Tukey HSD 
     
(I) Type of Institute 
(J) Type of 
Institute 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Ahle Hadith Brailvi .10857 .13386 .984 -.2877 .5049 
Deobandi -.22571 .13386 .626 -.6220 .1706 
Govt. School .36143 .12961 .080 -.0223 .7451 
Jamaat-i-Islami .18000 .13386 .830 -.2163 .5763 
Private School .73714
*
 .13386 .000 .3408 1.1334 
Shia Madrassa -.10000 .13386 .989 -.4963 .2963 
Brailvi Ahle Hadith -.10857 .13386 .984 -.5049 .2877 
Deobandi -.33429 .13386 .162 -.7306 .0620 
Govt. School .25286 .12961 .448 -.1309 .6366 
Jamaat-i-Islami .07143 .13386 .998 -.3249 .4677 
Private School .62857
*
 .13386 .000 .2323 1.0249 
Shia Madrassa -.20857 .13386 .709 -.6049 .1877 
Deobandi Ahle Hadith .22571 .13386 .626 -.1706 .6220 
Brailvi .33429 .13386 .162 -.0620 .7306 
Govt. School .58714
*
 .12961 .000 .2034 .9709 
Jamaat-i-Islami .40571
*
 .13386 .041 .0094 .8020 
Private School .96286
*
 .13386 .000 .5666 1.3592 
Shia Madrassa .12571 .13386 .966 -.2706 .5220 
Govt. School Ahle Hadith -.36143 .12961 .080 -.7451 .0223 
Brailvi -.25286 .12961 .448 -.6366 .1309 
Deobandi -.58714
*
 .12961 .000 -.9709 -.2034 
Jamaat-i-Islami -.18143 .12961 .802 -.5651 .2023 
Private School .37571 .12961 .059 -.0080 .7594 
Shia Madrassa -.46143
*
 .12961 .007 -.8451 -.0777 
Jamaat-i-Islami Ahle Hadith -.18000 .13386 .830 -.5763 .2163 
Brailvi -.07143 .13386 .998 -.4677 .3249 
Deobandi -.40571
*
 .13386 .041 -.8020 -.0094 
Govt. School .18143 .12961 .802 -.2023 .5651 
Private School .55714
*
 .13386 .001 .1608 .9534 
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(i)Type of Institute 
(J) Type of Institue 
 
 
Shia Madrassa 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
 
-.28000 
Std. Error 
 
 
.13386 
Sig. 
 
 
.359 
95% Confidence  
 
Interval 
 
Lower Bound 
-.6763 
Upper Bound 
.1163 
Private School Ahle Hadith -.73714
*
 .13386 .000 -1.1334 -.3408 
Brailvi -.62857
*
 .13386 .000 -1.0249 -.2323 
Deobandi -.96286
*
 .13386 .000 -1.3592 -.5666 
Govt. School -.37571 .12961 .059 -.7594 .0080 
Jamaat-i-Islami -.55714
*
 .13386 .001 -.9534 -.1608 
Shia Madrassa -.83714
*
 .13386 .000 -1.2334 -.4408 
Shia Madrassa Ahle Hadith .10000 .13386 .989 -.2963 .4963 
Brailvi .20857 .13386 .709 -.1877 .6049 
Deobandi -.12571 .13386 .966 -.5220 .2706 
Govt. School .46143
*
 .12961 .007 .0777 .8451 
Jamaat-i-Islami .28000 .13386 .359 -.1163 .6763 
Private School .83714
*
 .13386 .000 .4408 1.2334 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.    
 
Islamist Militancy 
After looking at the correlations between Items for the section Islamic Militancy, a very 
strong correlation was found among the following pairs of items: 
 Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir question by force and Pakistan should resolve 
the Kashmir question by supporting Jihadi groups against Indian army (r = 0.832, 
p<0.001) 
 Suicide attacks are Ja’aiz (approved) in Islam and Suicide bombers are Shaheed 
(martyrs) (r = 0.867, p<0.001) 
 Suicide attacks are Ja’aiz (approved) in Islam and Islamic militants killed during the 
operations are Shaheed (martyrs) (r = 0.725, p<0.001) 
 Suicide bombers are Shaheed (martyrs) and Islamic militants killed during the 
operations are Shaheed (martyrs) (r = 0.830, p<0.001) 
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Table: 6.15                                                               Descriptives 
Islamist_Militancy        
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Ahle Hadith 70 3.5400 .83221 .09947 3.3416 3.7384 1.60 5.00 
Brailvi 70 2.3371 .66598 .07960 2.1783 2.4959 1.00 4.40 
Deobandi 70 3.6514 .84214 .10066 3.4506 3.8522 1.80 5.00 
Govt. School 80 2.8875 .92441 .10335 2.6818 3.0932 1.00 5.00 
Jamaat-i-
Islami 
70 3.3343 .93482 .11173 3.1114 3.5572 1.00 5.00 
Private School 70 2.0629 .73626 .08800 1.8873 2.2384 1.00 4.00 
Shia Madrassa 70 2.6200 .80156 .09580 2.4289 2.8111 1.00 4.40 
Total 500 2.9184 .99581 .04453 2.8309 3.0059 1.00 5.00 
 
 
 
Table: 6.16 
ANOVA 
Islamist_Militancy     
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 157.964 6 26.327 38.530 .000 
Within Groups 336.867 493 .683   
Total 494.831 499    
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Table: 6.17                                                    Multiple Comparisons 
Islamist_Militancy 
Tukey HSD 
     
(I) Type of Institute 
(J) Type of 
Institute 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Ahle Hadith Brailvi 1.20286
*
 .13972 .000 .7892 1.6165 
Deobandi -.11143 .13972 .985 -.5251 .3022 
Govt. School .65250
*
 .13529 .000 .2520 1.0530 
Jamaat-i-Islami .20571 .13972 .761 -.2079 .6194 
Private School 1.47714
*
 .13972 .000 1.0635 1.8908 
Shia Madrassa .92000
*
 .13972 .000 .5063 1.3337 
Brailvi Ahle Hadith -1.20286
*
 .13972 .000 -1.6165 -.7892 
Deobandi -1.31429
*
 .13972 .000 -1.7279 -.9006 
Govt. School -.55036
*
 .13529 .001 -.9509 -.1498 
Jamaat-i-Islami -.99714
*
 .13972 .000 -1.4108 -.5835 
Private School .27429 .13972 .440 -.1394 .6879 
Shia Madrassa -.28286 .13972 .400 -.6965 .1308 
Deobandi Ahle Hadith .11143 .13972 .985 -.3022 .5251 
Brailvi 1.31429
*
 .13972 .000 .9006 1.7279 
Govt. School .76393
*
 .13529 .000 .3634 1.1645 
Jamaat-i-Islami .31714 .13972 .261 -.0965 .7308 
Private School 1.58857
*
 .13972 .000 1.1749 2.0022 
Shia Madrassa 1.03143
*
 .13972 .000 .6178 1.4451 
Govt. School Ahle Hadith -.65250
*
 .13529 .000 -1.0530 -.2520 
Brailvi .55036
*
 .13529 .001 .1498 .9509 
Deobandi -.76393
*
 .13529 .000 -1.1645 -.3634 
Jamaat-i-Islami -.44679
*
 .13529 .018 -.8473 -.0463 
Private School .82464
*
 .13529 .000 .4241 1.2252 
Shia Madrassa .26750 .13529 .431 -.1330 .6680 
Jamaat-i-Islami Ahle Hadith -.20571 .13972 .761 -.6194 .2079 
Brailvi .99714
*
 .13972 .000 .5835 1.4108 
Deobandi -.31714 .13972 .261 -.7308 .0965 
Govt. School .44679
*
 .13529 .018 .0463 .8473 
Private School 1.27143
*
 .13972 .000 .8578 1.6851 
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(i) Type of Institute 
 
(J) Type of 
Institute 
 
 
Shia Madrassa 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
 
.71429
*
 
Std. Error 
 
 
.13972 
Sig. 
 
 
.000 
95% Confidence  
 
Interval 
 
Lower Bound 
.3006 
Upper Bound 
1.1279 
Private School Ahle Hadith -1.47714
*
 .13972 .000 -1.8908 -1.0635 
Brailvi -.27429 .13972 .440 -.6879 .1394 
Deobandi -1.58857
*
 .13972 .000 -2.0022 -1.1749 
Govt. School -.82464
*
 .13529 .000 -1.2252 -.4241 
Jamaat-i-Islami -1.27143
*
 .13972 .000 -1.6851 -.8578 
Shia Madrassa -.55714
*
 .13972 .001 -.9708 -.1435 
Shia Madrassa Ahle Hadith -.92000
*
 .13972 .000 -1.3337 -.5063 
Brailvi .28286 .13972 .400 -.1308 .6965 
Deobandi -1.03143
*
 .13972 .000 -1.4451 -.6178 
Govt. School -.26750 .13529 .431 -.6680 .1330 
Jamaat-i-Islami -.71429
*
 .13972 .000 -1.1279 -.3006 
Private School .55714
*
 .13972 .001 .1435 .9708 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.    
 
Conclusion 
Broadly, two sets of studies shed light on the question of how schooling fuels militancy in 
Pakistan. In line with research on the background of terrorist recruits globally, one strand 
looks at the profiles of Pakistani militants and seeks to determine their educational 
background, income and other biographical information. Christine Fair conducted an 
insightful survey of families in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa who lost at least one child 
in militant violence in Afghanistan or Kashmir. According to her findings, a minority of 
militants were recruited in madrassas or even in public schools, while none were recruited in 
private schools. The results of her study also showed that fewer than a quarter ever attended a 
madrassa, and of those madrassa alumni, most also attended public school and a majority had 
the equivalent of a 10th-grade education, whereas the average Pakistani child only attends 
school through grade 6 (Winthrop and Graff, 2010). The study suggests that there is not a 
strong link between militancy writ large and either lack of education or madrassa attendance. 
However, when the same study examined a smaller set of militants who were suicide 
bombers in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Fair (2008) found that most did attend a madrassa, 
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primarily in North and South Waziristan tribal agencies. She reasons that given the thin levels 
of support for suicide bombings in both countries, militant groups have no choice but to 
recruit among low-skilled madrassa students. Studies such as this one are important given the 
dearth of robust information about the profile of militants in Pakistan. The second line of 
research focuses on the viewpoints of students studying in different types of schools and 
reaches at a conclusion (like that of Rahman, 2004). Such studies tend to associate the issue 
of militancy and sectarianism with respondents‘ extremist views, which according to some 
writers seems to be tied to the quality of education. According to them poor quality education 
foster narrow worldviews which highlights aspects of curriculum and teaching that appear to 
support more pro-militant views. The longer students are exposed to narrow worldview, 
which is reflected in the curriculum and in textbooks, the more they become prone to 
extremist perspective (Winthrop and Graff, 2010). 
 
Like Rahman‘s study, this research tends to look at the viewpoint of students from different 
types of schools with regard to five important themes that include: primary purpose of 
education, status of women, position of minorities, sectarianism and Islamic militancy. In the 
previous chapter the difference in the outlook of students from three different types of 
schooling systems regarding first three themes has been reported.  This chapter dealt with the 
opinions of students about sectarian divide in Pakistan and ongoing so-called holy war in the 
name of Islam. Keeping in view the survey results and interviews, one can see that 
differences do exist between the outlook of students of madrassas, Urdu medium and English 
medium schools. The findings of the study were reported by virtue of cross tabs, mean, 
standard deviation, Chi square to explore the relationship/relatedness between variables and 
ANOVA i.e. analysis of variance which was used to compare the variance (variability in 
scores) between the different schools (due to the independent variables; like type of 
institutes) with the variability within each of the groups. The interview data was linked to 
have further illustrative insights on the questionnaire data that substantiated the survey 
results. From the findings of data, it can be seen then that diversity do exist between the 
worldviews of students coming from three different types of schooling systems regarding 
their views on sectarian divide in Pakistan and issues related to Islamic militancy and Jihad. 
Data showed that the students from madrassas are the most extremist in their views and 
English medium ones are the least. The questionnaire data was further illustrated with the 
interviews of students from respective schools.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
Introduction 
In the wake of 9/11, the interest of academics, writers and policy makers increased in the 
Islamic religious schools known as madrassas. These schools caught the gaze of national and 
international media and as a result, a number of writings and reports linked Islamic militancy 
to madrassas. Most of these reports rely exclusively on secondary sources that were based on 
conjecture and were not substantiated by any kind of research. After a long slumber, the 
policy makers and academics of Pakistan also realised that a lot of our young kids are getting 
education by that system and poor quality education in government schools was held 
responsible for it (Andrabi, et al, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; 91/11 report). Though the 
enrolment in madrassas is less than 1 per cent of the total students‘ enrolment in Pakistan yet 
they can pose as an existential threat to Pakistan (Mir, 2009). He further added that these 
elements might represent a minority view, their threat is real. Like many others Mir (2009) 
describes that not all madrassas are active centres of jehadis, but even those without direct 
links to violence promote an ideology that provides religious justification for barbaric deeds. 
In the face of such stance taken by many writers, by virtue of this research, an attempt has 
been made to determine the worldview of madrassa students. The research does not focused 
on madrassa students only but also tried to find out what differences there are in the 
viewpoint of students coming from three different types of schooling systems about certain 
socio-political and educational issues. So, the study is destined to give a comparison of 
viewpoints of students, coming from different types of schooling system, working in parallel 
in Pakistan, about their educational priorities, and other related socio-political questions such 
as status of women, tolerance towards minorities and Muslims of diverse sect and Islamic 
militancy. The study also describes how Pakistani society is polarized along socio-economic 
lines and how, at least, at the school level, this results in polarization in the world views of 
students coming from different types of schools. In addition, this research also tries to make 
an understanding whether parents tend to send their kids to madrassas because they prefer a 
religious education for their children, or their economic position leaves very limited option 
for them with respect to the choice of schools for their kids‘ education. Along with it, by 
virtue of a psychometric scale, the study was intent to compare the degree to which students 
from different types of schools perceive that the outcomes result from their own behaviours, 
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or from the forces that are external to themselves. This orientation is known as "locus of 
control".  
 
Contributing to knowledge about Madrassa system and radicalism 
Madrassas were considered as the centres of education in Muslim world. In addition to 
providing Islamic knowledge, they imparted secular education in the fields of sciences, 
philosophy and public administration and governance (Anzar, 2003). With the advent of 
colonial rule in the sub-continent, a new modern system of education that sought to replace 
the role of Madrassas in any type of development came into being. In the new schools, only 
those elite were invited to obtain admission that could be used to run the machinery of 
colonialism.  This resulted in a dichotomy of education system – secular education for the 
elite and religious education for the poor (ibid, 2003). According to Prof. Nazeer Ahmed, this 
was the time when clear bifurcation of education into deeni talim (religious education) and 
dunyavi talim (worldly/secular education) made a vivid appearance. The new Western powers 
also brought the idea of separation of state and religion, which for the Muslim leaders was 
synonym to heresy (ibid, 2003). The new system of governance did not require legitimization 
through religion and this was seen by Islamic scholars as a direct threat to the established 
code of conduct for the Muslim rulers and their own power.  They were not happy with these 
developments at all. With the advent of British rule, a new educational system was 
introduced, which was perceived to be a threat to the Islamic identity of the Muslims, the 
Madrassa system in India took upon itself the task of opposing the cultural and educational 
hegemony of the British (ibid, 2003).  In the pursuit of their objectives, the Madrassa system 
underwent drastic changes in terms of Islamic education curriculum and teaching styles and 
quality and abandoning of the earthly science studies. The madrassas abandoned the quest for 
rational sciences and focused exclusively on the teachings of Islam as prescribed in the 
Koran. Ulema used the verses from the Koran to rationalize their stance that the earthly or 
rational knowledge either should not be taught in Madrassas or should only be studied in the 
light of the Koran. Without any drastic changes, Pakistan inherited the same type of madrassa 
system after independence.  
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In the contemporary Pakistan, the self-proclaimed mission of most the Madrassas is to 
prepare students for religious duties. Their adherence to strict religious teachings, gave rise to 
suspicions in the minds of many scholars who take madrassas as jihad factories having less to 
do with education and more to do with political indoctrination; incubators of Muslim 
terrorists; origins of conservative violent ideologies, and thus, a security threat to the modern 
world (Stern 2000; Singer 2001; ICG 2002, 2007; Alexiev 2005; Doumato 2003; Metzger 
2005; Loony 2003; Coulson 2004; Fandy 2007; Fair 2008; Brookings 2009; Imtiaz 2011; 
Kazmi and Pervez 2011). According to them madrassas are driven by such ideological 
agendas that promote a mindset which is intolerant and violent towards diverse worldview. In 
order to assess this, the study contended to provide empirical evidence by determining the 
viewpoint of madrassa students about certain socio-political and educational issues. Owing to 
the fact that madrassas, Urdu medium schools and English medium schools have divergent 
curriculum content and pedagogical practices, the study argued whether or not, owing to 
these differences, students which pass through these systems have divergent ideologies about 
education such as what do they think what education is for, do they think education‘s primary 
purpose is to prepare students for work and employment, education is to promote economic 
equality and social justice, education‘s aim is to encourage understanding between men and 
women, schools are to promote shared values of Pakistani society, should the students have 
their due share in the decision making process about them in the schools and so on and so 
forth. The research also looked at whether the worldview of all students, irrespective of their 
school type, is identical on women rights, status of non-Muslims, sectarian divide, armed 
Jihad. In the coming paragraphs, each theme (like primary purpose of education, status of 
women, position of minorities, Islamic militancy) has been discussed as a separate research 
question. Along with it, the study did include a psychometric scale named ‗locus of control‘ 
to gauge that to what extent the students believe that they can control events that affect them. 
In addition, the research work also tried to determine what exactly encourages parents to send 
their children to madrassas. This study attempts to synthesize the limited knowledge that 
exists on this subject. 
 
In the first instance, the study contributed to the knowledge about madrassa schooling system 
by making a comparison of madrassa students‘ opinions with that of Urdu and English 
medium schools students regarding the primary purpose of education. By analysing the take 
of students, the first research question has tried to explore whether there is divergence or 
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alikeness in the opinions of students from mainstream schools and madrassas running in 
South Punjab about the ‗primary purpose of education‘? Basically, the purpose of education 
is a whole range of things that are applicable, directly or indirectly, to all of us in some 
respect. However, for this study I choose some aspects like the purpose of education should 
be to prepare students for work and employment, to promote respect towards other cultures 
and understanding between men and women. Along with it, the questions about the roles of 
schools and students also came under the purview of ‗primary purpose of education‘.  
 
According to some, the fundamental aim of education is to pursue economic development 
and the preparation of a skilled workforce needed to meet the demands of day today labour 
market: traditional vocational education or career and technical education (CTE) can be taken 
as examples in this regard. In recent history such narrow role of education has been criticised 
severely and according to Hull, Dan (2005) using secondary schools to ―train‖ students in job 
tasks, or to run pieces of equipment does not represent a good education at all. He advocates 
the type of education that can help students not only in choosing careers but also to become 
good citizens of the state and also prepare them for higher education. More or less similar 
criticism was made by Tanabe and Theobald (1999) for an aim of education that is grounded 
on the idea of economic utility only. The purpose of education must be intended to increase 
the odds for an economically just society and should help in dwindling the gulf between the 
super wealthy and those who live below the poverty line (ibid, 1999).  
 
For some the prime purpose of education is conservation and transference of socio-cultural 
and religious values from one generation to the next one. Education preserves the basic 
structure of society by conserving all that is worthwhile in basic values and institutions, by 
transmitting them to the next generation and by renewing culture afresh whenever 
degeneration, stagnation, or loss of values occur (Ashraf, 1979). Ashraf came up with a 
classification; education and instruction. A human being may be a great general, an efficient 
carpenter or a first-class pilot, a lawyer, a mechanic or a pathologist, a renowned doctor, a 
chemical engineer or a chartered accountant, but still remain a semi-educated, ill-mannered, 
immoral, unrighteous or unjust person. We can say that people who have specialized in 
certain educational fields are well-instructed individuals, but we cannot necessarily regard 
them as truly educated (ibid, 1979). More or less similar views with respect to aim of 
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education were made by Baig (2008) when he says ―the linking of education to financial 
goals is extremely unfortunate. It turns the centres of learning into mere vocational centres in 
their outlook and spirit. It degrades education and through it the society.‖  He further adds, 
the society must ensure that the common ground i.e. beliefs, values and outlook on life, 
continues to hold from generation to generation. This is the real purpose of education. Such 
approach towards education reminds me the views of a Deobandi madrassa student, when I 
enquired about his take on aim of education: the real purpose of education should not be 
contaminated with material greed. My only aim (for getting education) is to serve 
Islam………...when Allah has taken the responsibility of Rizk (livelihood) of all human 
beings rather all creatures, why should I care about my livelihood. Though, in response to 
questionnaire questions with regard to aim of education, all students irrespective of their 
school types seem aligned with the notion that Education should promote enterprise and 
economic development and aim of education is to prepare students for work and employment, 
but one of the student who disagreed with that notion came up with aforesaid views as an 
explanation for his take. The story does not end here, one student from Brailvi madrassa even 
saw a conspiracy of ―enemies of Islam‖ to dissuade young generation of Pakistan from the 
only aim of education i.e. ‗service of Islam‘.73 One student from Ahle Hadith madrassa was 
of the view that ―as you know Muhammad (pbuh) was the last messenger of Allah and no 
prophet will come, these schools are the source to conserve and transfer the message of Allah 
to those who are to come and this process will go on till the day of judgement and our 
madrassa is playing its humble role in this noble cause.‖ Such role of madrassas has been 
stated by Mumtaz Ahmad (2000) in these words; the preservation of Islamic culture is of 
paramount importance to the ulema or clergy of Pakistan and constitutes the raison d‘être of 
the institutions they run. This attitude constitutes the guiding philosophy on which the 
madrassa curriculum is based (Shahid, 2009). However, so far as the questionnaire responses 
are concerned, many of the students both from main stream schools and madrassas do not see 
any harm if education is destined to economic well being along with other objectives pointed 
in the questionnaire. (see appendix…). 
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 In April 2004 a severe outcry over proposed changes to ninth and tenth - grade syllabi was witnessed. 
Madrassa clergy reacted strongly and blamed government for implementing the ―Western Agenda‖ in schools of 
Pakistan. In the face of this opposition the prime minister, education minister, and religious affairs minister had 
to capitulate to the uproar and reassert their loyalty to orthodox Islam and eventually the government retracted 
its proposals. 
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So far as the purpose of education with respect to promoting equality between men and 
women is concerned, it had lesser appeal for the students of madrassas (chapter 5). Anzar 
(2003) sees a vital contribution of madrassa curricula in formulating such thinking among the 
students of madrassas. She wrote a critique on Dars-e-Nizami; the curriculum which 
Pakistani Madrassas still teach today. Anzar (2003) quotes two books; Pand Nama, and 
Karima, these books are didactic and they are in Persian rhymed couplets. Both approve of 
view that women are inferior, untrustworthy and alluring as, indeed, are beardless boys. Both 
of the books belong to a male world confident in its superiority. Women are faithless and the 
wise must suspect them (ibid, 2003). According to a survey by the Institute of Policy Studies 
(IPS 2002) about 45 per cent of madrassa students considered women to be lesser than men, 
and only 11 per cent considered them equal to men. Rahman‘s (2005) survey also bore 
similar results: more than 77 per cent madrassa students said No when they were asked, 
Should Pakistan give equal rights to men and women as in Western countries? While 90.52 % 
students from elitist English medium schools students said yes in response to the aforesaid 
question. The results of the current study are also aligned to what IPS survey and Rahman 
(2005) study came up with.  
 
As far as other aspects of purpose of education are concerned, such as role of schools in 
promoting shared values and the part of students in decision making and formulation of 
curriculum so on and so forth, all students regardless of their school type seemed to be in 
agreement with the position. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 
unequivocally grants children the right to express their views freely in all matters affecting 
them. School self-evaluation in England requires schools to consult pupils.  The ‗Every Child 
Matters‘ policy in England, seeks active participation as an educational outcome (Leat & 
Reid, 2010). Active participation on the part of students in the formulation of curriculum and 
other activities of schools may enhance interests and satisfaction among students about 
learning. On the contrary there are some who think that students are disruptive agents in the 
learning process, liable to interrupt teaching for their own purposes. This view results in a 
learning environment where the teacher lectures or students prepare written assignments. An 
opposite view is that students are agents that can and must modify lesson content according 
to their own predilections, perceptions, and attitudes. These two views represent the 
endpoints of a continuum on which teachers take varying viewpoints and shifting positions. 
Research has shown that students prefer classroom activities that require their active 
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involvement (Webb, 1983). Given this, it should be the role of the teacher to facilitate the 
positive participation of the students as curriculum developers to such an extent that the 
students become lifelong learners, able to use their minds to think, explore, analyze, and 
evaluate the instruction they receive (ibid, 1983). Bragg (2007) goes one step farther and 
observes that such projects may be read as attempts to instil norms of individualism, self-
reliance and self-management, which resonate with new configurations of power and 
authority under neo-liberalism, respond to specific debates about school standards, 
effectiveness and competition, and help construct young people as reflexive ‗‗knowledge 
workers‘‘ (Leat & Reid, 2010).  
 
Another important aspect that came under the purview of the theme ‗primary purpose of 
education‘ is the role of schools in promoting shared values of Pakistani society to ensure 
community cohesion. There can be many a friction points in a society but the most frequent 
and often seen are diversity of faith, race, gender, culture, socio-economic class and so on 
and so forth. As far as Pakistan is concerned, ethnicity and sectarianism have always seen as 
major potential threats for the state and society. But, unfortunately in recent times, the issue 
of minorities has also come under spotlight.
74
 In such precarious situations in particular, the 
responsibility of schools, becomes more significant in promoting long term community 
cohesion. By virtue of their ethos and curriculum, schools should guarantee strong respect for 
diversity, and also play their part in promoting shared values and encouraging their pupils to 
actively engage with others to understand what they all hold in common. So, all schools, 
whatever the mix of pupils they serve, are responsible for equipping their pupils to live and 
thrive alongside people from many different backgrounds. Promoting community cohesion is 
not a new idea in schools. Since September 2007 all schools in UK have been under a legal 
duty to promote community cohesion.
75
  Here one thing is worth mentioning that schools 
cannot cope with this issue single handedly. There are some other external factors like 
parents, friends, families and the overall community that formulate the lives and thinking of 
students. Along with schools, the responsibility for a cohesive community lies with them 
also. Any effort for community cohesion needs to take into account these factors and requires 
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 The incidents of forced conversion of Hindu girls and the exodus of Hindus as a reaction came under the gaze 
of national and international media. In addition to it the plight of Rimsha Masih; accused of blasphemy, has 
explained further the unfortunate treatment of Pakistan's minorities. 
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 The Education and Inspections Act 2006 inserted a new section 21(5) to the Education Act 2002 introducing a 
duty on the governing bodies of maintained schools to promote community cohesion. 
 
 
195 
 
their active involvement. As far as the results of this study are concerned, students from all 
types of schools aligned to the notion that schools should promote the shared values of the 
Pakistani society. In addition, all types of schools‘ students sided with the conception of 
involvement of pupils in the governance and organisation of the school and want their 
consultation about what is studied in the school curriculum. 
 
The second research question is about the attitude of students of different types of schools 
and madrassas with regard to place of women in Pakistani society. Religious education 
imparted in madrassas is generally seen as a source of promoting misogynist view of Islam 
by a narrow interpretation of the Quran. A report; Religious Education, Modernization and 
Conflict: Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines (2005) suggests a reinterpretation of the 
texts to allow for more friendly renditions of the Quran with respect to the rights of Muslim 
women, minorities in Muslim countries, and non- Muslims in general. In this connection 
some efforts were made by Musharraf government but in the face of protest from religious 
circles no substantial achievement was made. In connection to madrassa education and 
women rights, Alexiv (2003, 2005) and Irfani (2004) tried to single out Deobandi madrassas 
only and intentionally or unintentionally seem exonerating other types of madrassas from this 
alleged role by not mentioning them. But the results of this study show that all types of 
madrassas disagreed with the notion that equal rights should be awarded to men and women. 
The results of my study corroborate with the findings of Rahman (2004, 2005) which 
suggests that madrassa students, relative to students in public and private schools, are less 
inclined to support equal rights for women. And if we make a comparison between public 
schools and private schools, notably, public school students  are  more  intolerant  towards  
women  than  private  school pupils, but less than madrassa students.  
 
According to Qureshi and Rarieya (2007) certain prejudices and biases against women persist 
in the society that perpetuates the problem of intolerance in Pakistani society. Such biases 
may include the perception that girls are not intellectually the equals of boys, or that they 
may lag in certain subjects, or that their education simply does not matter (Qureshi & 
Rarieya, 2007). In addition to it, Rahman and Bukhari (2006) also provided an overall view 
of the general state of education in contemporary Pakistan. Their work provided focussed and 
detailed description of religious schools, their funding, their ‗ideology‘ and their political 
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agenda. The value system is religious, which includes negative perceptions of minorities and 
women (Rahman and Bukhari, 2006). The results of my study are aligned to these writings 
which say, in the  obscure  Madrassas impressionable young  minds  are  taught  a distorted  
and  unnatural version  of Islam, by inculcating misogynistic ideals and hatred for non-
Muslims. Chinoy
76
 (2009); a Pakistani-Canadian journalist made a documentary with the 
name Children of the Taliban: a documentary to trace the suicide attackers and their trainers. 
She interviewed some of the students from a Deobandi madrassa in Karachi and asked one of 
the students about the place of women in Islam, ―women are meant for domestic care, and 
that is what they should do. Sharia Law says it, why are women wandering around? The 
government should forbid women and girls from wandering around outside, just like the 
government banned plastic bags. No one use them anymore. We should do the same with 
women.‖ He said, the people who keep women on their proper place are Taliban only 
(Chinoy, 2009). So far as the results of this study are concerned, more or less similar 
justifications were made by the students of all madrassas during their interviews, even those 
from Shia and Brailvi schools of thought who are relatively considered as moderates as 
compared to Deoband and Ahle Hadith schools of thought. They regarded women as the 
cause of obscenity and moral degradation in the society. Education, which should be used as 
a tool in helping to break the pattern of gender discrimination and bring lasting change for 
women in Pakistan, is in fact doing the opposite, particularly in madrassas. Education in 
madrassas promotes patriarchal structure in the society. Dominance of males on females is 
justified in the light of teachings of Islam. According to Farooq (no date) in Deobandi 
madrassas of females, such literature is taught which succinctly says that men are divinely 
superior to women. By virtue of carefully selected texts, the patriarchal notion of man‘s 
superiority is inculcated in the minds of girl students. Bihishti Zewar
77
, one of the important 
texts on girls‘ curriculum of Deobandi madrasas, indoctrinates the young girls that women 
are socially subordinate to the men of their families and also tells them that they are 
possessions of men (ibid, n.d). The book argues that ingratitude towards a husband is as much 
sin as ingratitude towards God. It induces woman that she should obey her husband‘s will in 
all things, seek permission on all matters concerning her life and call the white black if he 
does. The book instructs woman that she must learn above all to relate to her husband as she 
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 She is an Emmy and first Oscar award-winning Pakistani. The Pakistani President conferred the Hilal-e-
Imtiaz on Obaid-Chinoy on 23rd March 2012, for bringing honour to Pakistan as a filmmaker. 
77
 Literal meaning of Bihishti Zewar is Ornament of Paradise. 
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relates to God, with obedience and gratitude. She is responsible to her husband‘s disposition 
and is expected to keep him happy. The book advises the woman: 
 
Never think of him [husband] as your equal, never let him do any work for you…. If he comes to you 
and begins to massage your hands or feet, stop him; you would not let your father do this service, and 
your husband‘s rank is higher than your father‘s (Metcalf, 1982 as quoted by Farooq). 
 
Third research question is about whether there is any diversity in the opinions of students 
from different types of schools and madrassas with respect to position of non-Muslims in 
Pakistan? The results of the study corroborate with the study of Rahman (2004, 2005) which 
demonstrates that madrassa students have hardly any fondness for the notion that equal rights 
should be accorded to minorities of Pakistan. Public schools students are also relatively less 
inclined to support equal rights for non-Muslim citizens of Pakistan. In this regard, the 
curriculum of government schools in general and madrassas in particular have been held 
responsible by most of the critics and policy reports. In its 2011 annual report, the U.S. 
Commission on international religious Freedom (USCIRF) found that textbooks used in 
Pakistani primary and secondary schools foster prejudice and intolerance of religious 
minorities, especially Hindus and Christians. Such intolerant references are not restricted to 
Islamic studies textbooks:  they are found in both early elementary and more advanced social 
studies texts used by all public school students, including non-Muslim students. Moreover, 
the textbooks contain stories, biographies, and poems with an Islamic religious character that 
students of minority faiths must study and be tested on. More or less similar views were 
expressed by Rahman in his book Denizens of Alien world (2004). Rahman (2004) 
commented on the differences between the curricula of Urdu and English medium schools: 
The schools are vastly diverse in their approach toward minorities, Hindus, and other non- 
Muslims. The indoctrination that occurs against such groups is far more pronounced in Urdu 
textbooks than in English textbooks and may be a direct cause of greater intolerance among 
those schooled in Urdu schools (Rahman, 2004). Rahman and Bukhari (2006) also came up 
with a fair analysis of general state of education in Pakistan and pointed the ‗ideology‘ which 
through education the establishment of Pakistan tried to promote. The USCIRF (2011) report 
also made an evaluation about curriculum of Pakistan‘s madrassas: a significant minority of 
Pakistan‘s thousands of religious schools, or madrassas, reportedly continue to provide 
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ideological training and motivation to those who take part in religiously-inspired violence in 
Pakistan and abroad (ibid, 2011). A memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed in 
October 2010 between the ministry of interior and the five main madrassa boards in order to 
better regulate madrassas‘ curriculum and financing but no substantial achievement was 
made in this respect. Mumtaz‘s (2000) work is a detailed account of   madrassa education in 
Pakistan, which used various case studies to examine madrassa education with respect to 
what is being taught in the curricula as well as the value indoctrination that occurs on an 
informal basis. Other works that focus exclusively on the general state of Islamic education in 
Pakistan includes, al Attas (1979): Aims and objectives of Islamic Education, Baloch (2000):  
Education based on Islamic Values: Imperatives and Implications, and Ahmad (2005): 
Islamist School Chains and the coming New Order. During a session on ‗rethinking education 
for pluralism: representation of religious minorities in public and madrassah education‘ in the 
Sustainable Development Conference of the SDPI in December, 2011, experts recommended 
government to negotiate with madrassa umbrella organizations to discuss madrassa reforms 
and also to allocate funds for financing the process of change. Afsheen Naz of SDPI 
expressed that ruling elite have encouraged a particular mindset with using curriculum, which 
has instilled obscurantist vision in general masses in the name of advancing the ‗ideology of 
Islam‘ that resulted in the marginalising of minorities of Pakistan, in order to protect their 
own vested interests. 
 
The fourth research question deals with the comparison of views of students from mainstream 
schools (Urdu medium and English medium) to that of madrassas‘ with respect to sectarian 
divide in Pakistani society. The results of the study shows that all students regardless of their 
type of schoolings disapprove sectarian repugnance, however, receptive feelings towards 
diverse sects were relatively stronger among the students of private schools as compared to 
public and madrassas students. Interestingly, the findings of my study do not corroborate with 
the results of the studies done before. For instance, Ali‘s (2009) findings showed that 
sectarian violence is more likely to occur in localities where madrassa penetration is 
highest.
78
 Using incident data in two districts ( Ahmedpur and Islamabad),  Ali  found  that  
sectarian  violence  correlated  strongly  and positively  with  madrassa  penetration. Another 
                                                          
78
 Saleem H Ali made a Geographical Information System Based Analysis by making demographic comparison. 
He collected data by the surveys of all madrassas in the two regions; Ahmedpur and Islamabad. Interviews were 
carried out with various stakeholders as well as focus group discussions with leading religious leaders and 
government functionaries to revalidate the findings. 
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survey administered by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies in March 2009 found that at 
least 18% of the madrassas were affiliated with sectarian outfits. One such example is the 
Binori Town madrassa which has strong bonds to various terrorist groups, including JeM 
(Jesh-e-Mohammad) HuM (Harkat-ul-Mujahideen) and SSP (Sipah Sahaba Pakistan)
79
. Rana 
(2009) goes so far to claim that Jamia Binoria
80
 is the ―backbone‖ of banned militant group 
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). An ICG report published in 2007 supports Rana‘s assertions, 
claiming that the madrassa has helped establish and sustain these groups. The Binori Town 
madrassa is also known to be at the heart of anti-Shiite and anti-Barelvi violence. In the last 
decade, Shiite and Barelvi militants have assassinated at least four leading scholars of this 
seminary.  The aforementioned ICG study has reported on the link between sectarian 
militancy and madrassas in the context of Karachi; Pakistani‘s largest city. The study also 
found that a Barelvi madrassa chain, Faizan-e-Madina, believed to be militant, carried out 
jihadi activities geared against members of the Deobandis and Ahl-e-Hadith sects. The 
madrassa chain is run by Dawat-e-Islami, an off-shoot of which, Sunni Tehrik, is a sectarian 
militant group (ibid, 2007).  
 
There are many other research studies that tried to establish alleged role of madrassas in 
sectarianism (ICG report, 2002, 2005, 2007; Mumtaz Ahmad, 1997; Saleem H. Ali 2009; 
A.H. Nayyar, 2003; Jessica Stern, 2004; Qasim Zaman, 2007). According to ICG report 
(2002), the seeds of factional and sectarian conflicts are in the foundations of the traditional 
madrassas. Based on sectarian identities, madrassas are, by their very nature, mutually 
exclusive, driven by a mission to outnumber and dominate rival sects. Students are educated 
and trained to counter arguments of opposing sects on matters of theology, jurisprudence and 
doctrines. Promoting a particular sect inevitably implies rejection of the others. ―Refutation‖ 
(Radd in Urdu) has always been an important part of madrassa education. So, ‗Radd' 
literature  – the ‗logical' refutation of the belief system of other sects, aimed at proving them 
infidels or apostates – is a main feature of the literature produced by madrassa-based parties. 
In short, madrassa education and upbringing aim to indoctrinate with an intolerance of other 
religious systems (ibid, 2002). Mumtaz Ahmad (1997) says that the madrassa graduates 
indoctrinated with an intolerant ideology against other religious systems provide manpower 
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 All of these militant organisations are banned in Pakistan and had a long history of their involvement in 
sectarian killings. 
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 Jamia Binoria is a very big Deobandi madrassa in Karachia and the madrassa allegedly caters to thousands of 
students from around the world. 
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for the sectarian movements. ICG Asia Report (2005); The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan 
states that most of the leaders of sectarian organisations came from madrassas and have been 
running madrassas (pp 5-23). According to Ali (2009) the doctrine of Jihad has been 
perceived by madrassas in three categories; Domestic jihad against oppression, Pan - Islamist 
jihad, and jihad to establish theological purity (Ali, 2009). The third category of jihad 
described by Ali (2009), defines it as ―jihad to establish theological purity and prevent 
adulteration of Islamic doctrine‖ (Ali, 2009, p. 79). It is linked to sectarianism and   may 
manifest itself in sectarian violence, although the participants of the study did not identify 
any such manifestation.   He states:   
There are two concepts in Islamic tradition that are often misused and manipulated to motivate this 
form of jihad and often madrassahs students are indoctrinated with these. The concept of murtad, 
which is a term used to describe someone who has left the fold of Islam after becoming a Muslim. 
According to most interpretations of Islamic tradition, it is permissible to kill such an individual to 
prevent doubt from taking hold in the community (Ali, 2009, p. 76) 
 
He (2009) further goes on to state: ―the other concept is the notion of fitnah or ―mischief‖ 
that may cause disunity. Often disagreement or dissent is relegated to being fitnah and hence 
jihad is permitted against this‖ (Ali, 2009, p. 76). So far as the results of my study are 
concerned, no such manifestation was expressed by any student from madrassa or other type 
of school. This might be because of the fact that students might be afraid of expressing their 
true feelings about sectarian differences. It is noteworthy that all leaders of religious and sect-
based parties and heads of madrassa boards, at least publically, do condemn sectarianism 
unequivocally. Such clear and explicit position for equality of rights for women and 
minorities has hardly been taken by these religious dignitaries. 
 
Fifth research question tries to examine whether there is any difference of opinion among 
students from different types of schools and madrassas regarding militant activities going on 
in Pakistan. In recent times, madrassa education has raised numerous concerns in the 
academics and policy makers with regard to their perverted roles but the most important 
among those is its alleged connection with militancy. The results of this study show that not 
all madrassas but the students from Ahle Hadith, Deoband and Jamat-i-Islami madrassas are 
relatively more aligned to pro-militant outlook as compared to those of students from Brailvi 
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madrassas, Shia madrassas, Urdu and English medium schools‘ students. These results of the 
study corroborate with the findings of ICG report of 2004 which says that many of the 
Deobandi and Ahle Hadith madrassas in Pakistan support militancy and foster a way of 
thinking that leads to acts of terrorism. More or less similar views have been made by Mir 
(2009) when he traces a clear shift in the outlook of Ahle Hadith, Deobandi and Jamaat-i-
Islami madrassas doctrines with respect to Islamic militancy and jehad and pointed the 
radical changes made in their curricula in the face of new developments that took place in 
Afghanistan and Iran in late 1970s.  
 
According to Mir (2009) Pakistan‘s religious madrassas were not advocates of militancy 
since their inception in modern Indo-Pak history. Even the curriculum of Deobandi 
madrassas, that are considered most important in the context of extremism, focused on 
purification of faith for the purpose of knowledge, rather than militancy and Jihad. All this 
changed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Army Chief General Zia; an ardent Islamist who 
took power after a military coup against a secular and liberal government of Z. A. Bhutto in 
1977 had a plan to turn Pakistan into an Islamic state. The incident of Iranian Revolution in 
1979 and Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan in the same year gained urgency and fundamentalist 
tone. In the wake of these incidents Deobandi madrassas narrowed their syllabus by focussing 
on teaching of Koran and Hadith (sayings of prophet Muhammad) and dropped secular 
subjects like Mathematics and science in part or whole (ibid, 2009, p194). The emphasis in 
madrassa curriculum subsequently shifted almost entirely from the standard pillars of faith 
such as prayer, charity and pilgrimage to the obligations and rewards of jehad. The madrassas 
taught the young students that the world was divided into believers and unbelievers in a black 
and white setting. Students were taught militaristic aspects of faith instead of humility, 
tolerance and kindness. Subsequently, the era of Jehadi madrassas was born which got 
intertwined with politics and recruit troops for anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan (ibid, 2009).  
 
There are a lot more studies and reports that tried to establish a positive correlation between 
madrassas and militancy like (Jessica Stern, 2000-01; ICG reports, 2002, 2004, 2007; EC 
RRM report, 2002; Tariq Rahman, 2004). These reports and studies tried to link rise in 
Islamic militancy and sectarian violence in Pakistan with the rise in the numbers of madrassas 
in the wake of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. Jessica Stern in her writings ―Pakistan‘s Jihad 
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Culture,‖ (2000, pp 115-126) and ―Meeting with the Muj,‖ (2001, 42-50) has advanced the 
belief that Pakistan‘s madrassas are factories of ideological indoctrination and even military 
training for terrorist organisations throughout Pakistan and South Asia. More or less similar 
findings were shared by ICG report of 2004. Rahman (2004) compared the outlook of 
students of madrassa, public schools and private schools with regard to solution of Kashmir 
issue. Findings of his study showed that the students from madrassas, relative to students 
from public and private schools, are more likely to support mujahideen‘s role in Indian held 
Kashmir, and more likely to favour open war  with  India  to  resolve  the issue of Kashmir 
instead of peaceful means. Barring the fact, madrassas are divided on sectarian lines and have 
diverse standing for several socio-political and religious issues but in his study, Rahman 
treated madrassas as a monolithic being. Results of my study showed that students from 
Brailvi and Shia madrassas are relatively less inclined to belligerence than those of students 
from Urdu medium schools. Brailvi madrassas made the second largest in numbers only after 
Deoband madrassas in Pakistan. The students of Brailvi and Shia madrassas are less 
supportive for suicide attacks and do not consider Taliban as holy warriors or martyrs. 
Notably, public school students are more inclined towards belligerence and have pro-militant 
manifestation in their outlook than Brailvi and Shia madrassas students and private school 
pupils, but less than Deobandi, Ahle Hadith and Jamaat-e-Islami madrassas students. If we 
flick through the history of Muslims, there has been a tradition of the spiritual Islam of 
mystics that accepts and respects all faiths but at the same time the tradition of political Islam 
is militant and encourages teenagers to join holy wars. Instead of promoting those spiritual 
and secular traditions that are peaceful, some madrassas are emphasising fundamentalist and 
militant traditions that promote violence and war. The curriculum of madrassas continues to 
be an area of concern for the Pakistani government, United States agencies, and the 
international community because of its alleged linkage with militant and radicalized elements 
(Hoodbhoy, 2007). The Brookings report entitled Pakistan‘s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System 
of Education, not Jihad (2008) drew a connection between madrassa education and the 
different manifestations of intolerance in society, including violence. Hatred is allowed 
within the confines of a minority of madrassas where intolerance and the resultant violence 
are most palpable. The doctrine of militant jihad, which according to the fundamentalist view 
condones the killings of men, women, and children who may espouse a worldview different 
from that of radical Islam, is being taught aggressively in these institutions ( ibid, 2008). 
Although these may be few in number compared to the other madrassas, where simply a 
conservative Islamic education is being imparted, they, nonetheless, prepare students to take 
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up arms and may even allow weapons on their premises. These madrassa-trained students 
then proceed to take up arms in foreign lands such as Chechnya and Kashmir, raising the 
level of violence in these countries (ibid, 2008). Fair (2006), in her seminal work challenged 
that premise and suggested that while madrassa education can create conditions conducive to 
militancy, there is no reason to believe that the majority of militants are madrassa-trained. To 
address the need for robust analysis of militancy and human capital formation in Pakistan, in 
2004 Fair commissioned a convenience sample of the families of 140 militants in Pakistan. 
The instrument collected detailed information about the militant‘s group affiliation, work and 
educational experience, and other relevant personal background as well as detailed household 
information. The analysis of the data finds that militants in the sample are overwhelmingly 
not madrassa products. Fair (2006) concluded that madrassa students may propagate public 
support for terrorism and militancy nonetheless. 
 
Generally children‘s education depends on parental choice and in the context of madrassa 
education, the first question comes to one‘s mind is why parents might want to send their 
children to madrassas. In this connection three possibilities can be pondered upon: (a) 
madrassa can be an option where no other schooling options are available; (b) poor parents 
are more likely to send their children to madrassas as education and lodging in madrassas is 
free and; (c) the use of madrassas might be greater among certain types of households defined 
by religiosity or ethnicity. In this research, an attempt has been made to clarify what usually 
defines the choice of parents in the selection of type of schools; they chose to educate their 
children. Twelve fathers were interviewed to determine the motive behind the selection of a 
certain school for their child. In the light of their views, it seems that they send their children 
to madrassas due to financial constraints. The first possibility (a) can be repudiated on the 
grounds that the area of South Punjab from where the research sample was chosen was the 
one where the local madrassa was just one among at least two educational options and vice 
versa. The findings of my study corroborate with the results of Rahman (2004) who says, that 
those parents who cannot afford their children‘s education send their children to madrassa. 
Madrassa schools‘ children come from marginalised social groups who spend their life below 
the poverty line.  Interestingly, a father whose child was studying in government school 
showed his interest to get his child enrolled in an English school if he could afford the 
exorbitant tuition fee of the private school. Madrassa is a place where students get the 
boarding and lodging in addition to religious education free of charge. For those who cannot 
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afford feeding and clothing of their children along with fee might look for Madrassa as an 
option where along with education; their children can get food and clothing. 
 
Madrassa in perspective 
According to Winthrop and Graff (2010) worldview formation is one of important reasons 
why education and conflict are related. Schooling systems provide one important way of 
shaping individuals‘, and hence social groups‘, worldviews. Many other influences, such as 
families and the media, contribute to the framework of ideas and beliefs through which an 
individual interprets the world and interacts with it. But schooling is one such influence that 
is easily shaped by policy (ibid, 2010). The content of Pakistan's official textbooks has often 
been criticized by several sources including many within Pakistan for sometimes promoting 
religious intolerance and Indo-phobia. According to Haqqani (2005), only officially 
published textbooks are used in Pakistan's schools and colleges since the era of Ayub Khan. 
This is used by Pakistani government to create a standard narrative of Pakistan's history. 
During the rule of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq a program of Islamization of the country 
including the textbooks was started. General Zia's 1979 education policy stated that "[the] 
highest priority would be given to the revision of the curricula with a view to reorganizing the 
entire content around Islamic thought and giving education an ideological orientation so that 
Islamic ideology permeates the thinking of the younger generation and helps them with the 
necessary conviction and ability to refashion society according to Islamic tenets" (Jamil, 
2009). During Zia‘s rule madrassas not only multiplied in numbers but special emphasis on 
holy war and martyrdom was given also via jehadi literature (Mir, 2009). 
 
The results of this study show that the students coming from different types of schools have 
diverse outlook with regard to certain socio-political issues. The students of different 
madrassas, even, have diversity in their opinions on jehad and militancy. As far as the aim of 
education is concerned, the findings of the research showed that all students irrespective of 
their school types were aligned with the notion that education should promote enterprise and 
economic development but the madrassa students, relative to students in public and private 
schools, were less inclined to support this stance. And if we make a comparison between 
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public schools and private schools, notably, public school students  are  less supportive of  
intolerance  towards  women  than  private  school pupils, but less than madrassa students. 
The study also deliberated upon the most ignored aspect of parent and school relationship in 
Pakistan educational landscape. Parent-school relationships have evolved into what parents 
do with their children, such as help with homework, and/or what parents do for their children, 
such as choosing their school or providing learning resources (Crozier, 2012). But for this 
study only parent school relationship with regard to their selection of school has been 
thrashed out. The results of the study support the notion that the parents of madrassa students 
opt to send their children in madrassas because economically it is a workable choice for them. 
 
In any society, education is a major vehicle for the transmission of ideas, attitudes, and 
beliefs.  This means that control over educational content and access to classrooms can 
become valuable commodities in a conflict.   
 
Education can perpetuate negative judgments about the ―other,‖ engendering hostility and 
aggression among the young, and firing up the fever to go to war. According to P. W. Singer, 
the extremist madrassas described by President Musharraf run a curriculum where,  
Hatred is permissible, jihad allows the murder of innocents, and the new heroes are terrorists.  
Martyrdom through suicide attacks are also extolled, and anti-western speeches are 
committed to memory.  The students are uneducated, young, dependent on the schools, and 
cut off from contact with their parents for years at a time, and thus highly susceptible to being 
programmed toward violence.  These students from this minority of madrassas are regularly 
sent abroad to serve in conflicts in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and a number of other 
wars decided by the school leaders as part of the jihad. In addition, the foreign students of the 
madrassas return to their home states with a violent outlook and sow the seeds for conflict 
elsewhere. 
 
The aforesaid statement by Musharraf explains the phenomenon of some of the madrassas 
that are actively involved in militant activities. He did not miss the point that the students 
who launch militant activities are cut off from their parents for years which explicate that 
such students hardly get any input from their parents for their belligerent behaviour. Many 
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have argued that one of the main reasons so many students are forced to attend the madrassas 
is the failure of Pakistan‘s school system to provide an adequate number of teachers and 
schools, particularly in the rural areas. In addition to it, there are many a ghost schools; the 
schools that exist on the papers only. According to a World Bank report, in primary 
government schools of Punjab, the average span of study is 15 minutes per day.   Hence, with 
little alternative available, parents send the children to the madrassa to get some semblance of 
education.  As has been discussed before, the lure is increased by the fact that many of the 
madrassas provide free room and board the student body an enticement for large, low-income 
families.  
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Appendix-1 
 
 
Questionnaire: 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in my research project which is to investigate any 
association between madrassa education and religious radicalism. This project is part of my 
PhD studies at the University of Glasgow, United Kingdom. Your right of confidentiality and 
anonymity is assured. Please answer the questions candidly, without consulting your fellows. 
There is no right or wrong answer as it is not a test. You may choose to leave any statement 
unanswered. You have the right to withdraw from part of this study any time before, during 
or after the research process. The questionnaire should take you about 45 minutes. 
 
Name: ……………………………………………………………………………… 
Name of School/Madrassa: ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
Background 
 
1. Where did you receive your previous education? 
English Medium Schools  Urdu Medium Schools  
Madrassa    English and Urdu Medium Schools 
English Medium Schools and Madrassa 
Urdu Medium Schools and Madrassa 
Other   ……………………………………………….. 
2. Was your previous schooling in? 
Public School    Private School 
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Other   …………………………………………….. 
3. Where are you from? 
Urban part of Southern Punjab (City)    Rural part of southern Punjab (village) 
4. Who is/are earning hand(s) in your family? 
Father     Mother 
Both     Other   ……………………………………………… 
5. What is your father’s occupation? 
……………………………………………………… 
6. The occupation of your father falls in which category? 
Government Sector   Private Sector 
Self-employed    Other   ……………………………………………… 
7. Does your mother work? 
Yes     no 
 If yes 
8. What is the occupation of your mother? 
…………………………………………………………….. 
9. The occupation of your mother falls in which category?  
Government Sector   Private Sector 
Self-employed    Other   ……………………………………………… 
10. How many siblings do you have? 
………………………………………… 
11. What is your sect? 
Deobandi    Brailvi 
Ahle Hadith    Jamat-i-Islami 
Shia     Other   ………………………………………………. 
Don’t Know 
12. Where do your other siblings study? 
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................................................... 
13. Main decisions regarding family matters are taken by 
My father    My mother 
Jointly     Other   …………………………………………….. 
14. In comparison to girls boys are given more importance in my family. 
Yes     no 
15. Do you think your parents will mind if you have friendship with boys from different sect. 
Yes     no 
16. You live in a 
rented home    owned home 
17. Type of house 
pakka (bricks wall)   kacha (grass-thatched/mud made) 
18. How many rooms do you have in your house? 
………………………………………. 
19. You have a 
joint family system   unit family system 
20. I identify myself as: 
Pakistani    Muslim 
Digerian/ Multani/Bahawalpuri  Seraiki/Balouch/Pashtun/Sindhi/Punjabi 
Deobandi/Brailvi/Ahlehadith/Shia/Jamat-i-Islami 
 
 
Tick in the box that best reflects your degree of agreement or disagreement with each 
statement. This is not a test at all and there is no right or wrong answer. 
(A) Questions on the Aims and Purposes of Education 
1=strongly disagree, 2= Agree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 4= Disagree,    5= strongly agree. 
# Please tick the best option for the following statements  Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
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(B) Questions on gender Inequality 
21. A key aim of education is to prepare students for work and 
employment. 
     
22. Education should promote economic equality and social 
progress. 
     
23. A key aim of education is individual freedom and choice in 
life. 
     
24. A key aim of education is to prepare students to take their 
place in Pakistani society. 
     
25. A key aim of education is to increase awareness and 
appreciation of the world beyond Pakistan. 
     
26. Education should promote enterprise and economic 
development. 
     
27. A key aim of education is to initiate students into the 
knowledge and truth of Islam. 
     
28. A key aim of education is to promote understanding of, and 
respect for, other faiths and cultures in Pakistan. 
     
29. Education should encourage greater understanding 
between men and women. 
     
30 Education should encourage greater equality between men 
and women. 
     
31 Schools should respect the wishes of families in teaching 
about religion. 
     
32 Schools should respect the wishes of families in all aspects 
of a student’s education. 
     
33 Schools should promote the shared values of Pakistani 
society. 
     
34 Schools should promote the shared values of Pakistani 
society even if this conflicts with the wishes of parents. 
     
35 Students should be encouraged to question the institutions 
of Pakistani society. 
     
36 Students should be encouraged to debate social and 
religious questions in schools. 
     
37 Students should be enabled to participate in the decisions 
made about them in schools. 
     
38 Students should be consulted on what is studied in the 
school curriculum. 
     
39 Students should be prepared in school for their roles in 
family life. 
     
40 Equal rights should be given to men and women as in 
Western countries. 
     
41 It is desirable that equal opportunities should be given to 
both men and women to become head of state. 
     
42 Women should work shoulder to shoulder with men in all 
spheres of life. 
     
43 Women should be confined to domestic responsibilities.      
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(C) Questions on the Status of Non-Muslims in Pakistani Society 
 
(D) Questions on Sectarianism 
44 The presence of women in Pak army is a progressive 
development. 
     
45 A fixed quota of jobs for women across a range of 
occupations is a positive step on the part of government. 
     
46 Equal rights should be accorded to Ahmedis in all jobs.      
47 Equal rights should be accorded to Pakistani Hindus in all 
jobs. 
     
48 Equal rights should be accorded to Pakistani Christians in all 
jobs. 
     
49 Ahmedis should have right to perform their religious 
practices freely. 
     
50 Ahmedis should have right to occupy key positions in 
Pakistan without any discrimination. 
     
51 Ahmedis should have right to propagate their religion 
freely. 
     
52 The constitutional clause that says that the highest officials 
of the state must be Muslims is justifiable. 
     
53 Every Pakistani whether Muslim or non-Muslim must read 
Islamic Studies as a compulsory subject. 
     
54 There should be no compulsion on private schools to teach 
Islamic Studies to their students. 
     
55 All non-Muslims in Pakistan should have the right to 
celebrate their religious festivals freely. 
     
56 As Pakistan is an Islamic country, so all the restrictions on 
non-Muslims are justified. 
     
57 I get along well with people from different sects.      
58 I think a person should be elected on the basis of his 
personal character instead of his sectarian affiliation. 
     
59 I don’t make friends with people who are from different 
sects. 
     
60 Inter-marriages among different sects are acceptable.      
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 (E) Questions on Islamist Militancy 
61 I have no problem in offering my prayer in a mosque of 
different sect. 
     
62 I have no problem in offering my congregational prayer 
behind an Imam from different sect. 
     
63 If the head of the state/government belongs to different 
sect, it makes me to feel that I and people from my sect are 
going to be marginalised. 
     
64 Every Muslim must have right to celebrate his/her religious 
festival freely. 
     
65 I think that the word ‘sect’ should be removed from all 
governmental documentations requiring personal 
information. 
     
66 All political parties divided on sectarian lines should be 
banned. 
     
67 I think there should be different schools for students 
belonging to different sects. 
     
68 I didn’t have any problem with attending the funeral prayer 
of a person from different sect. 
     
69 I didn’t have any problem in marrying a girl from different 
sect. 
     
70 I didn’t have any problem with female from my family 
getting married with a man from other sect. 
     
71 Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir question by force.      
72 Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir question by supporting 
Jihadi groups against Indian army. 
     
73 Pakistan should resolve Kashmir issue by peaceful means 
only. 
     
74 Suicide attacks are Ja’aiz (approved) in Islam.      
75 Suicide bombers are Shaheed (martyrs).      
76 Talibans fighting against Pakistani army are mujahideen 
(holy warriors). 
     
77 Talibans fighting against Western forces and Karzai 
government are mujahideen (holy warriors). 
     
78 America and its allies are at war with Islam.      
79 America and its allies are at war with international 
terrorism. 
     
80 Talibans fighting against Pak army are terrorists.      
81 Talibans fighting against Pak army are gumrah (misled).      
82 Army operations in Swat and FATA are against fellow 
Muslims. 
     
83 Army operations in Swat and FATA are against extremists.      
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(F) Questions on Internal-External Locus of Control 
 
  
84 Military personnel killed during the operations are Shaheed 
(martyrs). 
     
85 Islamic militants killed during the operations are Shaheed 
(martyrs). 
     
86 9/11 attack was a justifiable act.      
87 9/11 attack was an unjustifiable terrorist activity.      
88 Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due 
to bad luck. 
     
89 No matter how hard you try some people just don't like 
you. 
     
90 I have often found that what is going to happen will 
happen. 
     
91 Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to 
course work that studying is really useless. 
     
92 Becoming a success is a matter of hard work; luck has little 
or nothing to do with it. 
     
93 It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many 
things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune 
anyway. 
     
94 Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability; 
luck has little to do with it. 
     
95 As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the 
victims of forces we can neither understand nor control. 
     
96 It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays 
an important role in my life. 
     
97 Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the 
direction my life is taking. 
     
 
 
228 
 
Appendix-2 
 
 
The University of Glasgow, charity number SC004401 
 
PROJECT TITLE: An investigation into the association between forms of schooling 
and students’ religious beliefs in Pakistan. 
 
Would you help me by taking part in a research study that I am undertaking as part of my 
PhD degree at the University of Glasgow, United Kingdom. Before you decide whether you 
want to participate, it is important that you to understand why this research is being done and 
what it will involve. Please take your time to read the following information carefully and 
discuss it with others if you wish so. Ask, if there is anything unclear or if you would like 
more information. Take your time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.  
 
The study aims to explore associations between different types of education and the beliefs of 
students. In order to collect data for my research, I would like you to fill in a questionnaire by 
ticking boxes to show your opinions. It will take about 45 minutes to complete. You have 
been selected for this study because you are a student in one of the schools I have chosen to 
represent one of the three main educational systems in Pakistan.  
 
The study is confidential and I will not reveal your identity to anyone. I have asked you to fill 
out your name on a strip on the front of the questionnaire. I would like this information so 
that I can select some students to talk to in more depth on a later occasion. You don‘t have to 
complete this information, but if you do, the strip containing your name will be detached 
from the questionnaire and the torn off slips will be kept in locked cabinets safely. The data 
and torn off slips carrying participants names will be destroyed once research results have 
been obtained. 
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If you have any questions about the project, please contact myself, Muhammad Arslan 
Raheem on phone: 00447529481547 or e-mail: m.raheem.1@research.gla.ac.uk If you have 
any other concerns regarding the conduct of the research project before commencing, during, 
or after the completion of the project, you are invited to contact the Faculty of Education 
Ethics Officer Dr. Georgina Wardle, via email: g.wardle@educ.gla.ac.uk 
 
If you decide to participate, please fill in the consent form which is attached with this letter. 
Irrespective of your decision of being part of this study, thank you for devoting some time to 
reading the information provided, and considering its contents. 
 
Yours sincerely 
Muhammad Arslan Raheem. 
 
This information sheet is yours to keep. 
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Appendix-3 
 
 
The University of Glasgow, charity number SC004401 
 
Consent Form for Interviewee 
 
PROJECT TITLE: An investigation into the association between forms of schooling and 
students’ religious beliefs in Pakistan. 
 
Name of Researcher: Muhammad Arslan Raheem 
   
(1) I confirm that I have read and understood the Plain Language Statement for the above 
study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
(2) I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any   
time, without giving any reason. 
 
(3) As a student, I understand that my participation in this study will not have any effect 
on my examination or grades. 
 
(4) I understand that my name and other data will not be revealed to anybody other than 
the researcher. I also understand that my anonymity will be protected in any 
publications arising from the research.   
 
(5) I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
     
Name of Participant Date Signature 
 
 
Researcher Date Signature 
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Appendix-4 
 
The University of Glasgow, charity number SC004401 
Hi, Thank you for agreeing to be part of my research project on association between certain 
form of schooling systems and students‘ religious and social beliefs. The approximare time of 
Interview will be 25 minutes. There are no right or wrong answers as it is not a test. You are 
allowed to say anything you wish to say. This interview will be recorded but it is assured that 
whatever you say will be dealt with confidentially. 
 
Interview Questions 
Aim of Education: 
What do you think to be appropriate aims of education system? 
 
Equal Rights for Men and Women: 
What are your views about the equality of men and women in our society? 
 
Status of Non-Muslims in Pakistani Society: 
What are your views about the status of non-Muslims in Pakistan? 
 
Sectarian Differences: 
How do you see the issue of sectarianism in Pakistan? 
 
Islamic Militancy: 
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What do you consider be the most appropriate way to resolve the issue of Kashmir with 
India? 
What are your views about Taliban fighting against Pak army in Swat and Tribal Areas? 
What do you say about suicide attacks? 
What do you say about the incidents like 9/11? 
What do you say about armed jihad? 
 
Thanks… 
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Appendix 5 
 
Dars-e-Nizami Curriculum of Madrassas (books and dates of publication under major 
categories of curriculum): 
General Books 
 
Title of Book Author Publication date 
Am-Mofassal  Jarullah Zamukhshry 1143 
AI-Kafia Jamaluddin Hajib 1248 
Sharh AI Fawaid AI 
Ziaeya 
Nooruddin AI Jami 1492 
AI Khulasa Jamaluddin AI Tafi 686 
AI Shfia Jamaluddin AI Hajib 1248 
 
Rhetoric 
Takhes AI Miftah Shamsuddin AI Qazvini 1338 
AI Mukhtsar, W. 
AI Mutawal 
Saduddin Taftazani 1390 
 
Principles of Hadith 
Nukhbat Al Fiqar Shahabuddin Al Asqlani 1448 
 
 
Hadith 
AI Mwatta Imam Malik 812 
AI Jame AI Sahih Imam Ismail AI Bukhari 870 
AI Jame AI Sahih Imam AI Muslim AI Qusheri 680 
Sun an Ibn-E-Maja Muhammad AI Qazvini 886 
Sunan Abi Dawood Sulaiman AI Sajistani 886 
AI Jame AI Sahih Mohammad Esa AI Tirmazi 892 
AI Sunan AI Sughra Shaib AI Sanai 915 
Sharh Maanil Aasar Mohammad AI Tahavi 933 
Exegesis of the Koran 
Jalalain Jalaluddin AI Mahalli 1442 
 Jalaluddin AI Syuti 1505 
Mudarik AI Tanzi! Hafizuddin AI Nasfi 1310 
Anwar AI Tazi! Umen AI Bazavi 1266 
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Mishkat AI Masabih Mohammad Bin Khatib AI Umeri 1336 
 
Theology 
Aquaid AI Nasfi Najmuddin 1433 
Sharh Aquaid Taftazani 1487 
AI Mwaqif Qazi Azad AI Din 1384 
Sharh AI Mawaqif AIi AI Jurjani 1413 
AI Hashia AI Zahidia Mirza Mohammd 1689 
 
Jurisprudence 
AI Husami Hassamuddin 1246 
AI Manar VI Anwar Abu AI Barkat AI Nasfi 1310 
Sharh Noor VI Anwar Mulla Jeven 1717 
AI Tanqih Ma Sharh Tozih Ubaiduddin Masood 1344 
Vsul AI Shashi Nazamuddin AI Shashi 939 
Muslim AI Sbut Muhibbullah AI Baharvi 1776 
 
Law (Fiqh) 
Mukhtasar AI Qadori Mohammad AI Qadori 1036 
AI Bidaia Ma'sharh AI Hidaya Ali AI Marghinani 1196 
Kanzudquaiq Abu AI Barqat AI Nasfi 1310 
AI Wiquaya Mahboob AI Mahboobi 1274 
Munya AI Musalli  
 
Sariduddin 
AI Kashghari 
1274 
Tanveer AI Absar Shamsuddin 1595 
Sharh AI Durrul Mukhtar Alauddin 1677 
Noor Ul Izah Hassan Al Wafai 1658 
Al Siraji Sirajuddin 1264 
 
 
 Dialectics (Usul-E-Jadal) 
AI Sharifia Ma'sharh Rashidah 
RFJRRashidiah 
Muslafa AI Jhonfozi 1672 
Arabic Prose (NasarArbi) - - 
Mqamat AI Badih Badi UI Zaman AI Hamdani 1007 
Maqamat AI Hariri AIi AI Hariri 1122 
AI Nafhatularab Ahmad AI Sharwani 848 
 
Arabic Poetry (Arbi Nazam) 
AI Mualiqat Alsabh Jimarurewaya 772 
AI Hamasah Abu Taam AI Tai 845 
Dewan AI Mutnabi Ahmad Hussain AI Kindi 1452 
 
Logic (Mantiqu) 
AI Shamsia Najmuddin AI Qazvini 1099 
AI Qutbia Qulbuddin AI Razi 1364 
AI Tahzib AI Taftazani 1487 
Sharh Mulla Hassan Mulla Hassan 1784 
Hidaitul Hikmat Asiruddin 1261 
AI Hikmat UJ Baigha - - 
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Astrology (Elmul Haiat) 
AI Mulakhas FiI Haiat Mahmood AI Khwarzami 1245 
Sharh AI Qazi Moosa AI Mahmood AI Rohi 1436 
Tashrih AI Aflak Bhauddin AI Amli 1620 
AI Sharh AI Tasrih Lutfullah AI Muhandi 1732 
 
Arithmetic (Hisab Aur Hindsa) 
Khulasa FiI Hisab Sahauddin AI Ami 1620 
Tahreer Aqlidus Nasiruddin AI Tosi 1273 
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Appendix 6 
 
 
 
Yearly Curriculum of a Madrassa 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 1  
Biography of the Prophet (Seerat), Conjugation-Grammar (Sarf), Syntax 
(Nahv), Arabic Literature, Calligraphy, Chant illation (Tajvid).  
Year 2  
Second Year Conjugation-Grammar (Sarf) , Syntax (Nahv), Arabic Literature, 
Jurisprudence (Fiqa), Logic, Calligraphy (Khush-navisi), Chant illation, 
(Tajvid). 
Year 3  
 Koranic Exegesis, Jurisprudence: (Fiqh), Syntax (Nahv), Arabic Literature, 
Hadith, Logic, Islamic Brotherhood, Chant illation: (Tajvid), External study 
(Tareekh Millat and Khilafat-e-Rashida- these are Indian Islamic movements).  
Year 4  
 Koranic Exegesis, Jurisprudence (Fiqh), Principles of Jurisprudence, Rhetoric, 
Hadith, Logic, History, Chant illation, Modern Sciences (sciences of cities of 
Arabia, Geography of the Arab Peninsula and other Islamic countries).  
Year 5  
Koranic Exegesis, Jurisprudence, Principles of Jurisprudence, Rhetoric, Beliefs 
(Aqa'id), Logic, Arabic Literature, Chant illation, External study (History of 
Indian Kings).  
Year 6  
Interpretation of the Koran, Jurisprudence, Principles of  
Interpretation & Jurisprudence, Arabic Literature, Philosophy, Chant illation, 
Study of Prophet's traditions.  
Year 7  
Sayings of the Prophet, Jurisprudence, Belief (Aqa'ed), Responsibility (Fra'iz), 
Chant illation, External Study (Urdu texts).  
Year 8  Ten books by various authors focusing on the sayings of the Prophet. 
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